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ABSTRACT
This study analyses a number of Hannah Arendt’s books and essays written over four 
decades and suggests that a common thread can be detected that links together the 
different stages of her thought. The need to do this follows from having to treat with 
caution Arendt’s own judgement that in the mid-1930s her thinking changed when she 
became political. In relation to writings she produced throughout her life, what can be 
seen is that she was actually preoccupied by one and the same question, namely, what 
it means to be with other people, she just looked for answers in different places and 
used different methods. The study shows how in her dissertation on Saint Augustine’s 
treatment of love and such early published pieces as  ‘The Enlightenment and the 
Jewish Question’ and her commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies, Arendt was already 
challenging Heidegger’s ontology, in Being and Time, of ‘being-with-one-another’. 
Her thinking at this time was purely empirical though, dependent upon interpretations 
of history alone. Her later work,  The Origins of Totalitarianism  and  The Human 
Condition, for instance, reveal that Arendt’s political conversion amounted to the 
realisation that ontology and history are as necessary to each other as Kant’s concepts 
and intuitions. Her defence of plurality therefore, represented both a reaction to the 
evils of totalitarianism on the grounds that it is an anti-political form of government, 
and a revised challenge to Heidegger’s assessment of das Man on his own terms. In 
addition though, Arendt’s depiction of public space and public discourse, suggested 
that choosing to be with others politically, is an antidote to the solitude of the 
individual engendered by mass society.     Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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INTRODUCTION
Existenz itself is never essentially isolated; it exists only in 
communication and in the knowledge of the Existenz of others. 
One’s fellow men are not (as in Heidegger) an element, which 
though structurally necessary, nevertheless destroys Existenz; 
but,   on   the   contrary,   Existenz   can   develop   only   in   the 
togetherness of men in the common given world. In the concept 
of   communication   there   lies   embedded,   though   not   fully 
developed, a new concept of humanity as the condition for 
man’s Existenz.
Hannah Arendt
1
In an interview with Günter Gaus broadcast on West German television in late 1964 
Hannah Arendt candidly observed that as a young Berliner during the early nineteen 
thirties she was not at all involved in politics.
2 While she had been an avid reader of 
the German press and had certainly formulated some opinions of her own (she was 
sure, for instance, that the Nazis would eventually gain power) she had not been a 
member of a political party nor had she felt inclined towards joining one. It was only 
in 1933 with the burning of the Reichstag that she realised she needed to become 
politically active; she no longer wanted to ‘simply be a bystander’.
3 Aged twenty-six, 
she lost her political innocence to the Zionist Organisation for whom she readily 
agreed ‘to put together a collection of all anti-Semitic statements made in ordinary 
circumstances’ – in ‘professional clubs’, for example, and in ‘all kinds of professional 
journals’.
4 As a result of her research Arendt was found out though, arrested, and 
interrogated for just over a week. She was fortunate: her Nazi interrogator was ‘a 
charming fellow’ who, she said, strove to do what he could to get her released.
5 
1  Hannah Arendt, ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’, in Partisan Review 1, 13 (1946): 55–56.
2 Hannah Arendt, ‘“What Remains? The Language Remains”: A Conversation with Günter Gaus’, in    Essays in 
Understanding 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, edited by Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1994), 1–23. Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated EiU.
3 Ibid., 5.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 6.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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One might draw from this the conclusion that 1933 was something of a watershed in 
Hannah Arendt’s life and in the sense that her new found political awareness and 
political commitment set her on a course that would lead her to make an exemplary 
contribution to political philosophy up until the mid-1970s it was, indeed, a point of 
departure. Yet in another sense Arendt’s political awakening in the nineteen thirties 
did not deflect her from pursuing questions that had already been troubling her for 
several years, questions about who we are, what our place in the world amounts to 
and what we can and cannot do. These were questions about ‘Existenz’, questions 
about our fundamental being in the world which, as a student of Martin Heidegger in 
the mid-nineteen twenties it would have been quite natural for her to pose. In his 
seminal work Being and Time, Heidegger had not only made it clear ‘that we should 
raise anew the question of the meaning of Being’, of Sein, but he had gone on to state 
‘that the “subject character” of one’s own Dasein and that of Others is to be defined 
existentially – that is, in terms of certain ways in which one may be’.
6  In her essay 
entitled ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’ published in 1946 Hannah Arendt would 
translate ‘Existenz’ as a word indicating ‘the being of man’
7 and post-1933, questions 
concerning ‘the being of man’ continued to preoccupy her. What, it seems to me, had 
changed though, was where she believed she now needed to look in order to try and 
find answers. Her attention fixed on politics and on the public realm.
In the late 1920s, while researching her doctoral thesis, Arendt had looked to Saint 
Augustine for illumination about Existenz.
8 Under the supervision of Karl Jaspers at 
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1962), 161. Hereafter abbreviated BT. The initial quote is from page 1. The quoted words that follow 
are from page 163. 
7 Arendt, ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’, 34.
8 Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine,  edited by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, & Judith Chelius Stark 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996). Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated LSA.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Heidelberg University she had reflected on Augustine’s writings on love and how he 
had, she believed, succeeded in making ‘the neighbour’ a meaningful and a significant 
other  deserving of brotherly love despite the material world and all its contents being 
of limited value within the orbit of a truly Christian life. We know that Hannah Arendt 
had been in love with Heidegger while she was his student at Marburg and had moved 
to Heidelberg to complete her research in order, literally, to put distance between 
herself and her former teacher when their relationship broke down.
9 However, their 
geographical separation in the late nineteen twenties was also matched by the 
beginnings of an intellectual fissure, I think, which only grew with the passing of time 
and in particular with Heidegger’s post-war refusal to acknowledge the significance 
of the Shoah. Arendt’s early differences with him did not reflect, I would argue, 
purely the reaction of a woman scorned in love. Augustine illuminated for her a 
possible way of responding to the question about what it means to be with others, or 
as Heidegger labelled it, ‘Being-with-one-another’ that he, Heidegger, had simply 
been unable to provide to her satisfaction.
10 Indeed, Arendt would return to her 
doctoral dissertation in later life with a view to clarifying and reworking some of her 
earlier ideas, and such was the weight of Augustine’s message in her view that even in 
her final work, The Life of the Mind, which she was writing at the time of her death in 
1975, Augustine was still very much a source of inspiration.
11  
In addition to probing Augustine for illumination about fundamental questions 
concerning human existence, Arendt, in the years immediately following the 
completion of her doctoral research in 1929, grappled with two existential questions 
9 See Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
10 BT, 163.
11 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, edited by Mary McCarthy (London: Secker & Warburg, 1978).Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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that lead her to draw on the ideas of other thinkers as well. These questions might be 
summed up as follows: ‘What does it mean to be a Jew?’ and ‘What does it mean to 
be with others in a world without God?’. In, for example, her essay entitled ‘The 
Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ published in 1932 she addressed the first of 
these questions and was greatly inspired by the ideas of both Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing and Johann Gottfried Herder, while in the only work she ever co-authored, 
her commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies (1930), written with her first husband, 
Günther Stern, it was to one of Germany’s most celebrated poets that she turned.
12 In 
each case Arendt can be seen as, again, looking for clarification about man’s 
relationship to the world around him and about God and about how men relate to each 
other. Even when she focused on the so-called ‘Jewish question’ contributing in the 
process to an ongoing German-Jewish dialogue that had started with the 
Enlightenment, she addressed far more than an issue purely about the integration of 
the Jews into German society. What she had to say applied much more broadly to the 
manner in which groups of any type, be they national, class-based or religious see 
themselves and communicate. Man’s experience within the world in the very broadest 
of terms always remained central to the investigations she undertook throughout her 
life.
‘The Enlightenment’ paper and a number of what have been collected together as her 
Jewish writings, many of which were written in the nineteen thirties and nineteen 
forties, are also valuable because they provide clues about what “Jewishness” meant 
12 Hannah Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ in Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings, edited 
by Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 3-18. Hereafter, this book will be 
abbreviated TJW. Arendt and Stern, RLC, 22-23.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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to Hannah Arendt as an individual.
13 Her stance was very different, for example, to 
many of her Jewish contemporaries or near contemporaries, thinkers like Franz 
Rosenzweig, Martin Buber and Gershon Scholem. A proud Jew, Arendt was 
nevertheless, in no sense committed to breathing new life into Judaism as were, say, 
Rosenzweig and Buber. In fact, her criticisms of the way the Eichmann trial was 
conducted, for instance, got her into hot water with many Jews, including Scholem, 
and lost her a number of personal friends prompting the view that she was, perhaps, 
even a “self-hater”. If anything though, her example demonstrated the nonsense of 
trying to apply the label ‘Jewish thinker’ to an individual like her. 
It was what the Shoah exposed as a crime against all mankind albeit one perpetrated 
upon the Jews specifically, a crime furthermore, to which Arendt was herself witness, 
that marked the real turning point in her life, one bearing far more significance, I 
think, than anything she had previously experienced. If her dissertation on Augustine 
had revealed an emerging critical distance between her and Heidegger, the increasing 
detachment of the student from the teacher indicating her growing self-reliance, it was 
the Shoah and in particular Heidegger’s response to it in the decades following the 
Second World War that continued to widen the gap between them. For Arendt, the 
Shoah and the emergence of, what she labelled, ‘totalitarian government’ marked a 
breaking point not in the continuous flow of history as such, which as she noted in the 
preface to her collection of essays entitled Between Past and Future would be an 
impossibility, but in terms of the way we could surely no longer avoid thinking about 
ourselves now in the aftermath of the wickedness that had been unleashed.
14 Even 
13 Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings, edited by Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken 
Books, 2007). Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated TJW.
14 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951). Hereafter, this 
book will be abbreviated OT.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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with the defeat of National Socialism and the demise of Stalinism Arendt contended, 
‘the problem of evil will be the fundamental question of postwar [sic] intellectual life 
in Europe – as death became the fundamental problem after the last war’.
15 There was 
no going back; it would be impossible now to return the (evil) genie to the bottle. 
If Heidegger’s starting point in Being and Time had been to revive a sense of 
‘perplexity at our inability to understand the expression “Being”’,
16 Hannah Arendt 
came to view her own task in the years following the Second World War as more and 
more that of making the incomprehensibility of what had occurred in Europe 
intelligible. She attempted to do this by continuing to clarify the possibilities in regard 
to being with others – but now in distinctly political terms. Totalitarian regimes had 
demonstrated with chilling effect how individuals could be stripped of their humanity 
to such a degree that they could be made to exist in proximity to one another in what 
amounted to a condition of utter non-plurality. The concentration and death camps and 
the Gulags, reduced each of their victims to a Muselmann and in so doing 
totalitarianism had disclosed itself as the very apotheosis of the anti-political. Such 
was the depravity of what had taken place in the camps and the Gulags that the 
actions of those who had perpetrated their beastly deeds in these terrible places 
seemed to defy all attempts to explain and to judge them in conventional moral and 
political terms. Something of an intellectual hiatus had thus been created. 
Totalitarianism represented, as far as she was concerned, a completely new form of 
government based upon destruction and sheer terror. Its like, she contended, had never 
before been witnessed in human history.  
15 Hannah Arendt, ‘Nightmare and Flight’ in  EiU, 134. Hannah  Arendt,  Between Past and Future: Eight 
Exercises in Political Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2006). Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated 
BPF.
16 Heidegger, BT, 1.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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The break in history that the appearance of totalitarianism signalled demanded, she 
believed, that we reconsider our conceptual frameworks, reorient our thinking (pace 
Kant) and re-plot those reference points according to which we exercise judgement in 
order to make sense of the world and conduct our affairs in it.
17 The emergence out of 
totalitarian movements of totalitarian regimes had prised past and future apart as it 
were (and here, I think, echos of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of historical rupture 
can be discerned in Arendt’s work) exposing a gap, which she argued, obliged us to 
think afresh about our actions and about the possibilities that exist in respect of how 
we might be with one another.
18 There were, she thought, ‘few guides left through the 
labyrinth of inarticulate facts if opinions are discarded and tradition is no longer 
accepted as unquestionable’.
19 To ask about being in this fashion had though, shades 
of Heidegger about it – albeit, of course, with an Arendtian twist. It was not to ask 
about Being with a capital ‘B’ but rather about the world in which human beings live 
together. It was certainly not about the articulation of eternal and necessary Platonic 
truths that are the product of silent and solitary contemplation. It concerned rather, 
men’s judgements about events as they materialised out of the dynamic contexts of 
the communities they shared. In other words, to ask about being on Arendt’s terms 
was to engage in public political discourse with others. This was to bring to the fore 
communication in place of Heideggerian interrogation. If ‘the Heideggerian asker lays 
himself open to that which is being questioned and becomes the vulnerable locus, the 
permeable space of its disclosure’, for Arendt, to jump ahead of ourselves just a little, 
17 See Immanuel Kant, ‘What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ in Religion and Rational Theology 
(hereafter RRT), translated & edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 7–18.
18 See, for example, Arendt,  BPF. See also,  Walter  Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in 
Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt and translated by Harry Zohn (Bungay, Suffolk: Fontana/Collins, 1973).
19 Arendt, OT, 9.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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it was public space that would become the all important site of for such 
achievement.
20  Her focus would not be, as it was in Heidegger’s project, Dasein’s 
burden ‘to guard the truth of Being’. Man’s role, as far as she was concerned, was not 
to serve merely as Being’s ‘shepherd’.
21 Ultimately, she would argue, ‘[...] the world 
is the primary thing’, not Being, not even ‘man, neither man’s life nor his self’.
22 It 
was the world captured in the plurality of men’s disinterested judgements, themselves 
subject to innumerable alterations throughout human history, that was of paramount 
importance. 
Nevertheless, as Heidegger noted, ‘Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has 
that which is asked about’.
23 And, like Heidegger what Arendt asked about concerned 
something fundamentally ontological though somewhat less mysterious than Being.
24 
Indeed, her inquiries would eventually, post-1945 to be more precise, result in what 
amounted to an ontological as much as a political, or even empirical/historical 
response to Being and Time. In 1958, for example, she published The Human 
Condition, a pioneering piece of work, in which she discussed the formal structures 
that make possible different types of human action.
25 Prior to this analysis, though still 
post-war, her inquiries focused on specific ‘entities’ in the world, and in this she too 
mimicked Heidegger who had described such a task as being part of ‘The Formal 
Structure of the Question of Being’.
26 Here, for instance, she considered precisely the 
nature, complexity and the “origins” of what she identified as that completely new 
20 George Steiner, Heidegger (Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1978), 57.
21 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Basic Writings: from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of 
Thinking (1964) (hereafter abbreviated BW), edited by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
1978), 210. 
22 Arendt, BPF, 222.
23 Heidegger, BT, 24. Emphasis in original.
24 Ibid., 34.
25 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
26 Heidegger, BT, 24 – 28.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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political phenomenon called totalitarianism, which all importantly, she believed, 
embodied a crime against the basic structure of Being itself as demonstrated by the 
egregious treatment of millions of human beings whose fate it was to come under its 
dominion.     
In posing her questions Hannah Arendt was, of course, disclosing something 
extremely important about herself and about us too as questioners. In the first place, 
and here she was very much in agreement with Heidegger, she demonstrated that 
whenever we try to understand the world in which we live, whenever we orient 
ourselves in that world, our inescapable relationship to the question of the meaning of 
being is revealed. In other words, our asking about the meaning of being ‘is 
coextensive with our [human] existence’.
27 More than this, however, Arendt 
confirmed that thinking about the world, trying to make it intelligible to ourselves, is 
actually constitutive of who we are as human beings. Human nature is not, as it was 
for Hobbes or for Locke or for Rousseau, for instance, something fixed and separate 
from whatever we might think about ourselves. Thinking about who we are and what, 
in actuality, we are are the same. What does this imply? It implies, I think, that, 
notwithstanding the fundamental ontology that conditions human existence, we are 
able to alter the way in which we live. We are not slaves to, or at the mercy of, laws 
of human nature from which we are unable to extricate ourselves. We can change. To 
this extent Arendt was still in agreement with Heidegger. However, the critical 
differences between them lay not very far below the surface.
27 Jonathan Rée, Heidegger (London: Phoenix, 1998), 8.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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The position Hannah Arendt adopted throughout her life reflected a degree of 
optimism, particularly in the wake of Europe’s descent into the darkness of the 
Second World War, that was not always matched in the writings or the feelings, for 
that matter, of her contemporaries.  Here, for example, we might cite the more 
negative and pessimistic outlooks of the Frankfurt School thinkers Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer. While Arendt settled down quite happily to a life of research 
and writing in the United States of America, Adorno’s melancholy over being in 
America was, in contrast, clearly captured in his observation that ‘at no moment 
during my emigration did I relinquish the hope of coming back’.
28 Arendt’s optimism 
is, I believe, discernible and becomes intelligible in the critical distance that can be 
identified between her and Heidegger both in regard to the ‘interrogation of entities’ 
within human history and at the level of fundamental ontology.  
With regard to history, Heidegger had indicated in his lectures on Parmenides during 
the war and in his seminal post-war ‘Letter on Humanism’ first published in France in 
1947, that there exist moments when events occur that make an imprint on humanity 
lasting for generations, for hundreds perhaps even thousands of years. He identified 
three such epoch-shaping moments in the ‘deep history’, Geschichte, of Western 
thinking to date.
29 The first was when the Romans appropriated ancient Greek 
language and ideas substituting for an earlier pre-reflective experience of Being as 
‘unconcealment’,
30 a robust and controlling Latin orientation towards reality. The 
28 Theodor Adorno cited in Patke, Rajeev, ‘Walter Benjamin: the Intellectual in a Straw Hat’, a paper presented 
at a Workshop on the ‘Role of Intellectuals in the Twentieth Century’, 18 August 1998, University of Haifa, Israel. 
(6th  ISSEI   Conference)  Source:   http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/ellpatke/Benjamin/benjamin_intellectual.htm  
(Accessed 3 March 2010).
29 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, translated by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998).  For a discussion of ‘deep history’ in Heidegger’s work see Timothy Clark,  Martin 
Heidegger (Oxon: Routledge, 2002).
30 See, for example, Martin Heidegger’s discussion of alētheia in, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking’ in Basic Writings: from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), edited by David Farrell 
Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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second shift occurred with the coming of Christianity and the third, when ‘Ratio and 
reason’, traceable to ‘the Roman re-interpretation of the Greek experience’ that 
‘contribut[ed] to the forgetting of Being [became] dominating concepts’ employed by 
seventeenth century philosophers like Leibniz.
31 What accounted, at least in part, for 
the widening of the intellectual gulf between Arendt and Heidegger was, I think, the 
fact that his judgements concerning the reverberations of deep historical events made 
no concession to the gravity and impact of the Shoah. Indeed, Heidegger gave no 
indication at all that he too believed that the unprecedented suffering of the victims of 
totalitarianism represented something new in Western history, something never before 
witnessed. He gave no indication that he thought the abomination of the Shoah, ‘the 
great insanity of the third Germany’ as Primo Levi described it, was, like Being, 
beyond our conventional, our traditional methods of understanding.
32 So, when he 
referred to the gas chambers and to the extermination camps (which was exceptionally 
rarely) he appears not to have considered it to be understating matters to have 
discussed them in the same terms as the mechanisation by which modern agriculture 
had been transformed into a ‘food-industry’, for example.
33 
For Arendt, on the other hand, the emergence of totalitarian government marked, as 
already noted above, a point of no return with respect to the way in which we try to 
address the question of the meaning of being; it represented nothing less than the 
rupturing of tradition, ‘perhaps the most profound crisis in Western history since the 
downfall of the Roman Empire’.
34 Arendt not only regarded the suffering of the 
31 Heidegger, Parmenides, 69.
32 ‘The great insanity’ is Primo  Levi’s expression. See his,  If This is a Man,  translated by Stuart Woolf 
(Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979). For a discussion of the limitations discussing the Shoah presents see Robert 
Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
33 Martin Heidegger cited in Thomas Sheehan, ‘Heidegger and the Nazis’ in The New York Review of Books, 
XXXV, 10 (16 June, 1988): 42.
34 Arendt, OT, 9.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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victims of totalitarianism as indeed something unprecedented in its brutality but she 
also, controversially, traced the routes by which totalitarian regimes had emerged to ‘a 
subterranean stream of European history’.
35 The impression on the Western psyche 
thus made by totalitarianism, for her, appears to have thrown into question the whole 
Heideggerian framework of Geschichte. Her writing suggests that there was now 
surely an undeniable case to be made for revising this framework in order to 
acknowledge the magnitude of the totalitarian phenomenon and to include what 
amounted to the profoundly disturbing ‘idea of a change in what it is to be’ that 
totalitarianism represented. After all, in Arendt’s estimation, this new departure was 
certain to preoccupy the European intellect for generations to come.
36
Perhaps of even greater significance than Arendt’s judgements, contra Heidegger, on 
the subject of totalitarianism was, however, the critical distance that opened up 
between them in respect of the “positive” possibilities, as it were, of being-with-
others. Their differences in this respect effectively account for the very different 
directions in which their respective philosophies gravitated. They reflect their 
attitudes toward both the ancient Greek polis and mass society, for example, and they 
disclose too, why Arendt became a champion of politics and a defender of public 
discourse. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger had opened his ‘Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory 
Analysis of Dasein’, with the observation that ‘We are ourselves the entities to be 
35 Ibid., 15.
36 See Robert Eaglestone, ‘The “Subterranean Stream of Western History”: Arendt and Levinas after Heidegger’ 
in Richard King and Dan Stone (eds.), Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and 
Genocide (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 208.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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analysed’.
37 At least part of what this implied involved Heidegger providing an 
environmental account, as it were, of the qualitatively distinct “locales” that Dasein 
can be found occupying as a ‘being-in-the-world’. In other words, Heidegger wanted 
to consider the ‘spatiality’ of Dasein, the type of settings that it continuously finds 
itself in depending upon the sort of activities in which it is engaged or the type of 
amenities it is seeking employ. Indeed, as he stated in Being and Time, ‘Dasein’s own 
spatiality is essential to its basic state of Being-in-the-world’.
38 So, for example, he 
noted that ‘What we encounter as closest to us [...] is the room; and we encounter it 
not as something “between four walls” in a geometrical spatial sense, but as 
equipment for residing’.
39 The thrust of Hannah Arendt’s Heideggerian critique of 
Heidegger seems, to me, to have been this: notwithstanding the philosopher’s 
objective to provide a rich analysis of qualitatively differentiated “places” that Dasein 
could be observed occupying he had, nevertheless, neglected to identify what was 
surely the unquestionable import of public space as an ontologically fundamental 
human locale. In this regard his eulogizing the ancient Greeks, for example, for 
holding the key to the recovery of Being was myopic and unimaginative, because 
according to Arendt’s political philosophy, he had simply failed to identify the full 
significance of what in meant to live in a polis.
Indeed, Heidegger warned against the corrupting influence of public life. In his post-
war ‘Letter on Humanism’, for instance, he implied that ‘the seductions of the public 
realm’ be as much resisted as ‘the impotence of the private’.
40 This echoed his earlier 
condemnation of ‘publicness’ in Being and Time where he denounced it for obscuring 
37 Heidegger, BT, 67.
38 Ibid., 148.
39 Ibid., 98. Emphasis added.
40 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, 199.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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everything.
41 What was the essence of Heidegger’s critique of ‘publicness’? The 
answer to this question is that he recognised the public realm to be home to das Man, 
‘the “they”’. And das Man, he believed, ‘prescribes’ everything from the way ‘we 
take pleasure and enjoy ourselves’ to the way we ‘judge [...] literature and art’ or even 
react with shock to something.
42 The picture of Das Man depicted by Heidegger is one 
of ‘averageness, and levelling down’. ‘Publicness [...] controls every way in which the 
world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right’ not because it is intrinsically 
astute but rather, for the very opposite reason: ‘because it is insensitive to every 
difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the “heart of the 
matter”’.
43 In other words, Heidegger’s judgement about ‘publicness’ seems to have 
been that it entailed one’s individual experience itself being put at stake. Loss of 
experience was a theme taken up by many thinkers before Heidegger and it is an issue 
which has certainly preoccupied thinkers since.
44 
Loss of experience was something that worried Hannah Arendt too. However, one 
extended extract from The Human Condition suffices to make the point that, in 
contrast to Heidegger, she thought very differently indeed on the matter of public life: 
To live an entirely private life means above all to 
be deprived of things essential to a truly human 
life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from 
being seen and heard by others, to be deprived of 
an “objective” relationship with them that comes 
from being related to and separated from them 
through the intermediary of a common world of 
things, to be deprived of the possibility of 
achieving something more permanent than life 
itself.
45
41 Heidegger, BT, 165.
42 Ibid., 164.
43 Ibid., 165.
44 See, for example, Giorgio Agamben, ‘Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of Experience’, in 
Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience (London: Verso, 2007).
45 Arendt, HC, 58.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Compunction is as much at work here as moral indignation is in Heidegger’s 
observations on das Man. It is morally wrong, Arendt implies, inhuman no less, to 
live just a quiet private existence – though this is not to suggest this was Heidegger’s 
position; it is life affirming to engage with others, to be seen in public. However, the 
overriding message of her post-war writings was, of course, an ontologically 
guaranteed political one, albeit a message conveyed by a messenger who trawled 
through the historical debris of a ruined tradition (again, echos of Walter Benjamin 
can be heard) only to salvage from it what could be used to reconstitute a lost 
understanding of politics. This she did by drawing sharp distinctions between what 
was, in a sense to be defined, authentically political as against other types of activity. 
Ultimately, for Arendt unlike Heidegger, public life was actually the seat of human 
experience. She looked to the ancient Greeks for illumination just as much as he did 
but, where she differed from him was in noticing something he had failed to see: the 
possibility of leading a public life that was not distinguishable  by virtue of being 
‘average’ but was rather, a life promising richness of experience and the possibility of 
genuine understanding. 
The reorientation of our thinking that Hannah Arendt’s mature political writings 
attempted to achieve was not though, purely a reaction to the European phenomenon 
of totalitarianism that spread across that continent during the nineteen thirties and 
throughout the nineteen forties ending only in the early nineteen fifties, according to 
her, with the death of Stalin. A citizen of the United States of America, to which she 
had fled from occupied France in 1941, Arendt, like Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse 
and many other émigrés, experienced the repulsiveness of mass society and the Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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dominance of public opinion at first hand. Indeed, entering the fray over Little Rock 
in the early 1960s, Arendt was again witness to the iniquities of human behaviour 
which, a lot of the time, lay only just below the surface of social decorum. She 
believed that mass society recreated the sort of conditions that had grown out of 
totalitarian movements to become one of the defining features of Nazi Germany and 
Stalinist Russia. Mass society effectively produced human beings who could, at one 
and the same time, be with one another but not in any sense as a plurality. The 
loneliness of men and women in modern Western democracies seemed to mimic the 
desperate isolation concentration camp inmates were made to endure. Arendt was 
conscious, for example, of Riesman’s important study, The Lonely Crowd, which she 
referred to in footnote in The Human Condition.
46 And, like those humiliated 
individuals she described in The Origins of Totalitarianism, whose unquestioning 
loyalty to the Leader and to the Leader’s every pronouncement was voiced afresh 
each time they were fortunate enough to avoid being victims of his sweeping purges, 
so ‘society’, Arendt wrote, ‘always demands that its members act as though they were 
members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest’.
47 It is 
testament to her optimism though, and this brings me back to a point already made 
above, that Arendt believed things could be different, that, as in the polis, it was 
possible for men to leave behind what Heidegger described as their ‘averageness’ and 
their ‘everydayness’, to be with their fellows in public in precisely conditions of 
freedom, equality and plurality.
48 
46 David Riesman, with Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denny, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American 
Character, abridged and revised edition (London: Yale University Press, 2001). For Arendt’s citation see HC, 59.
47 Arendt, HC, 39.
48 Heidegger, BT, 149 and 169.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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In contrast to Arendt, who recovered from ancient Greek experience a model of being 
with one’s fellow men that might serve to counter the excesses of isolation within 
contemporary mass society, Heidegger’s denouncement of ‘publicness’ seems to have 
been restricted to a vision determined by das Man beyond which he simply could not 
see. Where she recognised the import of Aristotelian civic friendship and the 
possibilities it suggested for articulating the meaning of contemporary experience, he 
could see only the impression of the “they” on every everyday judgement made by 
Dasein, hence, Arendt’s highly critical remarks directed at Heidegger in her 1946 
paper on ‘Existenz Philosophy’ from which the epigraph at the head of this chapter is 
taken. Without public discourse between those occupiers of the political realm, a 
dialogue very different to the ‘idle talk’ Heidegger put into the mouths of those 
comprising das Man, Arendt believed there could, in fact, be no thinking at all.
49 In 
this she demonstrated her agreement with Kant who had pointed out two centuries 
earlier, that thinking, of course, depends upon the presence of others between whom 
thoughts are communicated.
50 So, Existenz cannot exist in isolation. Yet, ‘[t]he most 
essential characteristic of [Heidegger’s] Self’, it seemed to Arendt, ‘is its absolute 
egoism, its radical separation from all its fellows’.
51 Existentially, this was simply not 
defensible, the implication being that the picture of Dasein painted by Heidegger was 
simplistic and flawed.
   
If, in regard to being with others, Heidegger could see no further than the shadows the 
“they” cast across everyday judgements, Arendt traced the critical distance crucial to 
49 Ibid., 212.
50 See Immanuel Kant, ‘What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ in Religion and Rational Theology 
(hereafter RRT), translated & edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 16. Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated RRT.
51 Arendt, ‘What is Existenz Philosophy’, 50.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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making worldly events intelligible to the public space occupied by the ‘spectator’.
52 
Lodged in the gap between past and future it was here in the political realm, she 
thought, that the spectator was free to ask genuine questions marking him out as one 
who rises above what Heidegger labelled mere ‘curiosity’.
53 In one sense there was 
actually an echo in this of Heidegger’s post-war teaching and publications in that at 
the very outset of the ‘Letter on Humanism’ he indicated that it was not action that 
paved the way to Sein but language: ‘Language is the House of Being. In its home 
man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of 
this home’.
54 What the later Arendt argued seemed to acknowledge something 
important in this: it was not, in fact, men of action, revolutionaries for instance, who 
were regarded as being crucial to illuminating the meaning of political events but 
those onlookers who could judge actions from a critical distance. Enactment, 
conditional upon the deed springing out of an unfettered resolve, an unrestrained 
commitment, seemed to be giving way to thought. For Arendt, it was the ‘third party’ 
in whom she came to recognise the key to achieving intelligibility and 
understanding.
55 This spectator (again she was indebted to Kant in this respect), is 
indispensable. It is he, we might describe him as the public intellectual – an exile 
camped on the margins of society – and he alone who, from the critical distance of his 
unique perspective on events, is able to bring clarity of thought to bear upon them 
where the actors themselves are simply too close to what is happening to offer 
anything more than an account of their direct experiences.
56 
52 See Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy edited by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989).
53 Heidegger, BT, 216.
54 Heidegger, BW, 193.
55 ‘The third party’ was an expression Hannah Arendt used in her commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies. See 
Hannah Arendt and Günther Stern, ‘Rilke’s Duino Elegies’ in Reflections on Literature and Culture, edited by 
Susannah Young-ah Gottlieb (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 18. Hereafter, this book will 
be abbreviated RLC.
56 See, for example, Edward W. Said, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures (New York: 
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It was, additionally though, the condition of being released from the worries of 
everydayness, released as far as Hannah Arendt was concerned, from constraining 
preoccupation with administrative issues or matters of health, welfare or sheer 
survival, that essentially freed the spectator to make his or her judgements about the 
political significance of events. In this sense, Arendt only reinforced the critical 
distance between her and Heidegger because she made her case by drawing 
distinctions between private, social and political spheres of activity that he, again, had 
failed to notice. If language, for Heidegger, constituted ‘the house of Being’, it was, 
for Hannah Arendt, only in the political discourse conducted within the public realm 
that understanding could reside. Had she though, in adopting this position simply 
come to expect too much of politics and had she burdened the public intellectual with 
responsibilities which it would be impossible for him, or her, to live up to? 
Heidegger’s examples of Dasein’s relationship to the world of entities with which it is 
in continual daily contact, it must be remembered, were predominantly of a practical 
nature. They involved vehicles like cars or tools such as hammers, for instance. Such 
‘ready-to-hand’ pieces of equipment as Heidegger described them,
57 were the very 
tools we might expect to be employed by Arendt’s labourers and workers about whom 
she wrote in The Human Condition. The point about her public realm was, however, 
its characterisation by, what we might describe as, “being-with-others-without-
equipment” free, that is, of any need to be concerned with matters relating to 
practicality. The political realm was, in essence, a sphere of non-practicality. Herein 
lies a problem: in describing things his way, what Heidegger had demonstrated was 
57 See, for example, Heidegger, BT, 109.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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his remove from what he regarded as the fraudulent Platonic suggestion that pure 
perception is achievable. Plato’s ‘fictive agent of cognition’, as George Steiner has 
described him, was ‘detached from common experience’; Dasein’s immersion in the 
‘quotidian matter and matter-of-factness of the world’, its rootedness in everyday 
practicality represented precisely a rebuttal of the Platonic guarantee.
58 Was Hannah 
Arendt, despite her similar intention to distance herself from Plato, perhaps more 
Platonic than she would like to have admitted?
In some respects the conflict between her and Heidegger turns out to be no real 
conflict at all: he, after all was concerned with fundamental ontology, the 
interrogation of entities, access to and unconcealment of Being; she meanwhile, 
believed she had revealed the ontological structure of the human condition and sought 
thereupon to make human experience in general and the experience of the Shoah and 
totalitarian government in particular intelligible, communicable. Yet, there is I think, a 
question still for Arendt to answer cast into relief as the critical distance between her 
and Heidegger opened up, and it is this: does the seclusion of the Arendtian political 
sphere in which the spectator-judges close their ears, as she implied they should, to 
the daily buzz of the human swarm only demonstrate a degree of dispassionate 
separation from the everyday world that cannot, in fact, yield genuine understanding? 
Was her ‘new concept of humanity’,
59 which was conditional upon a reconstituted and 
coppiced public discourse, in actuality, little more than a phantom?
58 George Steiner, Heidegger (Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1978), 81. Heidegger, BT, 109.
59 See footnote 1 above.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Chapter 1
Experience and Others
Thoughts   without   content   are   empty,  intuitions   without 
concepts are blind.
Immanuel Kant
60
[...] like somebody divinely absent-minded and sunk in his own 
thoughts who, the twelve strokes of midday having just boomed 
into his ears, wakes with a start and wonders ‘What hour 
struck?’, sometimes we, too, afterwards rub our ears and ask, 
astonished, taken aback, ‘What did we actually experience 
then?’ or even, ‘Who are we in fact?’ and afterwards, as I said, 
we count all twelve reverberating strokes of our experience, of 
our life, of our being – oh! and lose count.
Friedrich Nietzsche
61
[...] my assumption is that thought itself arises out of incidents 
of living experience and must remain bound to them as the only 
guideposts by which to take its bearings.
Hannah Arendt
62
Between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s Hannah Arendt prepared her notes for 
three lecture courses each entitled ‘Political Experiences in the Twentieth Century’. 
Her outlines for these courses, which now form part of the archive collections at the 
New School for Social Research and the Library of Congress, much like her 
published writings – journal articles, books, essays and critical reviews – are littered 
with comments, observations and judgements relating to human experience of one 
sort or another.
63 In, for example, the earliest of these, her doctoral dissertation on 
Saint Augustine’s treatment of love (1929), Arendt can typically be found discussing 
the pious believer’s experience of isolation before God or musing upon the Christian’s 
60 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 
1933), A51/B75. Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated CPR. The convention of in-text referencing according to 
the first and second editions of the CPR will be followed. The first edition will be designated ‘A’, the second ‘B’.  
61 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson and translated by Carol 
Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3. Emphases in original.
62 Arendt, BPF, 14.
63 Hannah Arendt’s lecture notes were amongst other materials I viewed during a research trip to the Hannah 
Arendt Centre in the Fogelman Library at New School for Social Research in New York, between 10
 and 16 July, 
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explicit experience of the past as sin.
64 In The Origins of Totalitarianism written a 
little over two decades later and published in 1951, by which time she had become 
more politically focused, she can be found commenting upon the changing fortunes of 
Prussia’s wealthy and educated Jews, who, she suggested, experienced life, at least 
prior to 1807, as ‘exceptions’ to the mass of German Jews inhabiting Prussia’s eastern 
territories.  Ten years further on still, in the ‘Preface’ to her wide ranging collection of 
essays entitled, Between Past and Future published in 1961, Arendt’s attention turned 
to the now ‘weightless irrelevance’ she said that was felt by former members of the 
Résistance who, in post-war Europe, had returned to ‘a private life centred about 
nothing but itself’, by which she meant a life absorbed purely with their own 
‘personal affairs’.
65 These daring individuals, she remarked ‘had lost their treasure’ – 
their erstwhile experience of ‘public happiness’.
66 As Arendt remarked in that same 
preface, thinking itself seems to depend upon ‘incidents of living experience’; it is out 
of experience, she believed, that we derive the reference points from which we learn 
to manage our way in the world.
67 Hence, the peculiarly American complexion of 
‘civil disobedience’, which, she judged, despite having become a universally 
recognised phenomenon could only properly be ‘cope[d] with’ in America itself 
because essentially it was ‘in accordance with the spirit of its [America’s] laws’ 
derivable from ‘the extraordinary experiences of the early colonists’.
68
In and of itself, the emphasis placed upon experience should perhaps not strike us as 
exceptional in a writer considered to be a political philosopher, though Arendt herself 
64 Arendt, LSA.
65 Arendt, BPF, 3
66 Ibid., 4–5.
67 See footnote 62. Emphasis added.
68 Hannah Arendt, ‘Civil Disobedience’ in Crises of the Republic (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), 67. 
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rejected this description of her. Where her analyses begin to have more of a 
provocative edge though, is at those points where she wrote about experience in what 
appears, at least on the face of it, to be computational terms. For example, in one 
respect, she argued that if we consider experience two or three hundred years ago, say, 
in relation to our own times, then it can be seen to have diminished – quite 
significantly, in fact: ‘If we compare the modern world with that of the past’, she 
stated in The Human Condition (1958), ‘the loss of human experience involved in this 
development is extraordinarily striking’.
69 This was more of an arresting claim to have 
made. The expression ‘modern’ had, since around the fifth century, denoted a shift in 
consciousness between epochs and until the French Revolution tended to indicate 
renewed relations to the ancients.
70 Post Enlightenment however, the term began to be 
used to suggest the superiority of all that was contemporary over what had gone 
before. Here, Arendt was talking of modernity in a critical fashion. The modern world 
was somehow falling short in terms of experience, quite noticeably, in fact, compared 
with previous generations. One problem with Arendt’s claim, however, is her 
vagueness in providing us with a detailed chronology of the alleged decline. 
On the other hand, Arendt was under no illusion that the twentieth century had 
exposed men to utterly new and previously unimaginable experiences, of which the 
horrors undergone by victims of the Nazi concentration and death camps and the 
Soviet Gulags can be cited as among the most disturbing examples. Such indeed, was 
the magnitude, the sheer otherness, of the abominations the victims of these descents 
into barbarism had been subjected to that their experiences, she judged, had exploded 
our legal, moral, and philosophical certainties, resisting articulation by way of 
69 Arendt, HC, 321.
70 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’ in New German Critique 22 (1981): 3–14.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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accepted conceptual frameworks and intellectual categories. There were echos in what 
Arendt wrote of the dismay Walter Benjamin felt following the First World War: 
never   has   experience   been   contradicted   more 
thoroughly:   strategic   experience   has   been 
contravened   by   positional   warfare;   economic 
experience, by the inflation; physical experience, by 
hunger; moral experiences, by the ruling powers. A 
generation that had gone to school in horse-drawn 
streetcars   now   stood   in   the   open   air,   amid   a 
landscape in which nothing was the same except the 
clouds   and,   at   its   centre,   in   a   force   field   of 
destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny fragile 
human body.
71
For Hannah Arendt what had changed, I think, as a result of the appearance of 
totalitarianism was our self-certainty about what it means to be and, in particular, what 
it means to be with others, a question that had preoccupied her as far back as her 
doctoral dissertation. Totalitarianism marked a paradigm shift in our experience of 
such matters. 
There is, of course, a problem, an apparent contradiction with all this. If we were to 
interpret Arendt’s remarks literally in terms of the cold calculation they seem to imply, 
using a type of balance sheet for recording human experience on which apparent 
losses could be “offset” against what appear to be apparent gains, then we would 
surely have to ask, do the “gains” she drew attention to outweigh the “losses”, or did 
she think it was vice versa? Put crudely, has there been a net profit or a net loss of 
experience over the generations? To be clear, this would be to inquire whether, 
somewhat insensitively given their egregious nature, the additions to human 
experience represented by the unprecedented displays of wickedness the victims of 
totalitarianism had to suffer could be measured against the losses Arendt believed she 
71 Walter Benjamin, ‘Experience and Poverty’, cited in Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and 
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had identified when contrasting the modern world with the past. We have though, no 
means of actually computing the relative weight of these so called gains in relation to 
the so called losses. Indeed, how could such an unsympathetic and purely clinical 
utilitarian calculation ever be realised on a ledger of human experience? 
Fortunately, we are spared from the necessity of having to engage in such cold-
hearted profit and loss accounting because Arendt was not suggesting gains and losses 
in real terms. Actually, her reflections represent two sides of one and the same coin, 
which concerns the intelligibility of experience. Her point was, I think, that she 
judged experience to have atrophied in the sense that we are at a loss, though we are 
not necessarily conscious of it, as to how to discriminate properly between distinct 
modes of experience. We are no longer cognisant about the nature of what is 
fundamentally human experience. For instance, she came to believe that we had lost 
the ability to distinguish political activity, undeniably crucial to what it means to be 
human, from activities that involved say, labour intensive practical tasks which, vital 
as they might be to the continued survival of human beings on earth are, nonetheless, 
surely undeserving of the public prominence they have come to enjoy. The results of 
our inability to draw this type of distinction, are quite clear, Arendt would argue from 
the late nineteen fifties onwards, if we only stop to think about the way that modern 
politics is now dominated by economic and commercial interests and by practicality, 
by what amounts to the demands of the appetites and the urge purely to survive. 
Politics, she seems to have concluded, associated now with little more than the art of 
the possible, has come to stand for the working out of solutions to administrative, 
economic and social welfare problems. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Being at a loss in regard to how to make distinctions has an additionally disturbing 
consequence, though. Arendt judged that it has struck us mute in the wake of 
totalitarianism, left us noticeably inarticulate about the significance of what the Nazi 
state represented between the mid-1930s and 1945 and likewise the Stalinist state 
represented to no lesser degree between 1930 and 1953. We are even left with self 
doubt about the reality of the crimes that were committed. Nazism and Stalinism, she 
judged, were the two most prominent examples of a previously unseen type of terror-
based government the logic of which par excellence was the utter liquidation of 
action. In other words, what totalitarianism represented was the complete antithesis of 
all that the concept ‘political’ stands for. Yet, how do we articulate this? Could even 
those who came through the horrors be certain about what they had suffered? She 
observed:
There are numerous reports by survivors. The more 
authentic   they   are,   the   less   they   attempt   to 
communicate things that evade human understanding 
and human experience – sufferings, that is, that 
transform men into “uncomplaining animals”. None 
of these reports inspires those passions of outrage 
and sympathy through which men have always been 
mobilised   for   justice.   On   the   contrary,   anyone 
speaking or writing about concentration camps is 
still regarded as suspect; and if the speaker has 
resolutely returned to the world of the living, he 
himself is often assailed by doubts with regard to his 
own  truthfulness,   as   though  he  had  mistaken a 
nightmare for reality.
72 
For Arendt though, it was precisely her own first-hand experience of having witnessed 
government of this anti-political nature that led her, in the years following the Second 
World War, to reflect on what had taken place. In the aftermath of the destruction she 
asked, what is it that politics actually requires and what does it mean for people to live 
with one another as a political community?
72 Arendt, OT, 439.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Still we are left with questions: what exactly does our loss of experience amount to? 
To what did Arendt attribute our impoverishment? And, how, if at all, can experience 
be recovered? These questions might be summarised by asking whether the crisis is 
something we can understand in historical terms, something over which we have 
some control suggesting a possible solution if only our present circumstances could 
be altered, or whether our loss of experience amounts rather to something 
transhistorical as it were, an ontologically fundamental ‘absence’ not a real historical 
loss at all.
73 Arendt, as I will show, thought it was both: a fundamental absence that 
could, nevertheless, be put right. There were echoes of Rilke, of course, in the 
problem she was articulating: ‘Each torpid turn of the world has such disinherited 
children [...]’. There were reverberations too, of Hofmannsthal’s letter to Lord 
Chandos: ‘In short my condition is this: I have quite lost the faculty to think or speak 
on any subject in a coherent fashion’.
74 And, the connection with Walter Benjamin 
already intimated, I am thinking here of his essays on experience as well as his 
discussions of colour and the loss of the purity of language, for example, is 
undeniably crucial.
75 What grounds though, did Arendt have for thinking that human 
experience had become unintelligible, that we have developed blind spots in this 
regard, as it were? Certainly she was not alone in expressing her anxiety. It was 
shared by a significant number of other, mainly German-speaking thinkers and writers 
ranging from Martin Buber to Walter Benjamin, Robert Musil and Theodor Adorno, 
73 See Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001).
74 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, translated by J. B. Leishman & Stephen Spender (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 4
th Edition, 1963), 7
th Elegy. Hugo von Hofmannsthal,    The Lord Chandos Letter, translated by Michael 
Hofmann (London: Syrens, 1995), 9. See also, Erich Heller, The Disinherited Mind: Essays in Modern German 
Literature and Thought (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975).
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but including as well the British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott, for instance, 
and the American pragmatist John Dewey, to cite but a few twentieth-century 
examples of those who were perturbed by what they saw, too, as deplorable 
circumstances. Today, Giorgio Agamben, one of Benjamin’s most sympathetic 
interpreters, has articulated similar concerns afresh. His ‘Infancy and History’, for 
example, is subtitled, ‘An Essay on the Destruction of Experience’.
76 
Walter Benjamin, who Arendt and her first husband, Günther Stern, knew as a fellow 
émigré in Paris from 1933 to early 1940, discussed the deterioration of experience 
from his earliest writings on colour and on language and he went on to develop his 
ideas in both historical and political respects, formulating a critique of the concept of 
progress, for example, which became part of his broader philosophy of history.
77 From 
his very earliest writings it was evident that there was an intense messianic and 
redemptive aspect to Benjamin’s discussion, though as his thinking developed a 
tension grew between this early position and his later attraction to historical 
materialism, a tension that he was never quite able to resolve. What is clear though, is 
that for Benjamin the loss of experience amounted to the loss of something spiritual, 
something innocent, pure, and prelapsarian, something that could only, it seemed, now 
be glimpsed through astrological and graphological ciphers, for instance. In his early 
work, the nature of the experience he had identified, he thought, was still observable 
in children:
76 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of Experience’  in  Infancy and 
History: On the Destruction of Experience (London: Verso, 2007).
77 Arendt and Stern had already met Benjamin in Berlin but had not known him well. In Paris they would 
attend his discussion circles. The last time they were in each other’s company was in 1940 in Marseilles where 
Benji, as Arendt fondly referred to him, entrusted them with a number of manuscripts including his ‘Theses on the 
Philosophy of History’ which he asked them to take to the Institute for Social Research in New York. See Elizabeth 
Young-Bruehl,  Hannah Arendt. Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ is collected in, 
Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn (Bungay, Suffolk: Fontana/Collins), 1973: 255– 
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children   see   with   pure   eyes,   without   allowing 
themselves to be  emotionally disconcerted, it is 
something spiritual: the rainbow refers not to a 
chaste abstraction but to a life in art. The order of art 
is paradisiacal because there is no thought of the 
dissolution of boundaries – from excitement – in the 
object of experience. Instead the world is full of 
colour in a state of identity, innocence and harmony. 
Children are not ashamed, since they do not reflect 
but only see.
78 
Benjamin would go on to present his arguments about experience in a variety of 
registers, linguistic, for instance, historical and aesthetic. I will have recourse to return 
to them at various points if only as a foil to clarify Hannah Arendt’s own position, 
which I would contend, though clearly indebted to Benjamin in many respects was at 
the same time quite distinct. 
An example of where Benjamin and Arendt agreed was in distancing their more 
positive observations about the nature of experience from the model of the natural 
sciences. For each of them, experience was not something to be explained by 
establishing temporal causal relationships but rather it pointed to something 
communicable as a result of the illumination across time of similarities. Benjamin 
referred, for example, recalling Baudelaire’s search for correspondences, to 
‘inconceivable analogies and connections between events’.
79 Arendt meanwhile, in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism would identify not causes and effects so much as 
‘elements that later crystallized in the novel totalitarian phenomenon’.
80  Furthermore, 
both she and Benjamin detected in the decay of experience something savage and 
dangerous, for her indeed, something banally evil, an oxymoron employed to suggest 
that at the level of culture and society something was gravely amiss. Yet, unlike 
78 Benjamin, ‘A Child’s View of Color’, 51.
79 Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism’ in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 211.
80 Arendt, OT, xv. Emphasis added.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Theodor Adorno who was also persuaded by Benjamin’s anxieties about experience 
and perturbed too by what he labelled the industrialisation of culture, Arendt was 
never tempted to frame her arguments in messianic terms.
81 There was no redemptive 
aspect to her discussion of genuine experience as there was at the conclusion of 
Minima Moralia, for example, where Adorno ended with a plea to see the world ‘from 
the standpoint of redemption’.
82 Arendt, in contrast, was neither attracted by the 
promise of a return to a time of innocence or absolute experience, nor was she 
persuaded by the intimation of harmonious reconciliation in an Arcadian future, the 
revival of an ‘integrated totality of experience denied by the modern world’.
83 Instead 
of the radical solutions typical of Benjamin’s later writings, the ‘apocalypse that 
would bring about the redemption of culture, liberating language from platitude and 
instrumentalization’, Arendt would gesture instead towards a more modest politics 
characterised by something approaching the relative gentility of Aristotelian civic 
friendship and public happiness.
84
The apparent modesty of Arendt’s stance, the proposal to do no more than ‘to think’, 
above all, ‘what we are doing’, set her apart not only from Benjamin but from the 
radical sensitivities displayed by a variety of Jewish messianic thinkers during the 
period from the fin de siècle to the 1930s.
85 Amongst these thinkers were, for instance, 
Gustav Landauer, Ernst Bloch, Franz Rosenzweig and Georg Lukács whose positions 
were formulated by the fusion, the ‘elective affinity’, between romantic utopian ideals 
81  See, for example, Theodor W Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, edited by M. 
J. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 2001).
82 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia:Reflections from Damaged Life, translated by E.F.N. Jephcott (London: 
NLB 1974), 247.
83 Jay, Songs, 316. Jay provides a wide-ranging account of different modes of experience prompted by Kant’s 
transcendental method.
84 Anson   Rabinbach,  In   the   Shadow   of   Catastrophe:   German   Intellectuals   between   Apocalypse   and 
Enlightenment (London: University of California Press, 1997), 3. 
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and ‘restorative messianism’. In contrast, Arendt’s intentions were deceptively 
unassuming.
86 Anson Rabinbach summarises a widely shared attitude, which reflects, 
I think, her position too:
at the end of the Second World War Jünger and other 
German conservative intellectuals abandoned their 
revolutionary stance for a more muted critique of 
Americanism and the “West” as the purveyors of a 
globally   technological   nihilism.   [Their]   abstract 
thinking about the apocalypse might be characterized 
as both “pre-postmodern” and antiredemptive. To put 
it in a convenient formula, World War I gave rise to 
reflections on death and transfiguration, World War 
II to reflections on evil, or on how the logic of 
modernity since the Enlightenment, with its legacy 
of progress, secularism, and rationalism could not be 
exculpated from events that seemed to violate its 
ideals.
87 
I shall return to the relative “modesty” of Arendt’s political philosophy shortly. Before 
going any further though, I think that the details of the Kantian roots of the crisis of 
experience, the origins of its alleged decay and the conditions for its possible 
retrieval, are worth unearthing. As Martin Jay has insightfully demonstrated, 
experience plays  a significant part in the writings of many cultural critics, 
philosophers and political theorists, for example, each of whom has responded to 
Kant in a different, unique and frequently challenging manner.
88 In Arendt’s case her 
adoption and existential adaptation of crucial Kantian principles is, I think, quite 
fundamental to understanding why the loss of experience was such a significant, if 
surprisingly little commented upon, aspect of her work. 
In Songs of Experience Jay evaluates a number of different, sometimes radically 
different, melodies pointing to the fact that the reality which experience indicates is 
86 Michael Löwy,  Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe  (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1992).
87 Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe, 9. 
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fugitive. He acknowledges that experience has been explained in terms of religious, 
aesthetic, historical and political modalities by a wide variety of thinkers. His starting 
point on each occasion though, is Immanuel Kant because following its appearance in 
the eighteenth century Kant’s Critical philosophy ignited a string of touchpapers 
brandished by those who strenuously opposed what they interpreted as ‘the reduction 
of experience to a question of cognition’.
89 Herein lies the clue that in talking about 
‘experience’ we are not referring purely to the fact that on a daily basis each and every 
one of us is exposed to an innumerable array, a ‘manifold’ in Kantian terminology, of 
personal happenings or occurrences – immediate psychological experiences 
(Erlebnisse), as it were. This, in itself, would be an unexceptional observation about 
our being. Rather, the point about the degree of significance that has been attached to 
experience by so many thinkers, including Arendt, and denigrated by just as many 
others, concerns the weight that can, with confidence, be attributed to it as a means of 
disclosing something vital about human life on earth, something pre-analytic, an 
affective dimension. Experience in this sense is characterised by being irreducibly 
non-rational, in fact, non-identifiable and immeasurable using the tools of scientific 
observation though more than purely a matter of individual mood and sentiment. It 
was, I think, as a result of her reworking of Kant that Hannah Arendt developed a 
political voice and was able to express a number of her own insights about how to 
retrieve lost experience. It is these insights, I believe, that ultimately suggest a 
provocative, if unstated critique of historical judgement generally, in terms, that is, of 
what Heidegger recognised as ‘Historie’,  and certainly they are at the root, more 
particularly, of her differences with him in respect of his ideas about the unfolding of 
Geschichte, or ‘deep history’.
89 Ibid., 78.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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In his epistemological writings, most notably in the Critique of Pure Reason 
published in 1781, Kant’s objective had been to restore confidence in the possibility 
of certain scientific knowledge and he was adamant that experience had to be the 
starting point for any such certainty: ‘For how should our faculty of knowledge be 
awakened into action’, he asked, ‘did not objects affecting our senses […] arouse the 
activity of our understanding?’ (B1). However, though experience was for Kant the 
obvious place to begin in order to underwrite the results of science, and, as Jay points 
out, represented what Kant described as a ‘résumé’of the entire first Critique, its 
author did not believe that knowledge actually ensued from experience alone: ‘[...] 
though all our knowledge begins with experience’, Kant asserted, ‘it does not follow 
that it all arises out of experience’ (B1). In moving beyond both the fallacies of purely 
deductive reasoning as well as Hume’s inductive or associationist empiricism, Kant 
made the intelligibility of the idea of knowledge conditional upon a partnership in 
respect of which the individual became the ground for the necessary intellectual 
mediation of sensible intuitions, that is, he became the ground for a required mental 
interpretation of the manifold of sense impressions he received. The result was not 
knowledge in itself but an epistemology traceable to a transcendental unity of 
apperception, that is, associated with the singularity of a unified subject. The 
guarantee of all knowledge would be that it derived not from the passive reception of 
a manifold of sense impressions by a mind that was nothing but a tabula rasa, but, that 
it could only issue from impressions received by the senses and instantaneously 
actively interpreted by concepts and categories deduced to have been gifted to all 
rational beings. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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In contrast to Kant’s own estimate, I believe that a far more accurate summary, or 
‘résumé’, of his epistemology is, in fact, captured by his, now much quoted 
observation that, ‘[t]houghts’, by which he meant concepts, ‘without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ (A51/B75). This dictum will, indeed, be 
a very important part of my argument about Hannah Arendt’s “critique of historical 
judgement”. The observation expresses with almost lyrical concision the certitude that 
concepts alone, starved of experiential content, are as little able to form the basis of 
any certain knowledge, or indeed cognition, as are intuitions unmolested by the 
irritable drive to create order out of what would otherwise remain chaotic.
90 However, 
the assimilation of knowledge that Kant believed his transcendental method achieved 
was delivered at a price, because the range of what could now be described as 
genuine experience was reduced to those phenomena alone made intelligible through 
the transcendental capacity of the mind to subsume sense impressions under deduced 
concepts and categories. The nature of “things-in-themselves” could only be a matter 
of speculation. Indeed, the very notion of “things in themselves” now became 
meaningless, a nonsense. This was the logical consequence of Kant’s transcendental 
method. The realm where such “things”, ‘noumena’ as opposed to phenomena, might 
be imagined to “reside” would forever remain inaccessible to human cognition. Thus 
was born a divide that could not be straddled, a divide separating the unitary subject 
of apperception from the original object of experience. It was a divide that Benjamin, 
for example, in contrast to both Arendt and Adorno sought to dissolve by indicating 
what Jay refers to as a ‘moment of equiprimordiality’, a moment that is, when 
90 In the Cambridge University Press edition of the first Critique, the translation of part of the text at A50/B74, 
which almost immediately precedes Kant’s dictum runs as follows: ‘[…] neither concepts without intuition 
corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition’. Immanuel Kant, The 
Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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experience is, somewhat incomprehensibly, no longer conditional upon the existence 
of the experiencing subject.
91   
Kant’s transcendental method lead to what many perceived to be a ‘cramped and 
limited reduction of experience to nothing but an epistemological function’.
92 
Benjamin, for one, dismissed Kantian experience because of its vacancy: ‘[t]he 
decisive mistakes of Kant’s epistemology are, without a doubt, traceable to the 
hollowness of the experience available to him, and thus the double task of creating a 
new concept of knowledge and a new conception of the world on the basis of 
philosophy becomes a single one.’
93 In the same essay, ‘On the Program of the 
Coming Philosophy’, he remarked further, ‘[i]ndeed, one can say that the very 
greatness of his [Kant’s] work, his unique radicalism, presupposed an experience 
which had almost no intrinsic value and which could have attained its (we may say) 
sad significance only through its certainty.’
94 Similar discomfort provoked many of 
Kant’s detractors to react by expressing views hostile to his critical philosophy on 
grounds that his methods left no room for what, beyond cognition, comprised 
essential, immediate and pre-reflective facets of experience. Their abhorrence for the 
system the Königsberg philosopher had built attested to their fear that what was 
indispensable to any full and proper appreciation of the rich qualitative potential of 
human life and the needs of human beings was being shunned. To cite just one of 
many possible critics, the young Martin Buber, in the first decade and a half of the 
twentieth century, in an effort to breathe new life into German Jewry and revitalize its 
sense of community, called in his speeches for a return to the depths of inner lived 
91 Jay, Songs, 357.
92 Ibid., 76.
93 Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ in Selected Writings Volume 1, 102.
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experience through which entry into a transcendent sacred reality could once again be 
achieved.
95 Like Benjamin, Buber deplored what he perceived to be a complete lack 
of immediacy and intensity in Kant’s understanding of experience as Erlebnis (Buber 
would himself subsequently be criticised by Benjamin for his over enthusiasm about 
the First World War on precisely the grounds that it was too bound up with this type 
of experience) and certainly at this early point in his life he sought to oppose Kant’s 
shallow, because purely epistemological, results in respect of phenomena by drawing 
attention to the virtues of rich experience – rich in that it was imagined to be both 
more primitive and more profound. Agamben, echoing Max Weber in ‘Science as a 
Vocation’, summarises the general consequences of Kantian epistemology thus:
Inasmuch as its goal was to advance the individual 
to maturity – that is, an anticipation of death as the 
idea   of   an   achieved   totality   of   experience   – 
[experience]   was   something   complete   in   itself, 
something it was possible to have, not only to 
undergo. But once experience was referred instead 
to   the   subject   of   science,   which   cannot   reach 
maturity but can only increase its own knowledge, it 
becomes   something  incomplete,   an  “asymptotic” 
concept, as Kant will say, something it is possible 
only to  undergo, never to  have: nothing other, 
therefore, than the infinite process of knowledge.
96
The tribute Walter Benjamin paid to the purity and innocence of the way in which 
children see colour constituted, to all intents and purposes, a repudiation of both the 
Kantian unitary subject as well as the imposition by this subject of intellectual 
categories upon the manifold of sensible intuitions. That is, this repudiation amounted 
to more than just the rejection of the limiting of experience to what could be known as 
a result of synthetic a priori judgements. There was in his critique an even more 
95 Asher D. Biemann (ed.), The Martin Buber Reader (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
96 Agamben, ‘Infancy’, 23. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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extreme position being adopted by Benjamin, one with far-reaching consequences, 
namely, the disappearance of the subject altogether. Howard Caygill, in Walter 
Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, has described just how ambitious and radical 
Benjamin’s ideas were:
In this [Benjamin’s] experience, two components of 
Kant’s account – sensibility and the understanding – 
collapse   into   each   other,   and   the   experiencing 
subject which would contain them dissolves into 
experience.  The opposition between gaze and the 
gazed upon collapses, both threatening a nihilistic 
dissolution into a pure featureless identity beyond 
subject   and   object   but   also   promising   a   new 
articulation of experience.
97 
The demise of the subject, which to all intents and purposes dissolved the Kantian 
opposition ‘between the gaze and the gazed upon’ will be crucial, I think, when we 
come to consider Hannah Arendt’s adoption and existential adaptation of some of the 
ideas I have thus far been discussing in relation to both Kant and Benjamin. 
Notwithstanding the possibilities Benjamin’s thought offered for re-articulating 
experience, Arendt’s understanding of politics and what was required in order to make 
political experience intelligible and thus, all importantly, communicable, actually 
came to rely upon a distinction between the gaze of the spectator (who had originally 
appeared in Kant’s 1790 discussion of aesthetics), and the conduct of the political 
actors upon whom the spectator’s critical gaze happened to fix.
98 The subject, in other 
words, was fundamental to what would amount to an Arendtian political philosophy 
built upon both plurality and the interdependency of individuals. Hence her concern to 
challenge the limitations of Heidegger’s thoughts about the meaning of being-in- 
relation-to-others, thoughts which seemed to be ensnared by his negative conception 
97 Howard Caygill,  Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience  (London: Routledge, 1997), 12. Emphasis 
added.
98 See, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
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of das Man beyond which he could not see. The other as spectator would, in Arendt’s 
later writings in particular, come to play a crucial Kantian function, though now in 
terms of political rather than aesthetic experience.
99 The other as spectator, that is, 
would prove to be the very condition for making political judgements. 
Arendt’s observations about both Rahel Varnhagen and Adolf Eichmann are, I think, 
salient at this point.
100 Her assessment of Rahel seems to have been that much to her 
own distress Rahel simply allowed life to saturate her with the consequence that she 
spent most of it unhappily and unsuccessfully plotting to escape her circumstances, 
not least of which involved being a Jewess. It is as if Arendt concluded, Rahel was so 
overburdened by experience that she was simply unable to properly understand or 
make any sense of it. Despite writing her thoughts down in her now famous diaries 
and letters she simply could not achieve the critical distance demanded by 
understanding. Arendt noted:
Her whole effort was to expose herself to life so that 
it   could   strike   her   “like   a   storm   without   an 
umbrella.” (“What am I doing? Nothing. I am letting 
life   rain   upon   me.”)   She   preferred   not   to   use 
characteristics   or   opinions   on   persons   she 
encountered, on the circumstances and conditions of 
the world, on life itself, for purposes of shelter.
101
In Rahel’s Berlin salon, there was certainly plenty of talk, indeed ‘unbounded 
communication’. However, in Arendt’s estimate the salon functioned as little more 
than a quaint and charming place where ‘“enlightened” aristocrats, middle-class 
intellectuals, and actors’ could meet on equal terms, but in the end where ‘nothing 
99 See, for example, Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy edited by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989). Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated LKPP.
100 Hannah Arendt,  Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess,  edited by Liliane Weissberg and translated by 
Richard and Clara Winston (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977).
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really mattered but personality and the uniqueness of character, talent, and 
expression’.
102 Friedrich Gentz, the political publicist and diplomat, might rub 
shoulders with the banker Abraham Mendelssohn, Louis Ferdinand, a Hohenzollern 
prince, with the romantic writer Friedrich Schlegel, nevertheless, there was little 
prospect, Arendt concluded, for genuine communication, for objective selfless 
thinking, ultimately for political judgement. Though also subject to an ‘unthinking 
absorption in everydayness’
103 Eichmann, on the other hand, did seek out shelter. 
However, he found it only by receding into the twisted ideological labyrinth of 
National Socialism that claimed to be able to explain and make sense of everything 
through the logic of race conflict. The further into this maze that Eichmann travelled 
though, the more isolated he became deprived also, though for different reasons to 
Rahel, of meaningful dialogue with others so much so, in Arendt’s estimation, that he 
ended up losing all facility for language itself and thus all sense of the reality that is 
confirmed through genuine communication with one’s equals.
I make these points only to emphasise that the unresolved Kantian tension between 
“subject” and “object” that Benjamin had attempted to short-circuit but that Hannah 
Arendt preserved was, in and of itself, no guarantee of experience as such. 
Experience, on an existential level, Arendt thought, could no more be the product of a 
purely raw engagement with events than epistemologically, as Kant had demonstrated, 
it could result form unmediated intuitions. In both instances something more was 
required. Existential experience requires the other. However, it requires the other not 
simply as a matter of proximity. Mass society was proof of that. It is the other’s 
intellectual judgement that is crucial, just as epistemologically sensible intuitions need 
102 Arendt, OT, 59–60.
103 Michael Mack, ‘The Holocaust and Hannah Arendt’s Philosophical Critique of Philosophy: Eichmann in 
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to be mediated by concepts: ‘Existenz itself is never essentially isolated’.
104 The other 
then, who effectively anchors Existenz (the being of man), has at least to fulfil this 
condition: she or he has to be capable of communicating. In other words, the other has 
to be capable of supplying intellectual analysis and this can only be achieved by both 
maintaining a critical distance from events and by applying the very critical discursive 
tools inevitably absent from those actually engaged in action itself. 
Hannah Arendt was not alone in finding Benjamin’s radical ideas about 
‘equiprimordiality’ uninspiring. Theodor Adorno too, expressed deep-seated 
suspicions about Benjamin’s “vanishing” subject.
105 He strove to preserve what he 
perceived to be a non-identity characterising the true relationship between subject and 
object. In ‘A Portrait of Walter Benjamin’ Adorno couched his anxieties in the 
following terms:
Between myth and reconciliation, the poles of his 
[Benjamin’s]   philosophy,   the   subject   evaporates. 
Before his Medusan glance, man turns into the stage 
on which an objective process unfolds. For this 
reason Benjamin’s philosophy is no less a source of 
terror than a promise of happiness. [...] He reduces 
[...]   autonomy   to   a   moment   of   transition   in   a 
dialectical process, as with the tragic hero, and the 
reconciliation of men with the creation has as its 
condition the dissolution of all self-posited human 
existence.
106
Yet in Benjamin’s thought itself things were not so incontrovertibly black and white. 
A fault line began to appear in his writings a decade or so before his premature death 
by suicide in 1940. This occurred as Benjamin noticed the possibilities historical 
materialism offered and he allowed it to play as important a role in shaping his ideas 
104 See footnote 1 above.
105 See, for example, Theodor Adorno,  Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a Lecture Course 
1965/1966, edited by Rolf Tiedmann and translated by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).
106 Theodor Adorno, ‘A Portrait of Walter Benjamin’ in Prisms, translated by Samuel and Shierry Weber London: 
(Neville Spearman, 1967), 235–236.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 47
as, in an earlier mood, messianism had played. In contrast to Erlebnis, the more 
individual sense of experience that describes the immediacy of a personal 
psychological episode or incident, Benjamin now began to write about Erfahrung, a 
social-historical sense of experience as a cultural characteristic rooted in tradition. 
This was, in fact, a fundamental distinction explored, for example, by Wilhelm 
Dilthey and Hans-Georg Gadamer amongst many others.
107 It had, perhaps, 
underpinned some of the anti-Semitic distrust of the Jews that had threatened the post-
Enlightenment German-Jewish dialogue: just how German, truly German in terms of 
the depth of their immersion in social and historical institutions and traditions, were 
the Jews? Was theirs a culturally rich Germanness, deeply rooted? Or was it 
something far more superficial, individual and personal and thus, in social terms less 
convincing?
108 Criticising Bergson’s concept of ‘durée’, from which, Benjamin 
observed ‘tradition is excluded’, he contended, in an essay entitled ‘Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’, that the French philosopher had, in effect, reduced all experience to that 
solely of   Erlebnis: ‘The durée has the miserable endlessness of a scroll. [...] It is the 
quintessence of a passing moment (Erlebnis) that struts about in the borrowed garb of 
experience [Erfahrung]’.
109 
By the 1930s Benjamin was focusing very much on historical and political issues. In 
doing so his earlier quest for the purity of absolute experience seemed now to be 
giving way to a much more worldly concept. This, I think, was something Hannah 
107 Dilthey, for example, in Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on History and Society edited by H.P. 
Rickman (New York: Harper, 1962), focused on Erlebnis as a means of replacing the objectivity of the physical 
sciences when discussing human beings. Hans-Georg Gadamer meanwhile, in  Truth and Method, 2
nd  revised 
edition and translation by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004), is more critical 
of Erlebnis because of its romantic associations. 
108 See George, L Mosse, German Jews Beyond Judaism (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985) for a 
discussion of this dialogue.
109 Walter Benjamin, ‘Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ in Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High 
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Arendt found very appealing. For example, in his 1933 essay ‘Experience and 
Poverty’ Benjamin wrote:
everyone knew precisely what experience was: older 
people had always passed it on to younger sons. It 
was   handed   down   in   short   form   to   sons   and 
grandsons, with the authority of age, in proverbs; 
with   an   often   long-winded   eloquence,   as   tales, 
sometimes as stories from  foreign lands, at  the 
fireside. – Where has it all gone? Who still meets 
people who really know how to tell a story? Where 
do you still hear words from the dying that last, and 
that pass from one generation to the next like a 
precious ring? [...] And who will even attempt to 
deal with young people by giving them the benefit of 
their experience?
110 
Arendt’s discussion, twenty five years later in The Human Condition, of the 
importance of storytelling was surely a recollection and an acknowledgement of 
Benjamin’s regret. She quoted the Danish novelist, Isak Dinesen, for example, as 
having observed that, ‘All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a 
story about them’.
111  There is a broader point that can be made here, however. 
Though there was a shared linguistic theme in Benjamin’s discussion in ‘Experience 
and Poverty’ and, for instance, his much earlier essay entitled ‘On Language as Such 
and on the Language of Man’, written in 1916, the emphasis in the later writings was 
less about the failure of language to convey ‘cosmic affinities’ and more about human 
deficiency in regard to communicating ‘residues of past learning that [...] might be 
functional in the future’.
112 What Benjamin was pointing to was nothing less than 
damaged experience as a result of a  broken tradition, which obstructed the passing of 
110 Walter Benjamin, ‘Experience and Poverty’ in Selected Writings, volume 2, part 2, 1931–1934, translated by 
Rodney Livingstone and others, and edited by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 731.
111 Arendt, HC, 175.
112 Jay, Songs, 330.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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learning from one generation to the next. His task therefore, and it was one that I 
think Hannah Arendt adopted as her own after the Second World War, became that of 
trying to establish the grounds on which what was of most value in the historical 
record could be illuminated, made newly intelligible and re-articulated. This was 
precisely what Benjamin had set himself to achieve in The Arcades Project, for 
example, where, like a ‘rag picker’ he foraged amongst ‘the scattered fragments of 
genuine historical experience’ in search of lost treasure.
113 With the manifestation of 
totalitarianism and what Arendt referred to as ‘the end of tradition’
114 after the Shoah, 
she described the same task in terms of diving for pearls, the skill of the pearl diver 
being to ‘pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the depths’, in 
order to bring ‘them to the surface’.
115 There was something deceitful in this 
characterisation though, because whichever way one looked at it what was clear was 
that this was not going to be a straightforward or undemanding task: ‘“Our inheritance 
was left to us by no testament”’, Arendt observed in Between Past and Future, 
quoting the poet René Char.
116 And, changing her metaphor to one somewhat less 
alluring than pearl diving, she warned, in the same collection of essays, that genuine 
connections between the past and the present moment had to be ‘discover[ed]’ afresh 
by ‘each new generation, indeed every new human being’ and then only as a result of 
‘ploddingly’ hard work.
117
All this raises the question of what actually constitutes “genuine” historical 
experience. In what precisely does the value of experience reside? And what are the 
113 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project translated by H. Eiland, & K. McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999). The quoted extract is from Benjamin, Baudelaire, 144.
114 Arendt, BPF, 17.
115 Hannah Arendt, ‘Introduction’ to Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt & translated by 
Harry Zohn (Bungay, Suffolk: Fontana/Collins, 1973), 50–51. 
116 Arendt, BPF, 3.
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forgotten treasures that lie buried in history? I will come back to these questions 
shortly. For the moment, I think, we at least have some provisional answers to the 
questions I posed earlier about what Arendt intended us to understand by the loss of 
experience. Though her concerns did not imitate the anti-capitalist critique of 
‘progress’ that Benjamin would express in his later work, what they did suggest, I 
think, was the belief that the loss of experience entailed absence of the other, an 
absence that constituted a profound, in the sense of a fundamental, impact upon our 
ability to form political judgements. Kant thought it was epistemologically erroneous 
to argue that experience comprises of unmediated sense perceptions, something 
wrongly assumed in Hume’s empiricist philosophy. In a political as opposed to an 
epistemological context, Arendt thought we are equally mistaken in thinking 
experience is possible in the absence of our neighbour. She believed, that quite 
fundamentally this could not be so. In other words, the possibility of political 
experience in isolation from other people was just as unlikely as the possibility of 
cognitive experience resulting from Kantian intuitions divorced from concepts. 
‘Experience’, as Benjamin observed, ‘is [...] a matter of tradition, in collective 
existence as well as private life’.
118  It is something passed on from one generation to 
the next, indeed from one individual to the next. It follows then that the other is 
crucial to its transmission.  
What then, of the value of historical experience? What makes certain fragments of 
historical experience more important, more ‘genuine’ as Benjamin put it, than others? 
To ask these questions in respect of Hannah Arendt’s writings, is, I think, to ask about 
the ontologically fundamental roots of experience she was addressing. The response 
118 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 145.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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has to be somewhat ambivalent, however, because there is an ambivalence lurking in 
Arendt’s work. Or so it seems. For example, at times she wrote about political 
experience almost in nostalgic terms, that is, in terms which could be interpreted as 
expressing wistful affection for times past – the Greek polis, for example, as recalled 
in The Human Condition or the American Revolution in paying tribute to which 
Arendt acknowledged a debt of gratitude to the country that had taken her in together 
with so many other refugees fleeing the Old World during the nineteen thirties and 
nineteen forties.
119 And yet she was critical of both romantics and romanticising. A 
footnote in her Existenz essay attributed  Heidegger’s ‘complete irresponsibility’, his 
‘delusion of genius’ mixed with ‘desperation’, to his being ‘the last (we hope) 
romantic’.
120 And there was no looking back to the delights of prelapsarian joy and 
perfection or, for that matter, forward to a hoped for radical political upheaval, which 
might serve as a pathway to redemption. At other times, again in The Human 
Condition, for example, Arendt indicated a progressive loss of experience associated 
with developments in science and the advance of Cartesian doubt, for instance. Yet, 
she did not indicate to what extent earlier times, before the decay set in, were 
politically better. 
The essence of what she intended us to understand by experience is ironically 
indicated, I think, by critical remarks Adorno made against Heidegger. In these 
remarks he, Adorno, stated that his own ‘concept [of experience] is not intended to 
capture phenomenological “ur-experience”; nor like the interpretation of Hegel in 
Heidegger’s Holzwege, is it intended to get at something ontological’.
121  Adorno, 
119 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973).
120 Arendt, ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’, 46.
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whose own concept of authentic experience Jay has remarked ‘never fully sorted out 
the welter of denotations and connotations that cling to th[is] numinous word’ was at 
least distancing himself from Heidegger, though. Yet, while Hannah Arendt’s political 
philosophy led her, like Adorno, off the Heideggerarian track leading to the 
appropriation of Being, nevertheless, in common with her former teacher she too, I 
think, was bent on ‘get[ing] at something ontological’.
122 In contrast to Heidegger, it 
was not the disclosure of Being that was the ultimate prize. Instead, what Arendt 
believed was illuminated by experience was the ontological structure of the human 
condition itself, a politically inspired ontology that, in fact, privileged the very other, 
the neighbour, whose centrality in modern metaphysics Heidegger had found so 
perturbing. Heidegger had stated, for example, in his criticisms of Hegel made in the 
early 1940s that his, Hegel’s, ‘[e]xperience is the beingness of beings, whose 
determination, qua subjectum, is determined in terms of subjectness’.
123 Though 
herself critical of Hegel, it was precisely the subject as neighbour, and in her later 
work the subject as spectator with the critical distance that made judgement and 
political discourse possible, who Hannah Arendt foregrounded in her own writings. 
This should not be taken to suggest that Arendt was herself guilty of reducing 
experience to the expression, albeit in public discourse, of merely the spectator’s 
personal Erlebnis. Hers was, of course, a “materialistic” political philosophy in the 
sense that reminders about the objectivity of the surrounding world were never far 
from the centre of her writing. Indeed, part of the problem of experience in the 
122 Jay, Songs, 360. After the Second World War, Heidegger published a collection of pieces on Art, Nietzsche 
and poetry, which included ‘Hegel’s Concept of Experience’. Originally published under the title Holzwege the 
English version was published as Off the Beaten Track, edited and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
123 Martin Heidegger, Hegel’s Concept of Experience, translated by Kenley Royce Dove (New York: Harper and 
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modern world was reflected, she thought, in ‘the curious discrepancy between 
language and theory which [...] turns out to be a discrepancy between the world-
oriented “objective” language we speak and the man-oriented, subjective theories we 
use in our attempts at understanding’.
124 Far from being an expression of Erlebnis, the 
Arendtian spectator’s political experience surely involves something akin, I would 
argue, to Adorno’s description of ‘the experience of art [as] ‘the irruption of 
objectivity into subjective consciousness’ though Arendt, recalling Benjamin again, 
tended to talk in terms of feelings of sheer awe experienced when standing before the 
objective world rather than ‘irruptions’.
125 
Either way though, whether it was the ‘intense shudder’ or ‘tremor’ of aesthetic 
experience felt by Adorno’s subject, or the awe felt by Arendt’s political spectator, the 
point is surely that it was Erfahrung that was, in both instances, being defended here 
and a protest against the fundamental absence of the subject that was being registered. 
In Hannah Arendt’s case, this absence would be confronted by attempting to revitalise 
the other through what eventually would be offered, in The Human Condition and 
subsequent works, as a reorientation of political thought involving the reconstitution 
of public discourse conditional upon plurality and interdependency. In other words, 
Arendt believed that the fundamental absence of the other in modern experience could 
be rectified. 
It is worth remembering, however, that she did not start out as a political thinker. A 
student first of Heidegger then of Jaspers it took a while, by Arendt’s own account, for 
her to become politically aware in the early1930s. Yet, even in her earliest writings 
124 Arendt, HC, 94.
125 Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedmann, translated by Robert 
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which included the 1929 doctoral dissertation on the concept of love in Saint 
Augustine, to which I now turn, it seems to me that she was absorbed with thinking 
about what it means to be with others, what it means to live amongst neighbours. And 
she began to set down principles, to illuminate truths, that would later become central 
to her political theory.
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CHAPTER 2   
Being with One Another Reconsidered:
Love, History and Saint Augustine 
I distinguish the teaching of Christ from the report which we 
have of the teaching of Christ, and in order to get at the 
former I try above all to extract the moral teaching separated 
from all precepts of the New Testament. The former is surely 
the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel, the latter can only be 
an auxiliary doctrine [...].
           Immanuel Kant
126 
The special hermeneutic of empathy will have to show how 
Being-with-one-another and Dasein’s knowing of itself are led 
astray and obstructed by the various possibilities of Being 
which Dasein itself possesses, so that genuine ‘understanding’ 
gets suppressed, and Dasein takes refuge in substitutes [...].   
 Martin Heidegger
127
The several parts of this essay are linked only by the question 
concerning the other being’s relevance. 
           Hannah Arendt
128  
Wittgenstein observed about his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that it was actually 
two books – one comprising all that he had said (written), the other all that he had not 
said. Hannah Arendt’s doctoral dissertation on the the concept of love in the works of 
Saint Augustine is not just two books; it strikes me that she went one better than 
Wittgenstein in producing three books. First, there is the text that she submitted in 
1929 as her dissertation, a document completed under the supervision of Karl Jaspers 
at the University of Heidelberg. Then there is the edited text dating from the 1960s 
when she revisited it and began to make alterations. Finally, since she did not 
complete those alterations, we are left to speculate, as in the case of the Tractatus, 
upon what the author did not say but, in Arendt’s case, might have said, if she had 
completed her revisions. 
126 Immanuel Kant, from a letter to Johann Casper Lavater dated 24 April 1775, cited in S. Körner,  Kant 
(Harmondswoth: Penguin Books, 1955), 170–71. Emphases in original.
127 Heidegger, BT, 163.
128 Arendt, LSA, 4. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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In the late nineteen twenties, Arendt became a doctoral student at Heidelberg. In 
choosing Saint Augustine as a field of research she reflected something of a trend 
amongst  German university scholars interested in this Founding Father of the 
Christian Church. Hans Jonas, for instance, a friend and colleague of Arendt is 
reported to having said when asked, not about Arendt in particular but about research 
on Saint Augustine in general, that ‘such a topic would not have been that unusual in 
the German universities of the time.
129 Arendt was not untypical either, for that matter, 
amongst German-Jewish  scholars and thinkers in choosing an aspect of Christianity 
to study. Erich Fromm, published The Dogma of Christ in 1931 for instance,
130 and 
Micheal Löwy informs us that Gustav Landauer, ‘the Jewish anarchist writer’, took 
many of his religious references from Christianity while Martin Buber published an 
essay in 1901 on Jakob Böhme, the seventeenth century mystic. Indeed, Löwy 
comments, it was ‘a common interest in Christian mysticism [...] that brought 
Landauer and Buber closer together on a personal level after they met for the first 
time in 1900.
131  It is also worth mentioning that prior to her enrolment at the 
University of Marburg in 1924, Arendt had spent a number of semesters completing 
her schooling at the University of Berlin where, as a teenager, she was first 
introduced, by Romano Guardini, to the works of Søren Kierkegaard and even 
entertained the thought of later studying Theology. Added to this, her detailed reading 
with Heidegger of the works of Saint Paul coupled with the fact that at Marburg she 
also attended Bultmann’s New Testament seminars, all make the decision to research 
129 Hans Jonas cited in, LSA, xv.
130 Erich Fromm,  The Dogma of Christ: And Other Essays on Religion, Psychology and Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2004).
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the concept of love in the writings of a Christian bishop and saint a little less out of 
the ordinary. 
Arendt’s dissertation was issued by the Berlin based publishing house of Julius 
Springer shortly after its completion. It appeared then as the ninth and final 
dissertation in a series of his students’ doctoral theses that Jaspers collected under the 
title ‘Philosophische Forschungen’, and was referred to as, Liebesbegriff bei 
Augustin: Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation.
132 Substantial revisions were 
planned for a new edition. By the early 1960s the document had been waiting three 
and a half decades for the changes to be made and one suspects that the alterations 
Arendt planned to make at that time were quite different to the ones she might have 
made thirty years earlier. Consequently, the version of the document edited by Joanna 
Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark in the mid-1990s, represents not only the 
rediscovery of a text generally overlooked by Arendt scholars; it also marked the 
discovery of a text that Arendt had, around 1962, in respect of a contract with 
Crowell-Collier, revisited in order to make a number of alterations in advance of a 
planned publication for 1964-65. 
The editors of the dissertation, Vecchiarelli Scott and Chelius Stark, comment that the 
revisions Arendt began to make in the nineteen sixties ‘demonstrate her continuing 
commitment to the subject matter, mode of discourse, and conclusions she had 
produced in 1929’.
133 On the other hand George McKenna argues, for instance, that 
Arendt was in effect working in reverse to try and identify in Augustine lines in his 
132 Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner (eds), Hannah Arendt Karl Jaspers Correspondence 1926–1969,  translated by 
Robert and Rita Kimber (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1992), Note to Letter 10, 691.
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thinking that she had, she thought, missed the first time around.
134 Vecchiarelli Scott 
and Chelius Stark have skilfully analysed her alterations, which apply to greater and 
lesser extents to each of the three main divisions of the dissertation, indicating at 
which points the changes were either typed into a fresh manuscript or remained only 
as hand written insertions. As it turned out, Arendt’s project was actually never 
completed. McKenna comments that this was probably less because of the heavy 
demands of her other commitments (Vecchiarelli Scott and Chelius Stark’s 
explanation) and more because Arendt herself ultimately realised that what she was 
attempting just ‘wasn’t working’: the dissertation simply would not ‘bear the weight 
of her mature thought’.
135 I take this to imply that McKenna assumes the lines of 
thinking that she was trying to attribute to Augustine, in order to make him more 
consistent with the political thinking underpinning her mature writings, were not 
actually there. It is worth noting that a similar charge of reading into Augustine ideas 
which he had not, in fact, entertained, had been levelled against Arendt’s 1929 
document by none other than Japsers himself, resulting in her being recommended for 
a II-I (cum laude) rather than the highest grade for her doctoral research.
136 
There may well, I think, be a degree of truth in what McKenna suggests, particularly 
as Arendt herself was the first to admit that as a student she was not political. 
Therefore, what she wrote in 1929 would surely not have reflected what had become 
her politically focussed interests more than three decades later. Still, the question that 
suggests itself is why was Hannah Arendt remotely interested, more than three 
decades after she had first written it, in returning to her doctoral dissertation of the 
134 George McKenna, ‘Augustine Revisited’ [online] in First Things 72 (April 1997): 43–47, available from: 
http://print.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9704/mckenna.html (Accessed 20 March 2006).
135 Ibid., 42.
136 See Jaspers comments and recommendations in respect of Arendt’s doctoral dissertation, Kohler 
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late 1920s? Clearly, her investigation of Augustine’s treatment of love remained 
sufficiently important to her to want to return to it with a view to re-publication. In 
other words, she was not disposed in the early 1960s to look upon her earlier research 
either as an undertaking of little lasting value and so best consigned to a filing cabinet 
in some far off corner of a remote archive, or as something inconsistent with her 
mature political philosophy. So, what was its significance?
Before answering this question it is important to be clear first about the basic problem 
Arendt was trying to address in the dissertation. Essentially, her expressed concern 
was with the grounds upon which love for one’s neighbour could make any sense 
given that, in a Christian context, one’s love should be for God alone and not for the 
surrounding material world or any of its contents. As she indicated in her introduction 
to the dissertation’s three sections, she would consider ‘the question of how the 
person in God’s presence, isolated from all things mundane, can be at all interested in 
his neighbor’.
137  To all intents and purposes love could not be secured, she thought, 
simply by the commandment to love one’s neighbour as oneself. However, the 
grounds of neighbourly love could be demonstrated ‘by proving the neighbour’s 
relevance in a wholly different context’.
138 By this she meant, I think, it could be 
demonstrated by exploring the New Testament’s treatment of grace.  
To return to my earlier question about the significance of Arendt’s research, the 
answer to this question concerns, I would argue, the fact that Arendt had been a 
student of Heidegger at precisely the time he was working on his magnum opus, 
Being and Time. In a letter to Heidegger that Arendt wrote on 12 March 1970 she 
137 Arendt, LSA, 7.
138 Ibid.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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described his, Heidegger’s, genius in terms of his having ‘created real room for 
thought’.
139 At Marburg during the 1920s she and the other students attending his 
classes and his lectures had been captivated by something completely new. Thinking 
had seemingly come to life again. To mark the occasion of Heidegger’s eightieth 
birthday in 1969, Arendt wrote a piece published, originally in German, and 
subsequently in English in the New York Review of Books. In it she described the 
philosophical environment twenty-five years earlier in the following terms:
The rumor that attracted them [the students] to 
Freiburg and to the Privatdozent who taught there, 
as somewhat later they were attracted to the young 
professor at Marburg, had it that there was someone 
who was actually attaining “the things” that Husserl 
had   proclaimed,   someone   who  knew   that   these 
things were not academic matters but the concerns 
of thinking men – concerns not just of yesterday and 
today,   but   from   time   immemorial   –   and   who, 
precisely because he knew that the tradition was 
broken, was discovering the past anew.
140
Nevertheless, despite such high praise from someone who, when she had first met 
Heidegger at the tender age of eighteen had secretly declared her ‘“unbending 
devotion to a single one”’
141 we should not be fooled into thinking that, intellectually, 
Arendt was indebted to and thus uncritical of the philosopher. In actual fact she was, I 
believe, as demonstrated throughout her writings, extremely critical of many of 
Heidegger’s central ideas. And, her opposition can clearly be detected, I think, in her 
very first major piece of writing, the dissertation on Augustine’s treatment of love. 
Here, to avoid any category mistakes, it must be noted that Arendt began to challenge 
aspects of Heidegger’s fundamental consideration of being with others on the basis of 
an historical not an ontological line of reasoning. To put this another way, while her 
139 Hannah Arendt, and Martin Heidegger: Letters 1925–1975, edited by Ursula Ludz and translated by Andrew 
Shields (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Inc, 1998), 120.
140 Hannah Arendt, ‘Martin Heidegger at 80’ in New York Review of Books 17/6 (21 October 1971): 50–54.
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opposition was undeniable what distinguished it was the fact that it constituted an 
historical dress rehearsal prefiguring the full blooded ontological performance against 
the ‘existential analytic of Dasein’
142 that Arendt’s post-war publication of The 
Human Condition represented. Why then, the eventual change of tack and of tactics? 
What I am arguing, is that Arendt’s doctoral dissertation of 1929 showed first, that she 
was unpersuaded by what Heidegger had been writing and teaching in the nineteen 
twenties regarding ‘Being-with-one-another’ and individual authenticity, and 
secondly, that she thought she could undermine some of his key ontological claims as 
expressed in Being and Time by exposing them to what, for her was the authority 
conveyed by empirical truths of history.
143 Totalitarianism and the Shoah would, of 
course, change everything. With the rupturing of history, authority would lose its 
force and Arendt would return to the dissertation to reformulate its attack on 
Heidegger in terms of a rival ontology. In 1929 though, history was still sufficient for 
her purposes. 
Before considering this further I want, however, to address a possible concern. Given 
my desire to reveal Arendt’s thinking in the late 1920s in terms of the ideas then 
shaping her outlook in relation to Heidegger’s radical philosophy, it needs to be asked 
to what extent this can actually be achieved by drawing on the current edition of her 
dissertation edited by Vecchiarelli Scott and Chelius Stark, which now blends new 
changes with the earlier preliminary translation undertaken by E. B. Ashton. Here, 
reassurance comes from the editors whose comments are taken on trust. They state 
that, ‘even without Arendt’s revisions, the Ashton translation was problematic. 
Faithful to the text and painfully literal as a result, the translation left thickets of 
142 Heidegger, BT, 34. Emphasis in original.
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impenetrable phenomenological discourse in place. Awkward phrasing, repetition, and 
general incomprehensibility were constant difficulties’. They continue by stating that 
their own ‘additions and revisions expand upon rather than fundamentally reorient the 
original dissertation’, while in regard to Arendt’s own alterations, ‘there is no break in 
lines of argument, mode of discourse, or subject matter’.
144 So, echoing Charles 
Mathewes here, my hope is that while being free from what he cites Mark Jordan as 
describing as ‘the old philologists’ fetish of “sources”’, the ‘central dynamics’ of 
Arendt’s thinking have nevertheless been captured.
145 
The early to late 1920s was a period of gestation in Heidegger’s thinking which 
culminated in his magnum opus, Being and Time.
146 Heidegger’s mission was no less 
than the recovery of Being itself, which he argued, as a result of the ontological 
meanderings of a whole host of metaphysicians ending with Kant, had been banished 
to the backwaters of philosophy. In preparation for his “rescue operation”, as it were, 
Heidegger had written a series of lectures, which, we are informed ‘were presented in 
his classes in 1925–26 and finally published in 1929 as Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics’.
147 Arendt’s exposure to these lectures came on the back of having 
studied Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason three years earlier.
148 Thus, it can be justifiably assumed that already 
from the mid-1920s onwards, she was becoming increasingly familiar with the 
thought of Immanuel Kant, a philosopher for whom she demonstrated much regard 
144 Arendt, LSA, xiii. 
145 Charles T. Mathewes, Evil and the Augustinian Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
62.
146 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil 
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throughout her life and on whose political philosophy she would later compose her 
own series of lectures.
The lessons Arendt learnt from her exposure to Kant inform her dissertation. There is 
a Kantian presence in it from the very outset. What is the basis for this argument? 
There is, for example, no overt consideration of Kant’s reasoning about the possibility 
of, say, moral as opposed to religious experience or his discussion of the categorical 
imperative; nor is God revealed either in Arendt’s treatment of Augustine, or, for that 
matter, independently by Arendt herself, to be a postulate, little more than a necessary 
condition of practical reason, that he had become for Kant. God’s divinity, his status 
as creator, as the first principle, never seems to be in doubt in Arendt’s dissertation 
and judgement about man’s conduct in the world is considered from the point of view 
of man’s relationship with the creator as opposed to his apprehension of and 
overriding commitment to the moral law (through which, in Kant’s opinion, God, as a 
non-phenomenal “object”, receives guarantee). However, it is at least partly in 
relation to what follows upon Kant’s pietistic discussion of morality and religion as 
set out in The Critique of Practical Judgement and in Religion within the Boundaries 
of Mere Reason that Hannah Arendt’s treatment of Augustine in her dissertation, and 
shortly afterwards in the paper entitled ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’, 
needs to be understood, I think. Kant’s presence in those writings reflects not only a 
philosophical influence, but in addition reveals the nature of Arendt’s own 
contribution to attempts at reclaiming German-Jewish relations in the light of the 
experience of modern German Jewry from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. 
Varied contributions to that task of recovery came from, for example, Hermann 
Cohen, Walter Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig. In contrast, Otto Weininger and Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Gershom Scholem signalled that they believed, for different reasons, that the retrieval 
of any such relations was an utterly unattainable objective. Weininger internalised the 
anti-Semitic prejudices that were part and parcel of the German-Jewish experience, to 
the point of committing suicide; Scholem, on the other hand, simply would not 
concede that there had even been a German-Jewish dialogue in the first place 
clearly.
149       
Kant believed that, though independent of each other, there was an inextricable 
connection between the moral law, apprehension of which underpinned human 
conduct, and religion. Nevertheless, ‘an act of faith [was] required to close the logical 
gap between morality and the Idea of God as a “moral legislator outside man”’.
150 As 
a consequence, Kant argued that reason drew a clear line between, on the one hand 
particular religious creeds and, on the other, ‘religion which by an act of faith gives 
life to the Idea of God [...]’.
151 According to Kant:
There is only  one  true religion; but there can be 
many   varieties   of   religious   creeds   [...]   it   is, 
therefore, more appropriate to say: this man is of the 
Jewish, Mohammedan, Christian  religious creed, 
than: he is of this or that religion.
Logically therefore, it seems that Kant believed that the Idea of God indicated that 
religious certainty was intimately bound up with morality, with that is, the moral law, 
but divorced from anything attaching to particular confessions of faith. Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing, whom Arendt discussed in her 1932 paper entitled ‘The 
Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ and about whom, in 1959, she would deliver 
149 In this regard the following sources are invaluable: Jeffrey S. Librett, The Rhetoric of Cultural Dialogue: 
Jews and Germans from Moses Mendelssohn to Richard Wagner and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000); Willi  Goetschel,  Spinoza’s  Modernity:  Mendelssohn,  Lessing,   and  Heine  (Madison:  University  of 
Wisconsin Press, 2004); and, Michael Mack,  German Idealism and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of 
Philosophy and German Jewish Responses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
150 Stephan Körner, Kant (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), 169.
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an address on receiving the Lessing Prize, praising his unsystematic manner of 
thinking, adapted Kant’s ideas in his now well known parable of the ring.
152 
The parable is related in Lessing’s play Nathan the Wise. It actually derives from the 
Decameron of the fourteenth century Italian poet, Giovanni Boccaccio, and, in 
Lessing’s play, forms part of a dialogue between Saladin, a Sultan, and Nathan, a rich 
Jew. It concerns a king who one day receives ‘a ring/Of priceless estimate’ that 
affords him much power.
153 The king passes the ring on to his son, and subsequently it 
continues to be passed from father to son across the generations, until the magic ring 
eventually ends up in the possession of a man who has three sons who ‘He loved 
alike’.
154 To which of these sons should he bequeath the ring? This is his dilemma. As 
it turns out the father bequeathes it to each of them but only as a result of 
commissioning duplicates so that none of his sons experiences disappointment or 
feels rejected. However, as the events of the story unfold, it becomes clear that, in 
fact, none of the recipients actually inherits ‘The magic power’ possessed by the 
genuine ring that would have brought ‘its wearer love/And grace with God and man’. 
Only the original ring would have had the power to achieve that, but it is not known 
precisely what happened to it or whether or not, for instance, it was at some point in 
time lost to all beyond recovery. 
Lessing’s parable differs from Kant’s observations on religion in precisely the sense 
that the loss to mankind of the magical ring suggests that there is ultimately not even 
the one true religion that Kant envisaged. In her 1932 paper Arendt discussed this 
152 Published as: ‘On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing’ in Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times 
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 3–31.
153 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan the Wise: A Dramatic Poem in Five Acts, translated by W. A. Steel. 
(London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1931), Act III, Scene VII, 166. 
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point observing that for Lessing the loss of the ring was not really a loss at all but 
assumed a positive aspect in that in contrast to German Enlightenment thinking, 
which understood truth in terms of religious revelation, in Lessing significance came 
to be placed less on truth itself as on the seekers after truth, that is on the human 
beings searching for it. (This echoed, as we shall see in Chapter 4, Arendt’s thoughts 
about the positive side to our having been abandoned by God.) Man was no longer 
regarded as caretaker of a property against which his own value was measured. 
Historical man had now come of age and had attained a value and independence of 
his own. For Lessing different faiths were, in Arendt’s estimation, merely different 
labels for one and the same thing, whereas for Kant Christianity just so happened to 
embody the principles which guaranteed its connection with morality and, 
furthermore, justified its being recognised as the universal religion true for all. 
There are shades of this idea, I think, in Arendt’s own later evaluation of the 
attempted obliteration of European Jewry by the Nazis as a crime against humanity 
perpetrated on the Jewish people. That is, there seems to be a connection with her 
commitment to pluralism and to the political equality that attaches to all peoples. She 
did not perceive the Nazis as having committed a crime purely against God’s chosen 
people; they had committed a crime, in fact, against all peoples, their victims just 
happened to be the Jews. From the viewpoint of the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
however, what is suggested is that if Arendt was aware of Kant’s views on religion – 
and there is every reason to believe that she was – then she would have wanted to 
discuss Augustine in a manner that freed him from Christian doctrine, which masked 
the real message of Christ’s Gospel behind the ecclesiastical authority of historical 
interpretation and dogma as well as statutory law. This partly explains why she Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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undertook what she described as an investigation that she hoped would disclose a 
‘pretheological sphere’ and is behind Jasper’s acknowledgement of her wanting to get 
at ‘the essentials’ of what Augustine had thought about this subject. She sought to get 
behind explanations, hypotheses and dogma to the essence of the Gospels and the 
Christian’s inviolable faith. Both of of these she seems to have understood in a non-
theological sense and this, I think, she was able to achieve at least in part as a result of 
having read Kant. To explain briefly, in a similar sense to Kant’s treatment of 
Christianity as the one truly universal religion, Arendt gave the impression, at least in 
the late nineteen twenties and early nineteen thirties, of having regarded grace as 
containing a message universal to all. Grace is a universal reminder, she suggested, 
that each of us has sinned in the past and in so reminding us it ‘permits us to 
understand the binding equality of all people [...] in the presence of God.’
155 It was the 
manner in which grace refused to discriminate between people, regarding all as 
equally guilty, that was, for Arendt, the important message. I will return to this point. 
However, for the moment we should note that Arendt’s motives for undertaking her 
‘pretheological’ excursion through Augustine were not only to disclose the 
fundamental equality of human beings. She had another objective too and that was to 
expose the ontology of her former teacher, Martin Heidegger, to some truths of 
history. 
The Weimar period of her youth produced both Jewish thinkers, for example, 
Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Walter Benjamin and Leo Strauss, 
as well as such non-Jewish thinkers as Karl Barth, Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf 
Bultmann and Martin Heidegger who stridently challenged the confidence that had 
155 Arendt, LSA, 106. Emphasis added.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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come to be placed in history as a source either of solutions to the problems of Judaism 
or of reliable knowledge in respect of Protestant theology. Barth, for example, already 
mentioned above, regarded history as the type of unrewarding analysis to which men 
only turned in times of spiritual penury. He fiercely opposed attempts to consider in 
terms of historical research, the lives of such towering spiritual figures as Jesus, a 
practice which, he argued, humanised the divine, as it were, and which a number of 
modern Protestant scholars had found very appealing. Similarly, Rosenzweig is a very 
good example of the sort of anti-historicist Jewish thinker of the early twentieth 
century who believed that an all-consuming respect for the methods of history 
shrouded that spiritual province, indispensable to human existence, which was beyond 
the comprehension of the rationalistic methodologies of the liberal historian. 
To this extent, Arendt reflects a strong affinity with anti-historicist thinkers of both 
Protestant and Jewish persuasion. However, the first point that needs to be made clear 
is that there is an important contrast to be drawn between her and thinkers like 
Rosenzweig, Buber and Scholem. Rosenzweig, for instance, in writing the Star of 
Redemption, published in 1922 and in overseeing the establishment of the Lehrhaus in 
the 1920s, was seeking to draw back to Judaism ‘the large pool of Jewish adults 
drifting aimlessly in the sea of German culture’.
156 The appeal to deeper understanding 
of classical Jewish sources including the Torah, and more intimate awareness of the 
Jewish prayer book and the Hebrew language, were clearly aimed at a revival of 
Jewish identity and spirituality. Similarly, as I have already mentioned, Martin Buber 
was calling, at the same time as Rosenzweig, for nothing short of a Jewish spiritual 
Renaissance. And, in Gershom Scholem’s work too, there were clear indications of a 
156 Myers, Resisting History, 90Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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‘“retreat” from the Jews’ engagement with European culture, a critique and rebellion 
against that culture’, in fact, which was part of a wider Zionist project that, it was 
hoped, would result in ‘an immediate constructive engagement of the Jews with their 
own concrete past history’.
157 Arendt’s desire to marginalise all that was non-essential 
(an expression I will try to explain shortly) about history was not, however, 
accompanied by any similar ideological commitment. She would, of course, write a 
number of books and numerous articles in which ideas at the core of modern Jewish 
experience were central. She would, in the years immediately following the Second 
World War, devote herself to the recovery of Jewish artefacts, cultural and religious 
treasures, tirelessly seeking homes for them in Israel, Europe, and the United States of 
America. And, she too would be drawn to Zionism and work, for a time in the mid-
1940s, to establish a federal state of Jews and Palestinians. Her Jewishness would 
always be something of which she was proud and upon which she never sought to 
turn her back, even for a moment. Yet, in the wake of the destruction wrought by the 
Shoah there would be no lifelong project attempting to breathe new cultural and 
spiritual energy into Judaism. There would be no succumbing to lachrymose 
sentimentality either, and her biting criticisms of many Jews, from David Friedländer, 
in the 1932 paper ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ to the community 
leaders in the Nazi-controlled ghettos of Europe or the prosecuting counsel at the 
Eichmann trial, would be just as incisive and vehement as it was with regard to 
anyone else on whom her critical eye fixed. 
Paradoxically however, although Hannah Arendt resisted history on one level she was 
clearly very much concerned with it on another as the discussions in any number of 
157 Handelman, Fragments of Redemption, 118–119.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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her books and articles demonstrate. The Origins of Totalitarianism, On Revolution, 
the essays collected in Between Past and Future are each replete with historical 
analyses. So, this brings me to a further contrast that must be drawn, one that is 
crucial to understanding both Martin Heidegger’s treatment of history and her own. 
This is the distinction made possible by discrete German words for ‘Historie’, that is 
the flow of events and facts that come and go and are now consigned to the past, as it 
were, and ‘Geschichte’, which Heidegger understood as “deep” history that has the 
character not of ‘that which is chronicled’ but of an historical imprint or long lasting 
impression, something that is, which is likely to endure for generations.
158 Heidegger 
adopted the concept of Geschichte and introduced it into his lectures in the late 
nineteen thirties. He perceived ancient classical Greece, for example, to have 
constituted just the ‘beginning’, the source of fundamental modes of thought whose 
reverberations we are still feeling more than two and a half thousand years later. ‘The 
history of being is never past’, he wrote, ‘but stands ever before us; it sustains and 
defines every condition et situation humaine.
159 And earlier, in ‘The Self-Assertion of 
the German University’ written in 1933, he had stated, ‘the beginning exists still. It 
does not lie behind us, as something long past, but it stands before us’.
160
By describing Hannah Arendt as being predominantly concerned with the essentials 
of history or with the recovery, as in Benjamin, of fragments of genuine historical 
experience, I mean to convey the sense that her writings demonstrate a Heideggerian 
preoccupation with Geschichte, with what is relevant to deep history rather than with 
158 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in Basic Writings: from Being and Time (1927) to 
The Task of Thinking (1964), edited by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 306.
159 Martin Heidegger,  Pathmarks, edited by William McNeill and translated by John van Buren  et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 240.
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what is effectively a ‘mere chronicle of an inert past [the] unfolding sequence of 
unambiguous realities that are now over and done with’(Historie).
161 Of course, deep 
history does not preclude an interest in everyday events where these events are 
regarded as manifestations of modes of thinking that have shaped and continue to 
shape our meaning perspectives, that is, the categories and concepts in terms of which 
we make sense of the world around us. The important point, however, is that for 
Arendt, as for Heidegger and Walter Benjamin, deep historical thinking was 
unambiguously “original” in that it always led back to a beginning. It was precisely 
for this reason, I would suggest, that Benjamin quoted Karl Kraus, to the effect that 
‘Origin is the goal’, at the head of his fourteenth thesis on the philosophy of history.
162
In Hannah Arendt’s later writings, by which I mean those dating from the publication 
of The Origins of Totalitarianism and certainly from The Human Condition onwards, 
the origin or beginning indicated not a point in time but the ontological structure 
according to which, she argued, life on earth had been gifted to human beings. She 
used the distinctions between labour, work and action to reorient our thinking and to 
secure the moorings of human experience that had, in the modern age, loosened and 
slipped. In short, her analyses were aimed at clarifying afresh the possibilities for 
being with others that totalitarianism had done so much to destroy. In this regard her 
historical writings became symbiotically bound up with ontology. The individual 
historical phenomenon was granted a deep historical dimension and originality by 
virtue of indicating something fundamentally ontological. So, her study of the 
American Revolution, for instance, came to serve as a type of phenomenon of origin 
in that it permitted a glimpse of truly politically motivated actions whose politcal 
161 Reé, Heidegger, 48.
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character resided in the fact of their being consistent with the conditions of what it 
means to be human.
163 The events of this Revolution were, in other words, exemplary 
(in a Kantian sense to be discussed below) in that they illuminated and therefore 
indicated, at least for those looking on if not necessarily for those taking part, 
something fundamentally original.  On the other hand, the destructiveness of 
totalitarianism also led back to the origin because it was not so much the laying waste 
of buildings, bridges and other structures or the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of 
men, women and children that was so devastating, egregious and deplorable as these 
occurrences were, so much as the assault against ontology itself. National Socialism, 
in attempting to annihilate the Jews by wiping them off the face of the earth 
constituted a crime against Being perpetrated upon beings, all beings, as it were. This, 
for Hannah Arendt, was what distinguished totalitarianism from dictatorship. It 
represented an attack upon the very conditions of being with others that underpin the 
concept of politics.
However, in the mid to late 1920s while she was still engaged in doctoral research, 
her ontological ideas were, we can confidently assume, still largely unformed. Thus, 
when she aspired to illuminating, in the introduction to her dissertation, ‘a 
pretheological sphere’, she should not be taken as indicating that she was aiming to 
disclose something fundamentally ontological. This would have to wait until her 
revisions of the dissertation planned for the mid-1960s, by which time she had 
formulated a quite sophisticated line of reasoning in this regard. Rather, her purpose 
in the nineteen twenties was confined to making historical points, and at least one of 
163 For a discussion of the concept of the phenomenon of origin see Stéphane Mosès, ‘Benjamin’s Metaphors of 
Origin: Names, Ideas, Stars’ in Timothy Bhati and Marilyn Sibley Fries (eds.), Jewish Writers, German Literature: 
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these was, in fact, quite a deep historical point, targeted at Heidegger’s specific 
analysis of ‘Being-with-one-another’ and especially his depiction of ‘Authentic 
Being-one’s-Self ’ as simply a ‘modification of the “they”’.
164 My argument does not, I 
believe, depend upon Heidegger’s having worked out the precise details of his own 
framework of deep history prior to the time Arendt was completing her dissertation. 
This is because Arendt’s critique was confined to attacking what Heidegger had 
written in Being and Time. Nevertheless, I believe it to be a reasonable assumption 
that he had already at least put together some ideas in his mind, however rudimentary, 
in relation to Geschichte and had aired these with Arendt, if only in private, while she 
was still his student at Marburg.
Dasein was undeniably, for Heidegger, a social creature. In  Being and Time  he 
explained that:
In our “description” of that environment which is 
closest to us – the work-world of the craftsman [...] 
the outcome was that along with the equipment to be 
found when one is at work, those Others for whom 
the work is destined are “encountered” too. If this is 
ready-to-hand, then there lies in the kind of Being 
which belongs to it (that is, in its involvement) an 
essential   assignment   or   reference   to   possible 
wearers, for instance, for whom it should be “cut to 
the figure”. Similarly, when material is put to use, 
we encounter its producer or “supplier” as one who 
“serves” well or badly. [...] The Others who are thus 
“encountered” in a ready-to-hand, environmental 
context of equipment are not somehow added on in 
thought to some Thing which is proximally just 
present-to-hand;   such   “Things”   are   encountered 
from out of the world in which they are ready-to-
hand for others – a world which is always mine too 
in advance.
165 
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As Stephen Mulhall notes, others are therefore significant for Dasein in at least three 
senses.
166 First, they constitute another type of being that Dasein will unavoidably 
come into contact with in the world. Secondly, the activities with which Dasein is 
engaged in the world involve the use of ‘equipment’ that either others supply or to 
whom it will duly pass. And thirdly, whatever objects one Dasein finds ready-to-hand 
any other Dasein must be capable of finding ready-to-hand as well. In this sense, 
Mulhall comments, ‘readiness-to-hand is inherently intersubjective’ and Dasein ‘is 
essentially social’.
167   
Two further points should additionally be noted. First, although Heidegger is 
providing an ontological account of being with others here what he says should not be 
taken as excluding the possibility that Dasein can be alone if it chooses to be. On what 
he describes as an ‘ontic’ as opposed to an ontological level, that is, in terms of its 
everyday activities, of course Dasein can, if it decides to, look for solitude. That said, 
isolation or aloneness represents an insufficiency, as it were, because ontologically 
Dasein is a social creature. Heidegger writes, ‘[t]he Other can be missing only in and 
for a Being-with.’
168 Secondly, Heidegger argued that just as Dasein displays an 
attitude of care towards the objects it encounters in the world, so the manner in which 
it is with others like itself indicates an attitude of ‘solicitude’.
169 Of course, Dasein 
need not display solicitude for others if it chooses not to. It can act against them or 
simply neglect them by passing them by without even the merest acknowledgement. 
Again though, ‘deficient and Indifferent [sic] modes that characterize everyday, 
166 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996).
167 Ibid., 66.
168 Heidegger, BT, 157. Emphasis in original.
169 Ibid.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 75
average Being-with-one-another’, are not ontologically rooted.
170 Fundamentally, 
Dasein demonstrates care.
In contrast to Heidegger’s ontological discussion of society, Hannah Arendt, in Part III 
of her dissertation, located what she believed to be the roots of the ‘social organism’ 
in an inescapable ‘equality [...] of situation’, at once both ‘definite and obligatory’ but, 
above all, historical rather than ontological.
171 Her choice of the expression 
‘organism’, indicating interdependency, was telling. ‘Worldly interdependence’ or ‘the 
mutual give and take in which people live together’,
172 and the earthly society which 
grows out of this, she argued, are traceable to the historical fact that men are related to 
each other because of an undeniable ‘common decent from Adam’.
173 She had been 
searching in Augustine for the grounds of a ‘community of faith’ that might solve the 
problem of the ‘isolation’ of the individual ‘from his fellows in the divine presence’.
174 
It was not an ‘inner dialectics of faith’,
175 however, that her inquiry eventually 
unearthed. ‘Rather, it [was] a historically pre-existing reality’
176 and human 
experience of this that was disclosed, suggesting, as she had intimated at the outset of 
the dissertation, ‘the neighbor’s relevance in a wholly different context’ to what might 
have been expected.
177 In the process, her appeal to both, history and experience, and 
the significance she judged we should place in trust, equality and kinship, for 
example, suggested that  the guarantees of a Heideggerian ontology were much 
inflated. She wrote:
170 Ibid., 158.
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We   comprehend   all   history,   that   is,   all   human 
temporal   acts   by   believing   –   which   means   by 
trusting, but never by understanding (intelligere). 
This belief in the other is the belief that he will 
prove himself in our common future. Every earthly 
city depends upon this proof. Yet this belief that 
arises from our mutual interdependence precedes 
any   possible   proof.  The   continued   existence   of 
humankind does not rest on the proof. Rather, it 
rests on necessary belief, without which social life 
would become impossible.
178 
What Arendt was doing in making this historical point was turning to empiricism as 
against ontology.  Effectively, she appeared to be arguing that if we only stop to think 
about it, human interdependence, plurality, trust and equality (all of which she would 
discuss in her subsequent political philosophy) each stem from an ‘experiential 
ground’
179 that can be traced back to our origin in Adam, the father of all men, who 
thus represented a truly foundational moment in human history. This was the true 
significance, surely, of the Old Testament story about Eden, not the fact that Adam 
had been an ens creatum brought into the world by an ens perfectissimum or that he, 
Adam, and Eve had been duped by the serpent.
180 
There was a problem, though. Arendt was searching for the grounds of community 
within a Christian context. She judged that the nature of the equality deriving from 
kinship was not adequate for Augustine to speak of this as a form of love between men 
that was sufficiently powerful to rival caritas, their love of God. Alternatively put, she 
inquired, how ‘is it possible for their equality, based on the Christian sense of sin [...] 
to become obligatory for one gripped by faith? The creature knows itself dependent 
on the source, the epitome of being out of this world, that is, on the Creator. How can 
178 Ibid., 101.
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duties be derived from a past that is to be totally eradicated?’
181 Put another way, was 
it not the Christian’s duty to demonstrate his  or her devotion to God by turning away 
from the material world including his or her fellow inhabitants? And did this not 
thereby consign him or her, of necessity, to a life spent in isolation? An appeal to 
Adam, it seemed was an insufficient guarantee of community against such isolation. 
Inspired however, by the discussion of grace in the Gospels, Arendt made another 
historical point in defence of community. Her argument, once again, contained serious 
implications for Heideggerian philosophy. In particular, given his gloomy depiction in 
Being and Time of what he judged being with others fundamentally amounted to 
(which it could be argued, was simply the result of his having been ensnared by an 
assessment of das Man engendered by having become fixated on mass society) 
Arendt’s defence of community reflected a much more optimistic assessment. Let us 
remind ourselves of what Heidegger was claiming.
A significant problem for Dasein, as indicated in the extract from Being and Time 
quoted at the head of this chapter is that, because it is ontologically a social being the 
extent to which it can be aware of its own authentic individuality is essentially 
determined by the way in which it understands and behaves in relation to other 
beings. As such, ‘Dasein’s knowing of itself [can be] led astray and obstructed by the 
various possibilities of Being which Dasein itself possesses, so that genuine 
“understanding” gets suppressed’.
182 And so Dasein has a choice. It can either mimic 
the appearance, behaviour, life style and opinions of those around it in an effort to “fit 
in”, as it were, and conform, or it can choose to try and be different. Even if it chooses 
to do the latter, however, by virtue of reacting to others it still allows its actions and 
181 Arendt, LSA, 104.
182 See footnote 127 above.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 78
thoughts to be determined for it, though in a negative fashion rather than by way of 
conformity. Either way, its actions are not autonomous and not behaving in a way that 
could be judged authentic. The social circumstances in which Dasein finds itself in 
regard to its everyday activities are therefore extremely challenging, a situation made 
all the worse by virtue of being not simply the product of particular social and cultural 
arrangements but, rather, because Heidegger thought it constituted an ontological 
given:
Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands 
in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its being has 
been taken away by the Others. Dasein’s everyday 
possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of 
as   they   please.   The   Others,   moreover,   are   not 
definite  Others. On the contrary, any Other can 
represent them. One belongs to the Others oneself 
and enhances their power. “The Others” whom one 
thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one’s 
belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who 
proximally and for the most part “are there” in 
everyday Being-with-one-another. The “who” is not 
this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, 
and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the 
neuter, the “they”.
183   
This state of ‘Being-with-one-another’ as part of an amorphous “they” or das Man, 
was about as appealing, from a psychological perspective, as Thomas Hobbes’ 
seventeenth century description in Leviathan of men existing in a condition of 
complete insecurity in which life was ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short’.
184 In 
essence, das Man was a significant obstacle not only barring the way to Dasein’s 
personal achievement of authenticity but generating too, ontological 
misunderstandings within philosophy. Unable to see beyond das Man, indeed 
swallowed up by it, Dasein’s understanding of itself was described by Heidegger as 
183 Heidegger, BT, 164. Emphases in original.
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being determined by the categories most readily available to it. These, Heidegger 
believed, were likely be the categories of the inauthentic popular culture of which it 
formed a part. Dasein  typically understands itself therefore, by means of ingesting 
and applying the language of current popular opinion, which, Heidegger judged, was 
inclined towards simplicity, shallowness and inauthenticity. Meanwhile, on a 
philosophical level, Mulhall concludes that Heidegger believed ‘[a]ny attempt to 
retrieve an authentic ontological understanding will accordingly appear to subvert 
obvious and self-evident truths, to overturn common sense and violate ordinary 
language’.
185
To what extent we should ask, was Heidegger the victim of his own philosophical 
analysis? Was his critique of iniquitous das Man no more than a reaction on his part 
to the growing mass society in which he found himself, and thus, on his own terms, 
inauthentic? Was Heidegger simply the victim of history? When Hannah Arendt 
returned to her dissertation in the 1960s with a view to republishing it her alterations 
indicated her commitment to an ontology formulated in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. For example, the insertion in the dissertation of the term ‘natality’ – ‘the 
decisive fact determining man as a conscious, remembering being is birth or 
“natality”’
186 – introduced to her earlier line of reasoning ontological terminology 
intrinsic to her post-war understanding of the human condition.
187 In 1929 though, she 
found illumination, again, in a quite distinct empirical source, as she saw matters – the 
life of Christ and the possibility of grace. Having already in the first half of her 
chapter on the ‘Social Life’ drawn some conclusions about ‘historicity, that is, [...] 
185 Mulhall, Heidegger, 69 – 70.
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mankind’s own origin’
188 in Adam, she subsequently turned to ‘God’s revelation in 
Christ [...] as a historical fact’
189 to propose a fundamental argument in defence of 
community and against the isolation before God that an appeal to Adam still left as a 
possibility. The sense in which the argument was fundamental, I think, resided in the 
fact that it enabled her to cast doubt upon Heidegger’s assessment, in Being and Time, 
both of his account of ‘Being-with-one-another’ and his assessment of the iniquities 
of das Man.     
   
The more one reads Love and Saint Augustine in the light of Heidegger’s philosophy, 
in close proximity to which it was composed, the more one becomes aware, I think, 
that, notwithstanding the fact that this a text in which the young student concerned 
herself with different varieties of love as discussed by the Christian bishop and saint, 
it was also an investigation very much bound up with the ‘truths of history’,
190 as 
Arendt interpreted them. And these “truths” she pitted against the claims of 
Heideggerian ontology. If it was the historical fact that everybody’s roots can be 
traced back to Adam, which formed the basis for the first part of her discussion of 
social life, Arendt’s second line of reasoning shifted to considering the significance of 
Christ. God’s sacrifice of his Son, an all but incomprehensible demonstration of His 
love of mankind, was a sacrifice made that all might be redeemed and that all might 
be delivered from original sin. For every individual so redeemed, for every member of 
the human race saved by the grace of God, Arendt’s interpretation of Augustine was 
that his neighbours serve as constant reminders of not just a shared, but also, all 
importantly, a sinful past. None of us is perfect was the message. ‘“The whole world 
188 Arendt, LSA, 103.
189 Ibid., 105. Emphasis added.
190 See her discussion of Lessing on the ‘truths of history’ in ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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was guilty from Adam”’, she quoted Augustine as having written.
191 This established 
the grounds for a new equality and not, this time, simply an equality of kinship or of 
generation: ‘one should love one’s neighbor not on account of his sin, which indeed 
was the source of equality, but on account of the grace that has revealed itself in him 
as well as in oneself’.
192 It was Christ who made redemption possible. Furthermore, 
men also live in constant ‘peril’ of being lead to sin again, that is, of relapsing. In 
extending their concerns about this to include the other too, this peril was transformed 
into a ‘common danger’ upon which an ‘obligation’ to love the neighbour in order that 
he might be saved from such a fate, and escape ‘eternal death’, rested.
193
What did the significance Arendt attached to grace indicate? In the first place the fact 
that she attempted to lift the New Testament account of Jesus Christ out of theological 
debate in order to get to the essence of the Gospels suggested a type of Kantian 
appeal to the universal in the seemingly particular. Her understanding of the Gospels 
recognised in them how they applied to mankind generally, in other words in similar 
fashion to Kant’s having believed that Christianity was the only truly universal 
religion. And in this Arendt appeared to be making a point about grace that suggested 
it had made a deeply significant imprint in human history. Heidegger would suggest 
that Christianity was the second of three such moments in Geschichte. (The other 
moments were first, when the Romans appropriated ancient Greek language and ideas 
substituting for an earlier pre-reflective experience of Being as ‘unconcealment’,
194 a 
robust and controlling Latin orientation towards reality; and second, when ‘Ratio and 
reason’ traceable to ‘the Roman re-interpretation of the Greek experience’ that 
191 Arendt, LSA, 102.
192   Ibid., 106. 
193   Ibid., 109–110. Emphasis added. 
194 See, for example, Martin Heidegger’s discussion of alētheia, in ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking’, in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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‘contribut[ed] to the forgetting of Being [became] dominating concepts’ employed by 
seventeenth-century philosophers like Leibniz.
195) Arendt, I think, concurred with 
Heidegger’s general assessment of Christianity but spelt out the details based upon 
her own understanding. Grace and the neighbourly conditional upon it were at the 
centre of this understanding. Indeed, they represented her empirical response, as it 
were, to Heidegger’s ontology of solicitude. ‘Through imitation’, Arendt observed, 
‘everyone may initiate the impulse of saving one’s neighbor’.
196 Everyone is thus 
capable of demonstrating neighbourly love. 
However, Arendt’s excursus on grace and neighbourly love indicates something in 
addition to this, targeted, I would contend, against Heidegger’s depiction of Desein’s 
inauthenticity. Inauthenticity, Heidegger had suggested was intrinsic to Dasein’s very 
Being. He stated, 
Authentic Being-one’s-self  does not rest upon an 
exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that 
has been detached from the “they”; it is rather an 
existentiell modification of the “they”.
197
And despite the fact that Heidegger believed it was open to Dasein to live either 
authentically or inauthentically, he made it quite clear that its, Dasein’s, original 
position, as it were, was one of capitulation to, ‘dispersal into’ das Man.
198 The route 
to authenticity lay in Dasein’s being a practitioner. As a being whose worldhood 
depended upon its roles, functions and functional relations providing it with access to 
the objective environment, authenticity represented a personal achievement in respect 
of these roles and functions:
195 Heidegger, Parmenides, 69.
196   Ibid., 110. 
197 Heidegger, BT, 168. Emphases in original.
198 Ibid. Emphasis in original.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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As   they-self,   the   particular   Dasein   has   been 
dispersed  into the the “they”, and must first find 
itself. [...] If Dasein discovers the world in its own 
way and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its 
own authentic Being, then this discovery of the 
“world” and this disclosure of Dasein are always 
accomplished as a clearing away of concealments 
and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises 
with which Dasein bars its own way.
199 
  
What Arendt argued in relation to grace challenged this, I think, in the following 
respects. First, she demonstrated in the dissertation, that she was unconcerned with 
personal authenticity. The whole thrust of her argument showed her concern for being 
with others, escaping isolation, establishing the grounds of community and 
neighbourly love. There was no indication in this of a preoccupation with individual 
or  personal achievement. As indicated by the author in the introduction to her 
dissertation an extract from which is quoted at the head of this chapter, what linked 
the different parts of her text together was the question concerning the ‘other being’s 
relevance’.
200 In addition to this though, Arendt sought to establish an historical case, 
indeed a case rooted in Geschichte, against Heidegger’s depiction of the individual 
(Dasein) as simply being swallowed up by those in society around him (das Man). 
Neighbourly love, made possible by grace, was something very deeply ingrained in 
social life suggesting that the ontology of Being and Time was something  of a 
distortion of the actual facts of human existence. (By the time she came to write about 
the ‘social realm’ in The Human Condition, for example, Arendt was far less 
enthusiastic about “society” as such.) In other words, Arendt’s analysis cast into 
relief, that is, illuminated, characteristics of social life that Heidegger had not noticed 
199 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
200 See footnote 128 above. Emphasis added.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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perhaps because his perception was too much influenced by his contempt for the 
actualities of society around him beyond which he could not see.
Yet, Hannah Arendt’s Kantian inspired interpretation of Augustine, which we must 
remember came from the pen of a Jewess, suggested that unlike so many of her 
contemporaries and near contemporaries, she did not, as a matter of course, share the 
belief that the Jews had any special relationship to God, or that they were in a biblical 
sense, His elect or His ‘Chosen People’. In the context of Jewish historiography 
generally   and   the   projects   of   such   modern   Jewish   thinkers   and   scholars   as 
Rosenzweig, for example, or Buber or Scholem in particular, who were calling for a 
Jewish renaissance and trying to instil a renewed vitality into Judaism, her discussion 
of grace was quite radical. The intriguing question, however, is, was it actually 
something more sinister than this? The penultimate paragraph to the dissertation 
concluded with these words:
According   to  Augustine’s   philosophy   of   history, 
before salvation through Christ, there was only the 
human race determined by Adam. [...] it is the very 
possibility of isolation that enables us to detach 
ourselves   from   human   history   and   from   its 
irrevocable enchainment by generation.
201
Inspired by Kant, who expressed a number of anti-Semitic statements in his writings, 
was there a suggestion, perhaps, of latent anti-Semitism and self-hatred in Hannah 
Arendt, a desire maybe, to distance herself from her Jewish forbears? These are 
questions to which I turn in the next chapter  where I consider what might 
conveniently be summarised by the somewhat formulaic expression: being-Jewish-
with-others.
201 Arendt, LSA, 112.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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CHAPTER 3
In Cahoots with Kant? 
or 
Being Jewish and Escaping the ‘Long Present’
202 
Of course it is said that the freedom to speak or to write could 
be taken from us by a superior power, but the freedom to think 
cannot be. Yet how much and how correctly would we think if 
we did not think as it were in community with others to whom 
we  communicate  our thoughts and who communicate theirs 
with us! Thus one can very well say that this external power 
which   wrenches   away   people’s   freedom   publicly   to 
communicate their thoughts also takes from them the freedom 
to think – that single gem remaining to us in the midst of all 
the burdens of civil life through which alone we can devise 
means of overcoming all the evils of our condition.
Immanuel Kant
203
I am a Jew and I know nothing about the Jews. Henceforth I 
am a pariah, and I know not out of what elements to rebuild 
myself a dignity and a personality. I must learn who I am and 
why I am hated, and that which I can be.
Bernard Lazare
204
If the present is to be understood at all, then the past must be 
explicitly seized anew.
Hannah Arendt
205
During the nineteen thirties, both prior to her flight from Germany in 1933 and in the 
years immediately following it, Hannah Arendt published several papers on 
specifically Jewish themes including, ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ 
(1932), ‘Against Private Circles’ (1933), ‘The Jewish Question’ (1937 or 1938) and 
the extended essay entitled, ‘Antisemitism’ written around 1938 to 1939.
206 She also 
202 The expression, the ‘long present’ is Abraham Geiger’s: ‘As Geiger saw it, contemporary Judaism was bereft 
of historical consciousness. It lived in a “long present” which had not so much grown out of the past as fully 
absorbed it’. Cited in Michael Meyer, Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 92.
203 Kant,  RRT, 16. Emphases in original. Also see footnote 50 above.
204 Bernard Lazare, ‘Job’s Dungheap’, in Bernard Lazarre,    Job’s Dungheap: Essays on Jewish Nationalism and 
Social Revolution, translated  by Harry Lorin Binsse, edited by Hannah Arendt  (New York: Schocken Books, 
1948), 44.
205 Hannah Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’, in Hannah Arendt, TJW, 16. 
206 Each of these pieces has been published in Hannah Arendt, TJW.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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completed the initial draft, again in 1933, of her biography, Rahel Varnhagen: The 
Life of a Jewess, though the book would not actually get to be published for another 
twenty five years. To the extent that, as George Mosse has noted, ‘the “Jewish 
Question” had become an integral part of the political discourse’ in Weimar Germany 
by 1929, ‘assuming threatening dimensions which it had not possessed earlier’ 
Arendt’s research and published articles reflected her growing recognition that she 
needed to become engaged, to ‘do something’, as she put it to Gaus in a televised 
interview some years later.
207 They had an additional significance, though.  Given her 
recent discussion of the importance of grace Arendt might be seen at this time as 
clarifying her thoughts and feelings about what being Jewish actually meant to her. 
She was doing this, in one sense, on a personal level, establishing for herself the sort 
of person she wanted to be and be seen to be. In this regard Rahel was as much a 
confidante as a subject of research: Arendt described her, in a letter to Heinrich 
Blücher written in 1936, as her ‘closest friend, though she has been dead for some one 
hundred years’.
208 Crucially, I think this involved elucidating what being Jewish in the 
midst of others meant in the post-emancipation world of the twentieth century. In this 
regard, the fact that Arendt was so inspired by Kantian philosophical ideas might be 
taken to indicate that her critical comments against, for example, Jewish sectarianism 
demonstrated that she concurred with the Königsberg philosopher’s anti-Jewish 
remarks. However, I think this would be the wrong judgement to make. The fact that 
she drew heavily on Johann Gottfried Herder’s ‘expressivist’ philosophy, for example, 
in order to qualify Kant’s writings about the formal conditions of agency indicated, I 
would argue, that she was committed to balancing two fundamental values that would 
later become key to understanding her political philosophy. The first of these values, 
207 George Mosse, German Jews Beyond Judaism (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985), 21. For the 
source of the Gaus extract see footnote 2 above.
208 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 56.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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equality, she had already highlighted in relation to grace: she understood from 
Augustine that all human beings are equally sinners before God. ‘Original kinship’, 
she had written in her dissertation, was characterised by ‘an equal share in original sin 
and thus in death’.
209  The second value, ‘plurality’ was, I believe, rooted in her 
unwillingness to forswear her Jewishness under any circumstances (unlike her 
‘friend’ Rahel, for example). Her Jewishness was intrinsic to what made her different, 
one amongst many, which she subsequently translated into the fundamental 
observation, expressed in The Human Condition, ‘that men, not Man, live on the earth 
and inhabit the world.
210  Consequently, in this chapter, though I am primarily going to 
consider what Hannah Arendt had to say about Jews and Jewishness, the point is that 
her conclusions were not exclusive to the Jews but stretched far beyond this providing 
an insight into her commitment to fundamental values that would eventually occupy 
centre stage in her mature political writings.    
Hannah Arendt’s commitment to both equality and plurality can, I think, be traced to 
two objections she expressed in the nineteen thirties on Jewish themes. The first 
objection was to the authority and potency of fundamental Jewish beliefs about 
biblical election and the coming of a messiah, beliefs generated deep in the Jewish 
past, which had informed Jewish self-perceptions over generations and the behaviours 
of many of her fellow Jews still in the early decades of the twentieth century. Her 
second objection was directed against the attitude of individual Jews, David 
Friedländer who had lived more than a century earlier, was prominent amongst them. 
It was Friedländer and others like him who, during the Enlightenment, had renounced 
their religious heritage entirely and were thus exposed, in Arendt's judgement, as 
209 Arendt, LSA, 107.
210 Arendt, HC, 7.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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nullities. The substance of Arendt’s criticisms seems to amount to this: on the one 
hand segregation could only be achieved at a price. Social cohesion and the 
preservation of a collective Jewish identity, a ‘tradition-directed social type’ or 
grouping, as Riesman defined it, achieved either through acquiescence in or willing 
adherence to a set of religious beliefs and modes of behaviour determined long ago, 
has to be paid for.
211 The price is that of being imprisoned in a ‘long present’,
212 which 
has nothing at all, in fact, to do with the actual present, with what is happening now. 
To be a prisoner of the ‘long present’ is actually to be trapped in what amounts to an 
extended past, disengaged, as it were, and isolated from other people. In ‘The 
Enlightenment’ paper Arendt referred to ‘the Jews’ unique sense of life, which 
[attempts] to hold what is past within the present’.
213 This type of isolation from others 
was detrimental though, as Arendt knew from reading Kant, because it represented the 
voluntary relinquishment of relations which would inevitably involve communication 
with others; and communication with others was itself, vital to thinking, to making 
judgements. (In the Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt would develop this argument 
along political lines accusing wealthy German Jews in the aftermath of the European 
settlement worked out at the Congress of Vienna, of contriving to maintain their 
poorer brethren ‘in their national isolation, pretending that this separation [wa]s part 
of their religion’, in order to protect their own power and privilege vis-à-vis national 
governments.
214)  On the other hand, however, to reject one’s Jewishness in toto, to 
deny one’s own history, as Friedländer had, and to look upon everything peculiar to 
oneself ‘as an impediment to [one’s] integration’, to one’s becoming fully human, 
211 Riesman, The Lonely Crowd.
212 See footnote 202 above.
213 Arendt, TJW, 12.
214 Arendt, OT, 33.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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risks occupying the world from a non-perspective, dispossessed of a viewpoint 
necessary for making sense of reality.
215 
The cost to the individual in either case, whether it be through voluntary separation or 
the absence of a viewpoint, as it were, entails existential denial. (Arendt would surely 
have held this to be true of everybody, not just the Jews, though in her early writings, 
‘The Enlightenment’ paper being a case in point, it was still the Jews who were the 
focus of her attention.) By existential denial I mean to suggest being deprived of the 
intelligibility of experience that comes from being with others as an autonomous 
individual and being able to communicate with them. Where ‘self-consciousness’ is 
offered the prospect of ‘substance’ as a result of ‘merely ethical command’, Arendt 
observed early in her published writings, it, self-consciousness, ‘must always remain 
vacant’.
216  There can be no sense of an independent will, in other words, where the 
individual is bound by the formalities of a categorical imperative (she was, in this 
respect, highly critical of Kant), or where people, for instance the Jews, retreat behind 
rigidly adhered to religious convictions, customs and wardrobe the possession of 
which they rely upon to provide a sense of who they are independently of all worldly 
relations with others.  Then again, to go through life as an individual stripped of all 
that which connects me to my past (as might be thought to be the case in respect of 
the Enlightenment’s universal man) is to erase ‘the understanding distance’ born of 
having a unique perspective fundamental to communication and judgement.
217 It 
would have to wait until her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, of course, for 
Arendt to describe this ‘understanding distance’ as the achievement of the spectator. 
215 Ibid., 9.
216 Arendt, ‘Against Private Circles’, in TJW, 20.
217 Arendt observed that ‘Tolerance corresponds to the understanding distance held by the educated person’, 
‘The Enlightenment’, TJW, 14. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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In its original form, Kant’s ‘critical philosophy’ was, of course, meant to put beyond 
further dispute the argument that in order for knowledge to be at all possible, there 
must exist external stimuli, or ‘sensible intuitions’, which the mind, employing the 
concepts of space and time in conjunction with a set of twelve categories, can “work 
on” and process. Without such stimuli there would be nothing, no content, he pointed 
out, for the concepts and categories to order and unify. Likewise, given that our senses 
are perpetually, that is, minute by minute, nanosecond by nanosecond in fact, 
bombarded by external material, we, as rational beings, would be plunged into not 
just mental disarray and disorientation but, Kant argued, we would be denied all 
possibility of experiencing in any shape or form at all, were we dispossessed of the 
necessary conceptual apparatus to make out regularities and order from the haphazard 
and chaotic onslaught of overlapping, incongruous and incoherent stimuli. My 
contention here is that Arendt recast the crucial Kantian insight that ‘intuitions 
without concepts are blind’ employing it to argue that there are areas of experience 
that will remain inaccessible to us if we render them unintelligible by refusing to 
engage in the type of discussion about them with others that thinking itself demands. 
Of course, I might neither get to walk through the South American Rain Forest nor 
may I ever have cause to talk to my friends about trips made there by others. 
Similarly, I might not expect to taste beluga caviar or sip Dom Perignon champagne 
and I might be just as unlikely to feel the need to discuss the opinions on fine cuisine 
held by others. My experience and my understanding may, as a consequence, be all 
the poorer for these lacuna. However, there are other dimensions of experience whose 
opaqueness, because of an unwillingness on my part to interrogate them as part of Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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public discourse, threatens far more serious consequences. In the nineteen thirties, for 
instance, with anti-Semitism and Nazi aggression an ever growing menace, Arendt 
expressed her ire at those German Jews who looked inwards rather than outwards, as 
it were, calling for ‘“return”’ and ‘teshuva’ (a ‘taking stock of oneself’) as if all 
responsibility for what was transpiring belonged to them.
218 In her short essay entitled, 
‘The Jewish Question’, written towards the end of the decade she indicated her 
unconventional and outward looking approach: ‘there was no Jewish question in 
Germany in 1933’. She continued, ‘which makes it all the more important to ask why 
in Germany of all places antisemitic slogans held such promise of success and why of 
all places it was possible in Germany to remove Jews totally from the life of the 
German nation.’
219 In expressing her views publicly, Arendt was thus setting the 
pattern for a lifetime of thinking and writing, a lifetime spent not ‘entirely private[ly]’ 
and so not ‘deprived of things essential to a truly human life [or] deprived of the 
reality that comes from being seen and heard by others’.
220 To think, to make 
intelligible, meant acting responsibly (as Hans Jonas might put it), which in turn 
implied engaging in public discourse with others in the world.
221 Without such public 
discourse, to which Hannah Arendt began contributing from the 1930s, there could be 
no understanding.
222
Arendt’s earliest pieces, including a number of her so-called ‘Jewish Writings’ 
published in the 1930s, already suggest a concern about precisely the impoverishment 
of understanding.  In Between Past and Future, published in 1954, she wanted to 
218 Hannah Arendt, ‘The Jewish Question’ in TJW, 42–45.
219 Ibid., 45.
220 Arendt, THC, 58, emphasis added.
221 See, for example, Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological 
Age, translated by Hans Jonas with David Herr (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984).
222 Jerome Kohn has edited a book of Hannah Arendt’s essays entitled, Essays in Understanding 1930–1954: 
Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism. See footnote 2 above.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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show by example how intelligibility about what takes place in the world in which we 
reside might be invigorated if we only undertook the type of ‘exercises in political 
thinking’ she recommended. In her early writings, Arendt’s discussion focussed more 
on obstacles to understanding, on the one hand as a result of Bildung, for example, or 
as she described it, ‘formation’ (for nineteenth century German Jews Bildung was a 
very complex idea, a Weltanschauung, no less
223) and on the other the because of 
Jewish attitudes to the Jewish past.
Since Arendt’s analysis of the Jewish past, Judaism and Jewishness or Jewish identity 
demand that consideration be given to already existing and frequently contentious 
debates about what is generally summarised as the ‘Jewish question’, her contribution 
to these debates, between and amongst Jews and non-Jews, must be assessed, I think, 
in the context of offerings made by others, including non-Jewish Germans, German-
Jewish intellectuals and, in addition, the particular recommendations issuing from 
within German-Jewish movements for religious reform.
224 My overall approach to 
unravelling the complexities of the issue indicated here is, however, to estimate the 
extent to which the allure of Kant’s critical philosophy led Arendt to adopt and adapt, 
perhaps unconsciously, certain aspects of his more disagreeable thinking in respect of 
the Jews, in addition to his critical method. I will therefore, be exploring whether 
Arendt’s often controversial, sometimes cruelly insensitive and heartless comments 
about Jews and Jewishness were, in fact, an indication of her susceptibility in regard 
to Kant’s anti-Jewish beliefs, beliefs of which she could not have failed to be aware? 
Of course, contemporary influences should not be discounted in this respect. For 
instance, Arendt would have been well aware of the self-hating Jewish author, Otto 
223 See, for example, George, L Mosse, German Jews Beyond Judaism.
224 Some of the contributions were part of the Reform movement, others part of a reforms issuing form the Neo-
Orthodox Rabbi, Samson Raphael Hirsch.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Weininger, who published the best-selling ‘anti-Semitic and “idealist” book’ Sex and 
Character, in 1906. She would also have been familiar with the work of the German 
Jewish philosopher, Theodor Lessing, who undertook a study of Jewish self-hatred, 
originally published in 1930 under the title Der jüdische Selbsthaß.
225 Here however, 
given the extent to which Arendt drew on the ‘critical method’, my focus will be on 
the potential influence Kant’s anti-Semitic beliefs had on her. And, given this 
influence, the question I want to address is, did Hannah Arendt in fact fall prey to 
precisely what Rosenzweig had cautioned Jewish intellectuals against, namely 
‘apologetic thinking’?
226  
In an ‘Interpretive Essay’ that accompanies Hannah Arendt’s published lectures on 
Kant’s political philosophy, Ronald Beiner has provided a useful critical assessment 
of her thoughts on some key ideas, for example, judging, the so-called ‘enlarged 
mentality’, taste, and the virtues of being a spectator as opposed to an actor, each 
considered initially by Kant and subsequently developed in Arendt’s mature political 
thinking. The limitation of Beiner’s analysis and critical remarks, however, is that in 
common with other commentators he confines himself to analysing and discussing 
what Arendt says about her subject, at the expense of what she neglects to say. This is 
a significant oversight because what she neglects to say is that Kant’s attitude towards 
the Jews as expressed in a number of texts among which ‘Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason’ (1793) is a prime example, was filled with abhorrence. 
One is, in fact, left feeling that with respect to her relationship to Kant, some 
immensely important aspects of her thinking that are, at the very least, consistent with 
225 Mack, German Idealism, 104.
226 Rosenzweig actually wrote an essay with this title in which he observed in respect of modern Jewish 
philosophy that ‘Apologetic thinking remains dependent on the cause, the adversary. And in this sense Jewish 
thinking remains apologetic thinking’. Cited in Mack, German Idealism, 129.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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his and quite possibly derive from her detailed reading of his philosophy, have not 
only been left unarticulated by her and been overlooked by those writing about her, 
but in being left unarticulated and overlooked represent a hiatus that makes the 
intelligibility of Arendt’s work that much weaker. So, on the one hand we need to 
consider Arendt’s neglect in regard to not discussing Kant’s anti-Jewish remarks; on 
the other we need to be aware of her omission from critical considerations of German-
Jewish intellectuals and scholars including, for example, Moses Mendelssohn, 
Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin and Sigmund Freud who have 
been discussed precisely in terms of their reactions to Kant’s anti-Jewish German 
idealism.
227 How then, is Hannah Arendt’s apparent silence to be interpreted?
In ‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason’ and a number of other writings 
including  Anthropology and The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), Kant’s animosity 
towards Judaism is manifest in terms of the clash between his ‘critical philosophy’, 
consonant in his mind with Christianity, which he promoted as fit for a progressive 
modern nation state, and his dismissal of the outdated beliefs and practices of a 
primitive people – the Jews – occupying the realm of darkness, tethered immutably to 
their God and unable to see beyond the immediacy of their material being. This 
animosity, internalised and developed by a number of other prominent German 
thinkers in a variety of fields – Feuerbach, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Heinrich von 
Treitschke and Richard Wagner have been cited as examples by Michael Mack – was 
augmented by Kant’s representation of Judaism as a “religion” without religion, 
merely ‘a  cult’, disabled by a heteronomous fascination with all things material, 
which served to prevent the Jews from exercising rational judgement.
228 (Interestingly, 
227 See Mack, for example, German Idealism and the Jew.
228 Kant refers to Judaism as an old cult that ‘the teachers of Christianity’ sought to replace with a ‘pure moral 
religion’. See ‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason’ in RRT, 156.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Anson Rabinbach describes the German-Jewish intellectuals of the Weimar generation 
as being in possession of ‘a spiritual radicalism that constituted a Jewishness without 
doctrinal Judaism’.
229) This, for Kant, was an impediment to their liberation from 
what he perceived as their ethical imperfection and put paid to their chances of 
redemption, something an autonomous, rational-thinking Christian idealist, who was 
by definition free of all material inclinations, was much better suited to accomplish. 
Kant’s anti-Jewish discourses, and following him, Hegel’s too, fuelled a debate about 
Jewishness and the treatment and integration of Jews within non-Jewish communities 
to which both Jewish and non-Jewish thinkers and writers alike had begun 
contributing since the late eighteenth century. Writing in the twentieth century, 
Hannah Arendt’s work represents a further contribution to this ‘dialogue’.
230 Such 
essays as ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ published in 1932 and 
‘Original Assimilation: An Epilogue to the One Hundredth Anniversary of Rahel 
Varnhagen’s Death’ and ‘Against Private Circles’, both published the following year, 
are particularly noteworthy Arendtian texts because given the stance Kant took 
towards the Jews, what Arendt wrote appeared to indicate an apologetic dimension. 
What do I mean by ‘apologetic’? In contrast to Rosenzweig’s exhortation to his fellow 
Jews to challenge ‘the adversary’s’ anti-Jewish thinking, as he himself had and, in 
reaction to Kant, Mendelssohn, Freud and Benjamin had too, Hannah Arendt’s 
emerging radicalism gives the impression of her having internalised Kant’s 
animosity. It suggests she might have wanted to reform Judaism as a result.
231 She 
229 Anson Rabinbach, ‘Introduction’, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem 1932-
1940, edited by Gershom Scholem, translated by Gary Smith and Andre Lefevere (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), xxxv.
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Myth of a German-Jewish Dialogue’ become a matter of some contention, as discussed above. 
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seemed, that is, to be almost asking pardon for what were perceived to be Judaism’s 
‘shortcomings’. We may be forgiven then, for thinking that her tributes to Herder’s 
historiography in the 1932 ‘Enlightenment’ paper, for example, masked this 
internalisation and apologetic posture through implicit recommendations of her own 
that the Jews should relinquish their past, that Judaism’s ties to its God should be 
dissolved and that the Old Testament’s election theology, which identified the Jews as 
God’s ‘Chosen People’, be abandoned. There seemed to be something Nietzschean, 
counter-historical, about what Arendt was writing since it was Nietzsche who had 
provided a description of counter-history as the struggle to overcome the ‘aberrations, 
passions and errors, and indeed […] crimes’ of ‘earlier generations’ by ‘condemn[ing] 
these aberrations and regard[ing] ourselves as free of them’. In, ‘On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life’, he had observed, for instance, that the most we 
could hope for was, 
to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with 
our knowledge of it, and through a  new, stern 
discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in 
ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second 
nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an 
attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past 
in which one would like to originate in opposition to 
that in which one did originate […].
232 
In ‘The Enlightenment’ paper Arendt acclaimed Herder’s discussion of the Jewish 
question as this arose out of a treatment of history by ‘one of [its] first great 
interpreters’.
233 She offered a reading of Herder’s 1774 essay, ‘This too a Philosophy 
for the Formation of Humanity’, in which the author was described as providing an 
‘dismissal of priests and ceremonies as being alien to the sentiment of the Jewish people’. German Idealism, 129. 
232 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ in Untimely Meditations, translated 
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affirmative account of ‘the destruction of the content of [Jewish] history’, something 
that Arendt welcomed too – because it ‘signals [for the Jews] the loss of all historical 
ties’.
234 This, she clearly wanted the reader to acknowledge, was a development for 
the better. (To recall, she had concluded her dissertation by pointing to the advantages 
of ‘detach[ing] ourselves from human history and from its irrevocable enchainment 
by generation’.
235 Where her treatment of the Christian concept of grace had 
highlighted something she estimated was of deep historical importance there was the 
suggestion in relation to her treatment of the Jews that there was nothing that could 
not be surrendered.)  Similarly, Arendt expressed appreciation of Herder’s recognition 
that ‘well-formed’ Jews, Jews, that is, who understood the importance of Bildung or 
self-improvement through education, are content to renounce their self-perception as 
the people of God and thereby ‘cast aside proud national prejudice, and abandon 
customs that do not belong to our age and temperament, or even to our climate, [in 
order to] work not as slaves [...] but indeed as cohabitants of educated peoples’.
236 In 
this Arendt seemed, in the early 1930s, to be embracing as well, an orthodox 
Enlightened vision of the emancipated Jew, one perhaps not so very far removed 
even, from that which inspired Dohm’s recommendations in his 1781 book On the 
Civic Improvement of the Jews, or Friedländer’s radical proposal for a comprehensive 
reformation of Judaism as set out, initially, in an open letter, Sendschreiben, of 1799, 
sent to Wilhelm Teller, the chief Protestant provost in Berlin. 
Friedländer’s ‘“infamous” proposal’, amounted to the offer of what came to be 
described, somewhat ironically, as ‘dry baptism’.
237  The ideas he had put forward 
234   Ibid., 15.
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involved the Jews crossing the threshold of the Lutheran Church, as it were, ‘on the 
basis of shared moral values, but without having actually recognized the divinity of 
Christ and without having formally undergone baptism’.
238 And, the quid pro quo for 
this amounted to the forswearing of some of what were the more rote ceremonial 
practices within Jewish religious ritual. The proposal was rejected by Teller. In the 
wake of the rejection, however, Friedländer continued to push for significant 
alterations to the Jewish liturgy including the renunciation of prayers for a return to 
Jerusalem and the re-establishment of the ancient temple with its sacrificial culture. 
Arendt’s vision of the Jew transformed was in some ways quite similar to these 
proposals. Except that, in contrast to Friedländer and like-minded reformers amongst 
Prussian Jewry, Arendt was not at all interested in simply questioning the divine 
authority of Jewish ceremonial laws, updating the worship service, or consigning the 
study of Hebrew to philology. She was not, that is, a moderniser attempting to make 
the practice of Judaism, in some sense, fit for the twentieth century. She had, of 
course, grown up in a liberal German-Jewish household in which religious observance 
was minimal. While the biblical duty to be a light unto others
239 was, it could be 
argued, not completely alien to her, her sense of responsibility as a Jew was less the 
product of religious duty and more informed by the sense in which her friend, Walter 
Benjamin, regarded it as incumbent almost, for Jews to be intellectuals and cultural 
critics: ‘For me’, Benjamin had declared to Ludwig Strauss in November 1912, 
‘Jewishness is not in any sense an end in itself but the noble bearer and representative 
of the intellect’.
240   Similarly, though her radical vision of the Jew transformed in 
terms of beliefs and conduct, was much closer to the Enlightened vision of a 
238  Amos Elon, The Pity of it All: A Portrait of Jews in Germany 1743–1933 (London: Penguin, 2004), 73–74.
239  ‘I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a 
covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles.’ Isaiah 42: 6.
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transformation from particularity to ‘pure possibility’, she was all too aware of the 
limitations, ‘the blind spots’, as she referred to them, of Enlightened thinking.
241 
Indeed this was part of her attraction to Herder. He recognised the constraints of the 
Enlightenment mind, which was only able to think in terms of progress and 
universalism, while being blind to history and alterity. Arendt, concurred recognising 
the limitations. Consequently, while it is fair to argue that in contrast to Jewish 
orthodoxy hers was a unique and radically alternative vision of the Jew, it was 
certainly not, as I shall argue below, a vision of ‘pure possibility’. It did not reflect an 
acceptance of Enlightenment universalism that dispossessed Judaism of its undeniable 
historical content and the Jews of their exceptionalness. Rather, to recall what I have 
discussed in relation to Nietzsche, there was in Arendt an emerging commitment to 
rethinking one’s relationship to the past and identifying a new point of origin, as it 
were.  
Of course, challenges to the very foundations of Judaism (and Christianity) were not 
new. Spinoza’s seventeenth critique of a transcendent God in his Ethics (published in 
1677) was perhaps the most revolutionary of these for modern Judaism. The Jewish 
reformer, Solomon Steinheim, for example, repudiated Spinozism on the grounds that 
it exemplified pagan tradition. As for Spinoza himself, Michael Meyer reports that 
Steinheim labelled him as nothing less than ‘the great denier of God in the covenanted 
people’.
242 In Germany, towards the close of the Enlightenment period, Spinoza’s 
depiction of the Hebrews, who had received the written law, as being spiritually 
immature enjoyed a significant degree of popularity making it possible for Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing in his 1784 publication, The Education of Humanity, ‘to [clothe] the 
241 Arendt, The Enlightenment, 9.
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established Christian idea of the supersession of the older faith [Judaism] by the 
younger [Christianity] in a new, historical garment’.
243 Confining ourselves to 
German-Jewish thinkers and writers in the German states prior to unification and then 
in unified Germany after 1870, there were many who preceded Arendt by expressing 
radical ideas about the future development of Judaism. Indeed, Rosenzweig was 
prompted to write his essay cautioning against ‘apologetic thinking’ precisely because 
of a tendency he identified amongst contemporary Jewish philosophers to concede to 
rather than react against anti-Jewish criticism. The call for ritual reforms had 
certainly proceeded unabated, Friedländer’s misgivings and disappointments 
notwithstanding.
244 The new Hamburg temple, for example, dedicated in October 
1818, boasted some significant departures from traditional synagogues. Amongst 
these was the fact that two ‘preachers’ were now appointed and the position of ‘rabbi’ 
was made, literally, redundant. The temple prayerbook unusually contained both 
Hebrew and German texts ‘and the volume untraditionally opened from left to 
right’.
245 Of perhaps even greater import, was the fact that, echoing proposals called 
for by Friedländer some years earlier in Berlin, it was now considered permissible to 
alter sections of the prayerbook that spoke of a return to Zion. Michael Meyer 
observes in regard to the changes and omissions undertaken: ‘The Hamburg reformers 
had not lost their love of Zion, nor did they fail to recognize its significant role in 
Jewish history. But they did not hope or desire to return there themselves or to rebuild 
the ancient temple’.
246 
243 Meyer, Response to Modernity, 64.
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A little under two decades later, the Jews of the Berlin Reform Congregation were 
themselves prepared to take the radical step of formalising their misgivings about 
election. The prayerbook of 1844 stated:
 
[T]he concept of holiness and of a special vocation 
arising from this has become entirely foreign to us, 
as has the idea of an intimate covenant between God 
and Israel which is to remain significant for all 
eternity. Human character and dignity, and God’s 
image   within   us   –   these   alone   are   signs   of 
chosenness.
247
Such ritual ceremonial and liturgical reforms were complemented and underpinned by 
new theological conceptions of Judaism emanating from a number of Jewish thinkers 
and rabbis including, for example, Solomon Steinheim (1789-1866), Solomon 
Formstecher (1808-1889) and Samuel Hirsch (1815-1889). Samson Raphael Hirsch 
(1808-1888), who was in no sense a member of the Reform movement, was, 
nevertheless, the founder of a counter-movement for reform, namely, Neo-Orthodoxy; 
and, Abraham Geiger (1810-1874), though not the initiator of the reforms of the 
Reform movement is regarded, nonetheless, as the movement’s true ‘founding father’. 
The fine details that distinguish their various positions aside,
248 what (each of) these 
individuals had in common was that, in responding to the times, that is, in responding 
to the external pressures of modernity as these were reflected through the 
Enlightenment, they sought to preserve their religion by initiating changes from 
within Judaism itself. However, there were also differences that broadly distinguished 
the proponents of change. On the one hand they were all reacting to the perceived 
threats to Judaism’s continued viability should civic improvement lead to further 
assimilation prompting, as a possible consequence, increases in conversions. (In her 
247 Cited in, Joel S. Kaminsky, Yet I Loved Jacob: Reclaiming the Biblical Concept of Election (Nashville: 
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first major political work, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt re-assessed 
the grounds upon which such fears about the survival of the Jews had been supported 
observing ‘that the converted Jew only rarely left his family and even more rarely left 
his Jewish surroundings altogether’. She went on to conclude, that ‘the Jewish family, 
at any rate, proved to be a more conserving force than Jewish religion’.
249) Then 
again, there was the fear of the increasing intellectual isolation of Judaism confronted, 
as it was, by new and Enlightened thinking about history, science and philosophy. In 
this respect Geiger, for instance, recognised Christianity ‘was reshaping itself to 
become the religion of modern society’ leaving Judaism trailing woefully behind.
250 
On the other hand, some reformists, the Neo-Orthodox Samson Raphael Hirsch, for 
example, were disturbed by the attractiveness to young Jewish intellectuals (this from 
around the second decade of the nineteenth century onwards), of the empirical study 
of the Jewish religion and culture known as Wissenschaft des Judentums. This trend 
had grown out of the ‘Society for Culture and Scientific Study of the Jews’ founded in 
Berlin in 1819, of which Leopold Zunz was a leading member.  Those drawn to such 
studies demonstrated a particular appreciation for history and historical criticism. 
Reformists could exploit this, of course, to legitimise changes to the religion by 
pointing to precedents in earlier times. And it was precisely for this reason that 
Samson Raphael Hirsch rejected such studies, whose investigations threatened to 
undermine what had traditionally been understood as the revealed, and therefore 
timeless, word of God. In contrast, in an endnote to the concluding paragraph of 
Arendt’s ‘Enlightenment’ paper, she refers to Zunz, having already observed in the 
text that ‘history emerges as a special and legitimate concern of the Jews’.
251
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Amongst the most eminent of Enlightenment thinkers, it was Immanuel Kant, as 
already mentioned, who penned particularly deep-seated feelings of aversion towards 
the Jews in a number of his writings. The reforms that were prescribed by those 
especially on the Reform wing of modern Judaism sometimes reflected attempts to 
correct the false impressions Kant was perceived to have had of Judaism. However, it 
was the reformists’ ‘adoption of so much that the Königsberg philosopher pointed to 
as being not Jewish and stressing its centrality within their own self-definition’ that 
was ironic given the desire to initiate change from within.
252 For example, Meyer 
reports how the apotheosis of morality in Kantian philosophy was reflected in the 
importance that Jewish reformers began to attach to their sermons as a means by 
which to preach not so much about ‘ceremonial law [as] virtuous conduct in business 
or family relationships’.
253 More ironic still, and an indication of just how short-
sighted many reformers were, was the fact that they failed to realise that either way 
Kant would still have had no truck with their religion, reforms or no reforms, such 
was the robustness of his antipathy as dictated by his understanding of the conditions 
required for moral improvement.
Kant’s sense of purpose in writing what was to be the first of his three Critiques was 
expressed, vigorously in the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
‘In this enquiry’, he confidently stated, ‘I have made completeness my chief aim, and 
I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been 
solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied’.
254 In order 
to achieve his ambition Kant directed his criticisms here at the work of two other 
philosophers. The first, was the rationalist G. W. Leibniz, author of numerous 
252 Meyer, Response to Modernity, 65.
253 Ibid.
254 Kant, CPR, Axiii, 10. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 104
fragments as well as, The Principles of Nature and of Grace (1718) and the 
Monadology (1720), who had died in 1716; the other, was the Scottish Enlightenment 
empiricist, David Hume, who had passed away just five years prior to the publication 
of the first Critique. Kant, in fact, had great respect for the Leibnizian system, which, 
after meeting with initial coolness had, under Frederick the Great, become ‘the 
orthodox metaphysics of the German Enlightenment’.
255 Kant’s main target was 
actually Hume’s scepticism but in responding to this he was also aroused to 
weaknesses within the Leibnizian system in which he had been raised. The first 
Critique is, therefore, critical of both Hume and Leibniz. At the heart of its author’s 
investigation, as I have previously discussed, was the question of the status of our 
knowledge of the world around us. And in summary, as we have seen, Kant’s position 
was that all that we can reasonably expect to claim knowledge of is limited to the 
phenomena, the objects, that is, with which we are confronted on a daily basis. 
Contrary to Hume, Kant emphasised that the conditions of the possibility of 
understanding make reason a necessity: without concepts, after all, our intuitions 
would be blind. However, contrary to Leibniz, Kant emphasised the importance of 
what empirical discovery brings to understanding: concepts, without intuitions, would 
simply be empty.
It was the nature of Kant’s critical method, which comprised not so much a middle 
way between dogmatism and scepticism as a response to and departure from both, 
that appealed to Arendt and about which she spoke so favourably in her 1970 lectures. 
Throughout her writings generally, she made much of the idea that the claims of 
philosophy must be relatively modest, that philosophy is best suited to 
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‘communicating’, not to presenting results or attempting to discover the ‘Truth’. Truth 
she held, is something that can only be known to God.
 Philosophy, in balancing the 
abstract against the concrete (the conceptual against the empirical), must be prepared 
to settle for less than Truth, something which is at times perhaps too easily satisfied. 
Our commitment should rather be to truthfulness, which is ever demanding in that it 
requires us to question and to revise without satisfaction. By the mid-1940s then, she 
was arguing that thanks, especially, to Jaspers, we have come to recognise that 
philosophy, liberated from the burden of disclosing ‘Truth’ can, at last, allow itself to 
engage in ‘playful metaphysics’, never ceasing experimentation, the ‘never fixed 
representation of definite movements of thought’.
256 However, while Kant’s 
distinction between phenomena and noumena had, on the one hand radical 
epistemological implications as a consequence of setting limits to what we can 
justifiably claim to know about the world around us, on the other hand, it also seemed 
to offer the audacious prospect of releasing human reason from a dependency upon 
either the mundane, or for that matter, the extra-mundane. 
Under a system of government in which the sovereignty of numerous German princes 
was frequently underwritten not only by their being the head of the church in their 
respective Länder, but, additionally, as a result of the buttressing of their dominions 
by the “proofs” of God’s existence proffered by so many of the German 
Enlightenment’s rationalist thinkers, Kant’s critical despatch was unlikely to reinforce 
confidence in their rule – not least because of the inference that theoretical knowledge 
of the Divine could no longer be taken as an unquestioned assumption. However, if as 
a consequence of Kantianism, the foundations of princely rule suddenly appeared a 
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little less secure than before, the rational individual was at least recognised as now 
having the potential to form independent judgements with a degree of confidence not 
previously experienced in a world no longer underwritten by reason alone. Or so it 
seemed. Certainly, the everyday material distractions to which each of us is 
predisposed, and the ‘vices of culture’, which at their egregious extreme Kant 
described as engendering ‘diabolical vices’, could, given the Kantian transcendental 
paradigm, be prevented from getting in the way of the autonomous individual freely 
exercising their judgements.
257 Given the ‘right conditions’, autonomous reason would 
display itself in terms of a transcendental disregard for empirical objects. Kant’s 
recourse to autonomous reason though, was a denial that metaphysics, as traditionally 
understood, any longer ‘mediated between immanence and transcendence in a way 
that assured a meaningful relation between humanity and its place in nature’.
258 It was 
an argument in favour of viewing the natural contingent everyday world surrounding 
us as simply very basic malleable material for manufacturing ‘a new rational world 
that gradually progresses toward immanent perfection’.
259 The trouble with all this 
was that with the opportunities now opened up for creating better, in the sense of 
more stable, more rationally organised societies, there loomed the question as to what 
would become of those elements of existing society that were not deemed to fit into 
the Kantian picture of transcendental bliss and harmony. One such element, it 
appeared to Kant, comprised of the Jews.
Kant was critical of the Jews both in terms of their religion and in terms of their 
existence as a community or nation. In terms of Judaism as religion, among the very 
few more ‘generous’ concessions he permitted himself to make was the one already 
257 Kant, RRTh, 75.
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referred to above that reduced Judaism’s status to merely ‘an old cult’ which ‘the 
teachers of Christianity’ sought to replace with a ‘new faith’ – one  representing ‘a 
pure moral religion’.
260 A couple of pages prior to this remark in ‘Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason’, he was, however, keen to point out ‘that the Jewish faith 
stands in absolutely no essential connection, i.e. in no unity of concepts, with the 
ecclesiastical faith whose history we want to consider, even though it immediately 
preceded it and provided the physical occasion for the founding of this church 
(Christianity)’.
261 His animosity towards the Jews, which, in Michael Mack’s 
judgement
262 was surprisingly lacking in reflection for a philosopher of Kant’s 
importance and standing and was not very well thought through, was expressed in 
several different places and on several levels. Kant argued, for example, that Judaism 
was a religion that utterly lacked religious faith. In contrast to Christianity, which he 
viewed as a pure moral religion, one of his criticisms of Judaism in ‘Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason’, was that the Jewish ‘God [...] wills obedience to 
commands for which absolutely no improvement of moral disposition is required’ 
meaning the believer ‘cannot truly be that moral being we find necessary for a 
religion’.
263  Indeed, a house of God should be the place in which the individual 
receives instruction that is aimed precisely at moral improvement. In fact, it was these 
criticisms that weighed particularly heavily with Jewish reformers, often 
characterising both their writings and the sermons that were now being delivered to 
their congregations on a more regular basis than traditionally had been the case. Then 
again, Kant criticised Judaism for not being a religion in the true sense: ‘Strictly 
speaking Judaism is not a religion at all but simply the union of a number of 
260 Kant, ‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason’ in RRT, 156.
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individuals who, since they belonged to a particular stock, established themselves into 
a community under purely political laws, hence not into a church’.
264
In Kant's ‘defence’, and contra Mack, who as suggested above, expresses 
‘disappointment’ with the philosopher for having failed to think differently, it needs to 
be noted that the content and vociferousness of Kant’s anti-Jewish arguments were not 
particularly out of the ordinary given the way Jews were generally perceived even in 
educated and intellectual circles at the time. This is not to try and exonerate or excuse 
Kant, but simply to put his anti-Jewish arguments into context. Christian von Dohm, 
for example, of whom mention has already been made, was a middle-ranking 
bureaucrat in Frederick II’s administration and an acquaintance of Mendelssohn. His 
call for measures that would improve the civic status of the Jews were quite daring for 
the times and, indeed, his proposals caused something of a stir. Yet, Elon reports that 
he was apparently not beyond referring to Jews as his ‘circumcised brethren’ and was 
ready to acknowledge that they ‘might be more verdorben [morally corrupted] than 
other nations and even guilty of relatively more misdemeanors than Christians’ 
merely by virtue of being Jewish.
265 In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt refers to 
Karl Wilhelm Grattenauer, an educated man, a jurist and publicist, in fact, whose 1791 
publication, On the Physical and Moral Constitution of Today’s Jew: The Voice of a 
Cosmopolite, though not widely read at the time, harangued the Jews of Berlin and 
warned against their growing influence and, of all wrongdoings, their ‘hunger for 
education’.
266 After its reissue just over a decade on from its first publication, the same 
pamphlet had to be banned by the Prussian authorities, Elon  tells us, because it 
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generated such an inflamed debate.
267 Michael Meyer meanwhile, reports that 
Solomon Formstecher, the Reformer referred to above, ‘remembered from his own 
university years at Giessen that what he was taught in the lecture hall about Judaism 
was derisive, emotionally biased toward Christianity, and grossly in contradiction 
with his own conception and first-hand experience of his faith’.
268 
Arguably, the most significant and damning criticism that Kant levelled at Judaism 
involved not just describing it in terms of an obsession with the material world (in 
contrast he viewed Christianity as essentially spiritual), but in actually associating 
Judaism’s materialism with an ever present ‘evil principle’. This ‘evil principle’, Kant 
believed, has been locked in moral combat with the principle of good since the 
appearance of ‘an envoy of heavenly origin’ (are we to take this to be a reference to 
Jesus?) on earth.
269 This surely reflected the disdain showed towards Jewish money 
lenders throughout history on the grounds that money was frequently seen as the root 
of all evil. With respect to the ongoing battle between the principles of good and evil 
for ‘dominion over minds’, the Jews were, according to Kant, so absorbed ‘in their 
[own] minds [with] no other incentive except the goods of this world and only [the 
wish], therefore, to be ruled through rewards and punishments in this life’ that they 
make ‘no substantial injury to the realm of darkness but only serv[e] to keep ever in 
remembrance the imprescriptible right of the first proprietor’.
270 Kant did not 
acknowledge, however, that money lending was one of the few professions the Jews 
were permitted to engage in by Christians. God’s envoy pointed the way to victory 
over the principle of evil, and those who wish to imitate him must, ‘like him, choose 
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to die to everything that holds them fettered to earthly life to the detriment of 
morality’.
271 (Arendt discussed this in relation to the concept of caritas in her 
dissertation. And in her commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies, which I turn to in the 
next chapter, the poet can be seen to have suggested that, in order to have any chance 
of being noticed by the angels men would need to demonstrate love of a similarly 
pure nature.) However, it was Kant’s estimation that the Jews could simply not see 
beyond the original responsibility with which humans had been charged by God, 
namely to look after ‘the goods of the earth’. It was this responsibility and this one 
alone, to which they adhered at the expense of all others, and it was this, he believed 
further, that made their very being so very reprehensible.
Amos Elon reports that ‘Kant permitted a few young Jews to attend his philosophy 
seminars in Königsberg as non-matriculated students. They could graduate only if 
they converted’.
272 In fact, it was Kant’s hope that all Jews would eventually 
disappear as a result of ‘adopt[ing] publicly the religion of Jesus’. The ‘euthanasia of 
Judaism’, as he unfortunately put it in The Conflict of the Faculties (though arguably, 
still with more sensitivity than demonstrated in either Fichte’s brutal call to ‘cut their 
[the Jews’] heads off one night’, or Fries’ chilling demand for the eradication of 
Judaism, ‘root and branch’), would, for Kant, be the realisation of ‘pure moral 
religion, freed from all the ancient statutory teachings’.
273 His anti-Jewish writings, 
born of what Mack defines as ‘pseudotheological’ thinking put to work for secular 
purposes, attracted the attention of a number of German thinkers including Fichte, 
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Schopenhauer and Wagner who developed his line of reasoning for their own 
purposes. In contrast to Kant, their theses were often blatantly anti-Semitic. In this 
context it is therefore also important to recognise that what Kant envisaged amounted 
to something approaching an evolutionary process whereby the Jews would, not 
because of any violence used against them but as the result of a type of moral and 
intellectual and certainly bloodless natural selection, ultimately vanish. All the same, 
Kant’s beliefs understandably provoked a number of reactions from German Jewish 
writers many of whose texts Mack has subjected to detailed examination in  German 
Idealism and the Jew. 
One notable omission from the line-up of those Mack interprets as having crafted 
either ‘counternarratives’ or ‘counterhistories’ as ripostes to Kant is Hannah Arendt. 
Given what I have suggested about the influence of Kant on Arendt, should this come 
as any surprise? Perhaps not. Perhaps her omission was precisely because Mack did 
not feel that her work qualified as anything more than an apologetic response to Kant. 
If this was his reason it reflects an error of judgement, though: while Benjamin’s 
reaction to Kant was, as Mack makes clear, transcendental in nature and Freud’s 
psychological, Arendt’s was surely, initially empirical/historical and subsequently, 
that is, from the nineteen fifties onwards, ontological. Latterly, it was based on an 
exploration of the existential conditions according to which Arendt believed life on 
earth had been gifted to men. Her championing of the concept of pluralism and her 
enthusiasm for a material world, Kant would have rejected, appear to constitute a 
basis for arguing that her thinking, too, was essentially reactive to the anti-Jewish 
elements of Kant’s thought, as reactive, in fact, as Rosenzweig’s or Freud’s. Except 
that, all this, while consistent with her mature political thinking, indicates nothing Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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about her stance in the 1930s? With reference to her paper on ‘The Enlightenment and 
the Jewish Question’, for example, we must ask whether she was actually conceding, 
at least implicitly, Kant’s anti-Jewish criticisms without any challenge at all. So, was 
she, in the nineteen thirties at least, little more than an apologist for the philosopher? 
Did she, perhaps, only change her mind about Kant later in life?
The short response to these questions is ‘no’. Arendt’s writings, to be sure, suggest a 
complex relationship with Kantian thinking but she was no apologist for the 
Königsberg philosopher. On the one hand, it can be demonstrated that her mature 
writings represent a ‘counternarrative’ based upon the importance she attached to 
embracing the materiality of a world deemed crucial to a proper understanding of man 
and his relationship to his environment. And that ‘counternarrative’ clearly challenged 
Kant’s anti-Jewish thinking on the basis of the importance he himself attached, in the 
first Critique, to the material world as the source of intuitions. On the other hand, 
again in her later writing, Arendt seems to have also flirted with Kant’s anti-
materialistic separation of nature from freedom as demonstrated by her rigid division 
between the private and public realms in her analysis of the human condition. This led 
her to sanitize the latter of its association with all matters administrative, economic, 
social, or welfare related. The segregation was so unyielding, in fact, that Jürgen 
Habermas reflected in disbelief on her ‘curious perspective’ as follows:
[...] a state which is relieved of the administrative 
processing of social problems; a politics which is 
cleansed   of   socio-economic   issues;   an 
institutionalization   of   public   liberty   which   is 
independent of the organization of public wealth; a 
radical   democracy   which   inhibits   its   liberating 
efficacy at the boundaries where political oppression Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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ceases and social repression begins – this path is 
unimaginable for any modern society.
274 
How are we to make sense of Arendt then? The key, I think, lies in the concerns 
expressed already in her very earliest writings about the possibilities of being with 
others. These concerns were just as evident, as I will now go on to argue, in her 1932 
essay on ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ as they were in her subsequent 
work, except that in 1932 it was the fact of being Jewish while being with others that 
became the central focus of her attention. Her treatment of Jewishness and Judaism in 
the nineteen thirties, influenced by Herder and reactive to Kant’s anti-Jewish 
inclinations, prefigured her discussion of pluralism, I think, more than two decades 
later.
‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’, was a paper in which Arendt discussed 
the shortcomings of Enlightenment thinking, its ‘blind spots’, as she referred to 
them.
275 These ‘blind spots’ manifested themselves in relation to Enlightened 
perceptions of the Jews, who for their part in Arendt’s estimation were, ironically, 
content to accept the judgement that they were an eternally oppressed people whose 
misfortune it had been throughout their history in the Diaspora to be the victims of 
hostility and ill-treatment at the hands of their host communities. In a sense, Arendt 
would later observe in The Origins of Totalitarianism, ‘the assumption of eternal 
antisemitism’ was a ‘consoling idea’ given that in modern times ‘great parts of the 
Jewish people were [...] threatened by [...] dissolution from within’ as much as 
‘physical extinction from without’. The unexpected logical implication of eternal anti-
274 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power’ in Social Research 44 (1977): 3– 
24, 15. 
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Semitism was, of course, ‘an eternal guarantee of Jewish existence’.
276  Young-Bruehl 
correctly observes, it was Herder who in ‘The Enlightenment’ paper ‘emerge[d] as 
Arendt’s hero’.
277 He attracted Arendt because of his departure from mainstream 
Enlightened thinking regarding the status attached to reason itself, which he, in 
contradistinction to Lessing and Mendelssohn, made subject to the vicissitudes of 
history. With Herder, Arendt observed, ‘[t]he rule of reason, of man who has come of 
age and is on his own, is about to end’.
278 As far as she was concerned this did not 
represent a backward step. If anything, it provided an opportunity to release the Jews 
from the role they were acknowledged to have played throughout history as purely a 
persecuted minority.
Herder’s respect for the Jews was clear to Arendt. He did not deny their history as a 
persecuted race nor did he seek to trivialise their long held religious beliefs. ‘Herder 
understands the history of the Jews’, she wrote, ‘in the same way that they interpret it, 
as the history of God’s chosen people.’ She went on, ‘[he] recognises that their history 
arises out of the Law of Moses and cannot be separated from it, and therefore stands 
or falls with obedience to the Law’.
279 Given the strength of their religious convictions 
though, despite the threat of dissolution from within, the conundrum for 
Enlightenment thinkers was how to assimilate the Jews into German society. This 
could actually be broken down into two distinct if related issues both of which were 
intimately connected to Herder’s challenge to orthodox Enlightenment ideas. The first 
issue was one for the German people themselves. Herder did not share the idea that 
the Jews should abandon their history or abjure their religious beliefs in the pursuit of 
276 Arendt, OT, 7.
277 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 93.
278 Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment’, TJW, 12.
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the Enlightenment dream of ‘pure possibility’ and universalism, that is, in compliance 
with the purely formal conditions of agency described by Kant. This was though, 
precisely what Arendt judged Friedländer and his like would have been only too ready 
to sign up to. The political problem for the German nation, amounted then, to working 
out how it could assimilate a people whose ‘foreignness’ was not, contra to Kant’s 
hopes, about to disappear. As Mosse notes, the emancipation of German Jewry under 
the Wilhelminian Empire and certainly in the first decade following the foundation of 
the Weimar Republic made tangible advances.
280 Only in the late nineteen twenties, as 
already intimated above, did things begin to break down when the ‘Jewish question’ 
came to the fore once again with calamitous consequences. 
The second issue relating to the assimilation of German Jewry concerned the Jews 
themselves, their self-understanding as Jews and their perception of what it means to 
be Jewish amongst other people. Herder’s ‘expressivist’ respect for the distinctness of 
the Jews notwithstanding (his defence, that is, of the idea of becoming who you are), 
his vision was of their refraining from thinking of themselves as the chosen people 
and forsaking modes of behaviour and religious customs not befitting ‘our age and 
temperament’.
281 This did not imply however, that he concluded the Jewish past be 
consigned to some sort of historical dustbin or that the Jews should erase every trace 
of religious practice from the way they behaved. Quite the contrary since in a sense, it 
seems, he was prefiguring the Hamburg reformers mentioned above who, as Meyer 
indicates, recognised the enormous significance of certain aspects of their religion in 
contributing to the expression of who they were even though they themselves did not 
wish to promote these aspects. It is clear that Hannah Arendt believed Herder’s vision 
280 Mosse, German Jews Beyond Judaism, 21.
281 Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment’,  TJW, 15. In talking of ‘expressivism’ I am following Charles Taylor’s spelling 
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put paid to the stereotypical perception, including the self-perception, of the Jews as 
helpless and persecuted victims while at the same time it helped in retrieving and 
lending legitimacy, once again, to the Jewish people’s own sense of their past. 
Reading Arendt’s paper on ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’, it appears 
their sense of the past, snatched back from the future-directed Enlightened mind, 
fixated as it was upon the ideas of progress, pure possibility and universalism, was 
arguably the most generous of gifts that Herder could have bestowed upon the Jews. 
‘[…] in an oddly indirect way’, she remarked, ‘Herder gave the Jews back their 
history’.
282 Remembering the past, served, in at least one existential sense, a similar 
function in Arendt’s overall “critique of political judgement” to Kant’s concepts of 
space and time in the Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant, it was the instantaneous 
exercise of the concepts in conjunction with the spontaneous application of the 
categories of understanding that made it possible for a rational being to sense 
phenomena in an ordered and unified way. For Arendt, being aware of one’s past was 
the condition that made possible a perspective. And it was a perspective, a point of 
view, from which an individual’s judgements in the present derived. Without a 
perspective, political judgement would not, on Arendt’s account be possible at all. 
Enlightened thinking, which was committed to a universal man, to all intents and 
purposes, turned its back on perspective.  
However, I think Arendt was suggesting more than this and I think further that it is 
Walter Benjamin who can, again, assist us here. It seems to me that it was his idea of 
the explosive flash as past and present collide (remember, Arendt wrote of the 
282 Ibid., 14.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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significance of lived experience), that brings, to use his terminology, dialectics to a 
standstill in a sudden ‘cessation of happening’. It is the remembered fragment’s of 
genuine history, Geschichte, in collision with lived experience now that, for 
Benjamin, produced a split second of recognition and understanding, ‘a momentary 
“constellation”, pregnant with meaning and “now-time”’ (Jetztzeit). For Arendt this 
collision led, for instance, to the illuminating if somewhat less frenetic realisation 
about the fundamentally (anti-) political significance of totalitarianism.
283 ‘Finally, it 
dawned on me’, she wrote, ‘that I was not engaged in writing an historical book [The 
Origins of Totalitarianism], even though large parts of it clearly contain historical 
analyses, but a political book’.
284 It would take some years for these ideas to mature, 
of course. Hannah Arendt was, I think, alluding to them when she wrote about the gap 
between past and future, for example, which she sketched as a ‘small track of non-
time which the activity of thought beats within the time-space of mortal men and into 
which the trains of thought, of remembrance and anticipation, save whatever they 
touch from the ruin of historical and biographical time’.
285 In the nineteen thirties 
Benjamin had not fully worked out the basis for these ideas. However, I think that 
their influence can be detected in Arendt’s writings and certainly her early work 
demonstrates a tendency to be moving in a direction consistent with them. 
Already from the 1930s then, it is clear that for Hannah Arendt any attempt to deny 
the past was tantamount to putting in jeopardy the very chances of formulating 
judgements from a distinct perspective that might facilitate understanding. That was 
why she gave short shrift to Friedländer for whom, she commented, ‘the distinction 
between reason and history no longer served to salvage the Jewish religion, but was 
283 Handelman, Fragments of Experience, 118. 
284 See footnote 374 below.
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merely the means by which to be rid of it as quickly as possible’.
286 In an essay 
written in 1933 and entitled, ‘Against Private Circles’ in which she counselled against 
the establishment of a purely Jewish education system in Nazi Germany, she 
remarked:
The coming generation must know the  history of 
Jewish assimilation and of antisemitism as well as it 
knows the history of Judaism up until assimilation. 
Only in this way can they be provided with a basis 
from   which   to   judge   their   environment   and 
themselves in a genuinely reasonable way.
287
Herein were the roots of her subsequent commitment to pluralism.
Like Herder, Arendt was critical of Enlightenment thinkers (and the Jews who 
unquestioningly followed them) who asserted that Jewish integration into German 
society would be the product of a total renunciation of the Jewish past and religious 
beliefs accompanied by a comprehensive education involving immersion in the 
German classics and the embrace of reason all in the name of universalism. This 
would surely only result in the very euthanasia of the Jews for which Kant, who had 
described the conditions for formal agency alone, had hoped. (As Charles Taylor has 
observed, Herder’s expressivism ‘can be seen as a protest against the mainstream 
Enlightenment view of man – as both subject and object of an objectifying scientific 
analysis.
288) Neither reason nor Bildung was actually the answer to integration, Arendt 
argued. In her biography of Rahel Varnhagen she observed, ‘[t]he Enlightenment 
raised Reason to the status of an authority. It declared thought and what Lessing 
called “self-thinking”, which anyone can engage in alone and of his own accord, the 
supreme capacities of man’.
289 But, she continued caustically, ‘self-thinking [...] 
286 Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment’, TJW,  9.
287 Arendt, ‘Against Private Circles’, TJW, 20. Emphases in original.
288 Taylor, Hegel, 1.
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provides a foundation for cultivated ignoramuses. Being by birth exempt from 
obligation to any object in their alien cultural environment, they need merely, in order 
to become contemporaries, peel off old prejudices and free themselves for the 
business of thinking’.
290 In her ‘Enlightenment’ paper she made the following point, in 
relation to Herder:
Herder   reserves   his   sharpest   polemic   for   the 
Enlightenment’s concept of formation – that is, 
thinking for oneself – which he castigates above all 
else for lacking any sense of reality. Such formation 
does not arise out of any experience or lead to 
“action,” [sic] to its “application to life within a 
given sphere.” It cannot form man, since it forgets 
the reality out of which he comes and in which he 
stands.
291 
Understanding, that is, requires content, it requires experience (Kant’s intuitions), 
which provides food for thought. Unlike Kant, however, experience in Arendt’s 
existential adaptation of his ideas was not envisaged as something that could be 
described in purely formal terms; it is intimately bound up, she thought, with the 
expression of who one is, which is undeniably part of one’s past. For the Jews, as for 
any people, indeed any individual, it is the past that provides the undeniable context 
for expressing who one is. A sense of the past though, is not the same as being ruled 
by history whereby one’s beliefs or behaviours, now are determined, for instance, by 
‘faith in chosenness and a Messianic hope’.
292 A sense of the past rather, keeps history 
at a ‘distance’, as it were, so that understanding can take place. To permit history to 
absorb us, to allow it to become too “close” to us, risks obscuring ‘that trans-temporal 
moment of “now-time”’
293 that connects memory with the present.
290 Ibid.
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We may then, I believe, draw at least the following two conclusions. First, that 
Hannah Arendt was not an apologist for Kant in respect of his more objectionable 
remarks concerning the Jews, but secondly, that her own criticisms of the Jews and 
her understanding of what it meant to her to be Jewish certainly drew, quite 
significantly, on Kantian philosophy. However, this conceded, she was influenced by 
Herder’s expressivist philosophy too, which she employed to qualify the clinical 
formality of Kantianism. In the 1930s she demonstrated that, like Herder, she did not 
think the Jews should any longer consider themselves chosen, but, she believed they 
should not forget their history either, lest they risk total self-disfigurement. History, 
she thought, put the Jews ‘into a position of exceptionality that could still remain 
hidden during the Enlightenment’.
294 (The Jews represented for her a type of case-
study in relation to the conditions of pluralism.) History, that is, disclosed the very 
differences that the Enlightened mind was prepared to relinquish in pursuit of 
universal man. So, we are left with an understanding of Judaism very much in tune 
with the way Arendt viewed herself as a Jew. Indeed, she believed that, in the wake of 
the second generation of assimilationists associated with Friedländer, the ‘Jewish 
Question’ had become as much a personal question, that each individual Jew had to 
address, as it was a question demanding ‘broad[er] types of solutions’.
295  She lived 
therefore, without the comfort, inspiration and solace that faith in religious doctrine 
can supply but was not reduced to a nullity or made nondescript as a result. She was 
not a religious Jew, but in desiring a Jewish funeral service including Kaddish when 
her non-Jewish husband, Heinrich Blücher, died, it was not longing or regret she was 
expressing but rather her/their difference, her/their personal exceptionality that she 
was reinforcing, in much the same way that a yarmulka, ironically, worn in a public 
294 Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment’, TJW, 16.
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place by a non-orthodox Jew is not ironic at all but is meant also as a symbolic 
demonstration of his alterity. For Arendt, to renounce one’s past was as much an 
evasion of one’s responsibility to address the problems of the present by engaging in 
public discourse from a unique perspective as was the refusal to distance oneself from 
the clutches of history in which one simply permitted oneself to disappear, much like 
being swallowed up by mass society. 
It was not purely a consideration of the Jews and Jewishness that preoccupied her in 
the nineteen thirties, however. In a commentary on Rilke's Duino Elegies, written in 
1930, two years before ‘The Enlightenment’ paper, Arendt considered religiosity in 
more general terms. Was it even possible to be religious at all in the modern world, 
was the question. After all, was it not the case that God was dead? The commentary, 
to which I now turn, is important, I think, because Arendt not only considered the 
poet’s answers to these questions, but in doing so her interpretation generated ideas, 
that, once again, very much concerned being with others. Furthermore, the ideas she 
first expressed in the commentary would turn out to be crucial to understanding her 
political philosophy three decades later. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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CHAPTER 4
Fatherless
When in disgrace with Fortune and men’s eyes,
I alone beweep my outcast state,
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries [...].
William Shakespeare
296
Who, if I cried, would hear me among the angelic orders?
 Rainer Maria Rilke
297 
In   Rilke,  [...]  nothingness   is   neither   the   human   being’s 
nothingness before God, nor meaninglessness (being without 
God); it is, rather, being human, insofar as a being of this kind 
is not at home in the world and finds no entrance into it.
                                                      Hannah Arendt
298
In Act II, Scene 2 of Tony Kushner’s Pulitzer-Prize winning play, Angels in America: 
A Gay Fantasia on National Themes, an angel comes down through a ceiling and 
materialises in front of one of the main protagonists, Prior Walter. Residing in New 
York during the mid-1980s and portrayed by the playwright as simply an unassuming 
and modest sometime club designer and caterer, Walter is dying of AIDS. Enormous 
strains are being put upon his relationship with Louis, his male partner, as a result of 
this terminal illness. The first visitation by the angel is made just after Louis has 
walked out and deserted his partner at this time of heightened anxiety and personal 
crisis. Described as no less than ‘four divine emanations [...] manifest in One’, the 
angel challenges what many of us may have come to imagine about such 
messengers.
299 After all, it has descended to earth not as a godsend (for instance, the 
296 William Shakespeare, ‘Sonnet 29’, in Tragedies and Poems, edited by Peter Alexander (London: Collins, 
1958), 449.
297 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, translated by J. B. Leishman and Stephen Spender, 4
th edition (London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1963), 25.
298 Hannah Arendt, ‘Rilke’s Duino Elegies’ in Reflections on Literature and Culture, edited by Susannah Young-
ah Gottlieb (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 23. Emphasis in original. Hereafter this book 
will be  abbreviated RLC. Emphasis in original.
299 Tony   Kushner,  Angels   in   America:   A   Gay   Fantasia   on   National   Themes  (New   York:  Theatre 
Communications Group Inc., 2003), 9. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 123
Hebrew for ‘angel’, malach, indicates a ‘messenger’
300), not in order to deliver a 
divine injunction but, rather, to announce God’s having taken leave of Heaven. God, 
the angel despairingly informs Walter, has disappeared; He is nowhere to be found. 
He set off one day in 1906, 18 April to be precise, the day of the great earthquake that 
rocked San Francisco, and He has not been seen since. Humankind has been 
abandoned.
Kushner acknowledges an intellectual debt to Walter Benjamin in the play’s 
‘Afterword’. With the AIDS epidemic forming the backdrop, this is a play which 
offers ‘gay men in the midst of plague an occasion [...] to interrogate what it means to 
be part of a community in these difficult times’ – referring to the two Reagan 
administrations. And Kushner undertakes this by employing a strategy typical of the 
philosophy and cultural criticism of Benjamin. He, Kushner, calls ‘into question the 
concept of an official history’ presenting matters instead from the point of view of the 
disadvantaged, those in the gay community,
301 in order to demonstrate that this 
community is ‘not just the depository of a special kind of knowledge but’ also that it 
has played a crucial role ‘in the construction of a national subject, polity, literature, 
and theatre’.
302 This amounts to counter-history. It is no accident that the main 
protagonist shares part of Benjamin’s name; and when, towards the end of the play, in 
Scene 2 of Act V, Prior Walter and Harper, another of the plays mortal characters, 
ascend to heaven, it is no coincidence either that ‘the deserted, derelict [...] rubble [...] 
strewn’ surroundings in which they find themselves call forth the image of desolation 
300 Handelman, Fragments, 168.
301 David Román, ‘November 1, 1992: AIDS/Angels in America’ in Deborah R. Geis and Steven F. Kruger (eds) 
Approaching the Millennium: Essays on Angels in America (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 
42.
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and destruction heaped upon destruction that Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History is 
described as bearing witness to in the ‘Theses’, as he is inexorably carried forward 
(facing backwards all the time) by the storm of “progress” blowing from paradise. 
Except that it was Benjamin’s angel (based on  Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’) who was 
being exiled, rather than God Himself.   
As Angels in America unfolds, though, it becomes ever more clear that it is not only 
Benjamin to whom tribute is being paid. In the announcement of God’s disappearance 
there are also seismic reverberations of Nietzsche’s nineteenth-century chilling 
dispatch informing us, not simply that God has vanished, but of his demise to which, 
of course, Rilke added poetic assent in the Duino Elegies, which could be interpreted 
as expressing the despair of the bereaved: ‘Who, if I cried, would hear me among the 
angelic orders?’.
303 The poet’s language may be different, though sometimes, as 
pointed out by Erich Heller, it is difficult to distinguish between Nietzsche’s thought 
and Rilke’s verse, but the intent is the same.
304 As Arendt observed in regard to the 
Elegies: ‘who and where the Almighty is – this remains in the form of a question that 
no longer hopes for an answer’.
305 A calamity of such dimensions had generated a 
fundamental disconnection. With this observation Arendt confirmed her credentials as 
an emerging counter-historian who had already taken the first steps to re-plot man’s 
point of origin by rethinking the past in order to reveal a ‘pretheological’ sphere in 
which history was synomymous with man’s own Adamic roots. In years to come, she 
would describe the conditions of human life on earth not in terms of God’s Creation, 
303 See footnote 297 above.
304 See Heller’s chapter on ‘Rilke and Nietzsche’ in Erich Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche: Ten Essays 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).
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but as an indeterminate gift from nowhere.
306 By that time, the 1960s, she had, though, 
a much clearer blueprint of the ontology of the human condition. 
In the 1930s, however, the ‘no more’ of God cast into relief a whole range of issues 
that Arendt and her co-author and first husband, Günther Stern, drew attention to but 
could only address tentatively as young reviewers: what, in the absence of God, 
constitute the new frontiers within human experience? Will it possible now to make 
these frontiers intelligible? Is religion any longer possible in the absence of God? In 
what sense can human beings honestly say they feel at home in the world? In this 
chapter I will consider Arendt’s (and Stern’s) commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies in 
the light of these types of question and in the context, too, of the insecurities and 
vulnerabilities of Weimar Germany at the time. If, it seems to me, the poet was 
announcing the departure of the Father, then it is important to note as well that, to all 
intents and purposes, the Weimar Republic was fatherless in a number of other 
respects, which placed great strains upon the fabric of society. All importantly, 
Arendt’s and Stern’s commentary suggests the authors were searching in the poetry 
for answers. What they discovered, they believed, were the conditions of future 
religiosity in the expression of despair. Along the way though and of much greater 
significance, Arendt, I think, identified in what she and Stern labelled ‘the third party’ 
a character who, once again seemed to defy Heidegger’s depiction of das Man and 
would come to play an immensely important role as a significant other in her 
subsequent political philosophy.
307 
306 See HC, for example.
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Is Kushner’s a less unnerving, perhaps a more hope-filled judgement than 
Nietzsche’s? Initially, this appears so, suggesting perhaps in more broadly conceived 
terms a distinction between Christian and Jewish interpretations of Deus absconditus, 
the hidden God. As Hans Jonas notes, ‘the hidden God [...] is a profoundly un-Jewish 
conception’.
308  In contrast to both Nietzsche and Rilke, it seems that by couching his 
description of what has happened in terms of ‘disappearance’ the playwright has left 
room for the possibility that God may actually one day return. This looks like a 
possibility if only the angel’s entreaties are listened to and acted upon and men make 
an effort to mend their ways by at least trying to curtail their seemingly insatiable 
appetite for change, for the new, for movement, exploration, intermingling, for 
progress, all of which so ‘bewitched’ a God ‘Bored with His angels’ and inspired His 
divine wanderlust in the first place.
309 There is a chance then, that God might one day 
come back to us. There is the suggestion here, too, of an idea from the Lurianic school 
of Kabbalah, discussed by Scholem in his Sabbatai Zevi, by Jonas in ‘The Concept of 
God after Auschwitz: A Jewish Voice’, and cited by Susan Handelman, too, in her 
discussion of Benjamin.
310 According to this idea, Creation was accompanied by 
God’s ‘“withdrawal”’, His ‘self-contraction (tzimtzum)’ because ‘in the process of 
creation, the divine forces “shattered” their containing “vessels” [...] the fragments [of 
which] “fell” and became “embedded” in the lowest material worlds’.
311 It has 
subsequently been the task of humanity to set right this ‘“Breaking of the Vessels”’ 
and by doing so ‘bring about the redemption of the cosmos itself’.
312 According to 
Scholem, this “rationalised”, as it were, historical catastrophe (the writing of the 
308 Hans Jonas, ‘The Concept of God after Auschwitz: A Jewish Voice’, in The Journal of Religion  1, 67 
(January 1987), 9.
309 Kushner, Angels, 177. Emphasis in original.
310 Gershom Scholem, Sabbatai Zevi: The Mystical Messiah, 1626–1676 (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1973).
311 Handelman, Fragments, 156.
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Lurianic Kabbalah needs to be viewed in the context of the catastrophic event of the 
expulsion, in 1492, of the Jews from Spain) intertwining it with extramundane 
catastrophe. As Handelman observes, ‘[t]he meaning of Jewish exile and redemption 
was now a reflection of a cosmic cataclysm that affected the very life of God’. Jonas, 
meanwhile, conjectures that ‘[c]reation was that act of absolute sovereignty with 
which it consented, for the sake of self-determined finitude, to be absolute no more – 
an act, therefore, of divine self-restriction’.
313   
Closer inspection of what Kushner has written suggests, however, that he has firmly 
shut even this door of hope. He demonstrates quite clearly that he believes that God 
will only ever enjoy émigré status and that we should give up as a pipe dream any 
thought that He may yet return to us. The play ends with Prior Walter sounding 
nothing less than a Nietzschean clarion call for ‘More Life. The Great Work Begins’, a 
plea hardly designed to encourage the return of a prodigal Father who, we are 
informed, even before the Spring departure of 1906, had set off on numerous other 
explorations, on ‘Voyages, not knowing where’, in an effort to emulate the unending 
quests of men.
314 
Profoundly disconcerting, the notion of the Heavenly Estates abandoned by their 
‘landlord’ (the metaphor is Erich Heller’s
315) does, of course, offer the possibility of 
release from intellectual dependency upon traditional conceptual frameworks in terms 
of which the world is made intelligible and articulated. Such a prospect was one 
which Hannah Arendt was able to exploit, though not with any real sense of 
originality until after the Second World War when, it seemed to her, new possibilities 
313 Handelman, Fragments, 157. Jonas, ‘The Concept of God after Auschwitz’, 11.
314 Kushner, Angels, 177 and 280. Emphasis in original.
315 Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche, 112–113.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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opened up.  As she ploughed her way through the writings of Augustine, Aristotle and 
Plato, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche and Rilke, amongst many others, under her 
mentor, Martin Heidegger, who had begun teaching at Marburg in the mid-nineteen 
twenties at the height of Weimar, she was though, laying the foundations for a future 
political philosophy. Like Nietzsche and Rilke before him, Heidegger too, it should be 
noted, addressed the consequences of a Godless world, ‘the utter exposure and 
defenselessness of the frontiers of human existence against the neighbouring void’
316 
and, in the process, created what Arendt later described with much gratitude, as space 
for thinking to take place.
317  
Thinking or perhaps, re-thinking the reference points according to which we make 
sense of the world (for Heidegger, re-thinking in order to unconceal Being) was not 
the only option, of course, open to a European imagination unsettled by divine 
abandonment and whistling in the dark, as it were, as it despairingly approached the 
precipice beyond which loomed a spiritual void. Capitulation to a cheerless and 
bewildering imprisonment in absolute immanence beckoned, and it was this, indeed, 
that formed the backdrop to Hannah Arendt’s analysis, in the 1960s, of Adolf 
Eichmann’s non-thinking and the banality of his role in the Shoah. To recall Rilke, 
quoted earlier, ‘Each torpid turn of the world has such disinherited children, those to 
whom former has ceased, next hasn’t come, to belong’.
318 Eichmann, she will expect 
us to understand, was one of those disorientated by such disinheritance. In his case 
316 Ibid., 116.
317 In a letter to Heidegger that Arendt wrote on 12 March 1970 she describes Heidegger’s genius in terms of 
him having ‘created real room for thought’. See Hannah Arendt, and Martin Heidegger: Letters 1925–1975, edited 
by Ursula Ludz and translated by Andrew Shields (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Inc, 1998), 120.
318 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, translated by J. B. Leishman & Stephen Spender, 4
th Edition (London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1963), 7
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though, the consequences of such disorientation were not intellectually profound but, 
as he and his fellow Nazis demonstrated, disturbing beyond belief. 
Within a few short years of Arendt’s completion of her university studies, the 
extremes of spiritual depression and intellectual disorientation to which Europe had 
succumbed became all too clear as the Nazis initiated an experiment in total control 
and unremitting domination releasing, in the process, the brutal and macabre side of 
the European imagination to a degree never before witnessed. Unleashed was a 
battery of heinous crimes and terror spreading death, destruction and fear across the 
European continent and beyond for more than a decade. This was the very antithesis 
of all that European man had come to appreciate as politics since its first appearance 
in ancient Greece. In what was still a formative decade for her in the economically, 
politically and culturally turbulent 1920s and indeed up until the early 1930s, when 
Arendt began publishing her earliest articles just prior to the demise of the Republic, 
her political response to this situation, made possible by the death of God and, for 
example, Nietzsche’s liberating declaration that ‘Only after the death of religion will 
the imagination be able to luxuriate again in divine spheres’ was still some way off.
319 
She observed in her 1946 paper entitled ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’: ‘In [an] 
atheised world man can be interpreted in his “abandonment” or in his “individual 
autonomy”. For every modern philosopher – and not only for Nietzsche – this 
interpretation becomes a touchstone of his philosophy’.
320 In the context of Weimar 
Germany in the nineteen twenties and nineteen thirties, the fatherless society, as it 
might be dubbed, the young Arendt (and Günther Stern) in commenting upon Rilke’s 
319 Friedrich Nietzsche, cited by Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche, 121.
320 Arendt, ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’, 39.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Duino Elegies highlighted a number motifs that would subsequently feature very 
much in her writings. It is to these motifs that I will turn my attention in this chapter.
During this period Arendt wrote several relatively short articles and reviews on, for 
example, Martin Buber, Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia, Zionism, the 
schooling of Jewish children in Germany and, as we have seen, the so called ‘Jewish 
Question’ more generally conceived.
321 One of these pieces is the paper referred to 
already as ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’, written in 1932. This paper 
is important because it revealed, as I have indicated, an enormous amount about 
Arendt’s perception of what being Jewish meant, or should have come to mean she 
thought, by the twentieth century. Essentially, drawing heavily on Herder to qualify 
her use of Kant’s more formal pronouncements on the conditions of agency, we have 
seen how Arendt “released” the Jews from what she judged to be self-imposed 
constraints born of a conception of themselves determined by a very introverted and 
particularistic historical consciousness. The article was an early exercise in counter-
history which sought to avoid relying upon the past as it was conventionally 
understood, used as a prop, as it were, upon which to lean in order to avoid standing 
on one’s own feet.
322 Read in conjunction with ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish 
Question’ the “news” about God conveyed by Nietzsche, gives us a good indication of 
just how liberatory for Arendt’s own intellectual development her essay was. In 
charting the direction her thinking was taking the commentary on the Duino Elegies 
published in 1930 is very revealing too. Sandwiched between her doctoral research 
321 Hannah Arendt, ‘A Guide for Youth: Martin Buber’ (1935) and ‘The Jewish Question’ (1937 or 1938) are 
collected in TJW.
322 ‘It is’, wrote  Heinrich Blücher,  Hannah Arendt’s second husband, ‘a long process in a human being’s 
development to learn [...] not to lean on something. Not to walk on crutches’.This extract is from his last lecture 
delivered   at   Bard   College,   available   from:   http://www.bard.edu/bluecher/lectures/last_lecture/last_pf.thm 
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and ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’, the commentary does not have a 
Jewish theme but it is an important text because it indicates a number of ideas that 
Arendt would subsequently develop. It was also a text that in many ways reflected its 
times. Unless otherwise indicated, I will, in my discussion below, draw upon Arendt’s 
and Stern’s own translation of extracts from the Elegies, although, I will also use the 
translation by Lieshman and Spender to fill in any gaps.
323
Hannah Arendt and Günther Stern published their Rilke commentary in 1930. It was 
to be the only piece that Arendt co-authored. The commentary, entitled simply, 
‘Rilke’s Duino Elegies’ was recently omitted from a selection of her writings edited 
by Jerome Kohn on the grounds that this ‘close analysis of the prosody and diction of 
the  Elegies  would be inaccessible to non-German readers’. Besides, the editor 
continues, ‘it is not clear how much of [the text] Arendt actually wrote’.
324 To deal 
with this latter point first, while it is true that she and Stern did not always see eye to 
eye, it nevertheless seems plausible to assume, since Arendt neither subsequently 
made any attempt to retract interpretations expressed in the piece nor conveyed in 
public opinions contradicting them, that she was happy having her name associated 
with this text.
325 
However, more than this, while it is conceded that a reading knowledge of German 
would, at the very least, make the complexity of Arendt’s and Stern’s analysis much 
easier to comprehend, it is felt that sufficient sense can be made of their line of 
argument even in translation to justify discussing it here as an important document 
323 See footnote 318 above.
324 Kohn, EiU, xv.
325 Susannah Young-Ah Gottlieb, for example, refers to Arendt’s rejection of the line Stern took in his lecture on 
Kafka, delivered at the Institut d’Études Germaniques in Paris in 1933. Walter Benjamin similarly repudiated 
Stern’s interpretation. See Hannah Arendt, RLC, xix. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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following on soon after the completion of Arendt’s doctoral dissertation on Augustine. 
In fact, the essay is far too important a document to be omitted from a discussion of 
Hannah Arendt’s intellectual development, I would contend. This is partly because of 
Rilke’s towering importance still in Weimar. Peter Gay, for instance, remarks that 
‘everyone read him. Young soldiers went to their death with his verses on their lips’. 
And as Gay further notes, ‘Thomas Mann recognised him, “of course”, as a “lyrical 
phenomenon of the highest rank”’.
326 In addition to this though, given Arendt’s line of 
reasoning in her earlier research, the Rilke commentary picks up on two themes that 
were of special interest to her: man’s disunion from God and man’s capacity to 
express love. The disunion of men from God, introduced in the 1929 dissertation as a 
result of Arendt thinking afresh about man’s origins, was restated more forcefully in 
the commentary on the Elegies. Arendt and Stern appear to have accepted the idea 
expressed by Rilke, that, however hard man might try, he should not delude himself 
any longer by thinking that his appeals to God will be heard in future because, to all 
intents and purposes, God has removed Himself beyond man’s reach. Like Rilke and 
like Nietzsche, this was the new context of disconnection in which thinking and 
writing would now have to take place. The importance of Arendt’s and Stern’s 
commentary lies, I think, in grasping this bigger picture, and does not depend upon 
fully comprehending every minute detail or every literary nuance of their critical 
analysis. 
A crude summary of the commentary could be expressed as follows: Rilke, the 
authors note, has established that man has been abandoned by God. Humans are 
henceforth, condemned to lead lives in echoless immanence from which there appears 
326 Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 52.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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to be no escape; there is no possibility of transcendence or redemption, of being heard 
by a higher power. We are alone, deserted. Yet, out of this bleak solitude some small 
measure of hope is offered, the result of a certain religious ambiguity in the poetry. If 
the opposition between what is this-worldly and what is other-worldly has effectively 
been dissolved, why then does the poet still speak of ‘angelic orders’ (First Elegy) if 
not to allow us some sort of absolution. Is there perhaps, just the slightest glimmer of 
a possibility that we might yet escape our imprisonment in immanence and find 
redemption? Well, just as in Kushner’s play, these are no “ordinary” angels; they are, 
perhaps, rather the equivalent of Nietzsche’s Übermenschen introduced in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra – an order of not quite human but then not quite divine beings either, who 
are released from having to think in terms of the concepts, categories and distinctions 
employed by humans. This is what privileges them from having to live in our world 
and this is why they occupy layers of being, hierarchically above and beyond our 
own.
327 If we learn to speak to them though, in the simplest of terms about our human 
achievements and the objective world which surrounds us, perhaps these angels might 
just take notice:
So show him
something simple which, formed over generations,
lives as our own, near our hand and within our gaze.
Tell him of things. He will stand astonished; as you stood
by the rope-maker in Rome or the potter along the Nile.
(Ninth Elegy)
328
Or again, this time from the Seventh Elegy:
Angel, gaze, for it’s we – 
O mightiness, tell them that we were capable of it – my
breath’s too short for this celebration. So, after all, we have not
failed to make use of the spaces, these generous spaces, 
these, our spaces.
329
327 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,  translated by R. J. Hollingdale  (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1961). 
328 Quoted in Arendt, RLC, 6.
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Indeed, is it not the case anyway that things, inanimate objects, in the world are 
dependent upon us, upon humans, rescuing them from their transience by our uttering 
their names? Might it not be that such rescuing, the commentators suggest, constitutes 
our ‘mission’ in life? From the Ninth Elegy:
Are we, perhaps, here just for saying: House, 
Bridge, Fountain, Gate, Jug, Fruit tree, Window, – 
possibly: Pillar, Tower? . . . but for saying, remember, 
oh, for such saying as never the things themselves
hoped so intensely to be.
330 
There is a quid pro quo here: in the act of naming and establishing the being of 
objects in a way that they cannot achieve on their own, we might at least hover 
between the immanence to which we have been condemned and a transcendent realm 
we can only ever imagine.  We might just achieve this if we can sufficiently impress 
the Angelic orders and provoke their astonishment with our words.
331
If we imagine the uttering of names will secure our place in the higher orders of the 
angels our hopes can only be dashed, however. The world it seems, has come to exist 
nowhere ‘but within’ [because] ever diminishing, outwardness dwindles’.
332 We have 
become, it turns out, ‘disinherited’ beings. Arendt and Stern translate extracts from the 
Seventh Elegy thus: ‘the exterior disappears more and more’; human existence has 
been reduced to an ‘imageless act’; and, ‘where once there was an enduring building, 
a mental image suggests itself’.
333 Our position, it seems, as Fatherless children ‘is 
thus directly grounded in futility’.
334 
330 Ibid., 85. Emphasis in original.
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All may not be lost, though. Love may yet hold the key to our salvation – or, at least, a 
salvation of sorts. If ‘things are becoming ruins, “pushed away” and “replaced” by [an 
“imageless” act]’
335 then perhaps an expression of love that has achieved such purity 
that it can demonstrate it has lost all ‘specificity’ and has become transformed, in 
effect, into an ‘objectless being-in-love’ from which the beloved has been ‘forgotten 
and surpassed’, can disclose a new world, a world that ‘is a fundamentally different 
world from the one that presents itself to us in our daily lives’. We are back with 
something that looks very much like Augustine’s concept of Caritas, devotion to God 
at the expense of everything and everyone in the material world.  If love could 
achieve such purity, Rilke believed, then we would indeed have achieved much. 
Nevertheless, we must still remember that ‘when the this-worldly sphere is surpassed, 
it is not for the sake of a radically other world, but for the sake [only] of the higher 
layers of the world, which are not properly other-worldly despite their fundamental 
inaccessibility’.
336 This is the most we can hope for. And in the meanwhile, we are 
condemned to inhabit this world in which feeling at home is simply not possible at all.
A summary cannot do full justice to every point made by the commentators in their 
interpretation of the Elegies but I do think it is possible to highlight at least some 
ideas in their discussion that would come to prominence in Hannah Arendt’s 
subsequent political writings. To put it a different way, there are motifs in the 
commentary that will reappear with some modification but in a significant form in 
Hannah Arendt’s post-war political philosophy and these motifs can be traced back to 
ideas she was already thinking about and discussing in the 1930s. One such motif 
concerned, for example, the profundity of the loss of God. Arendt would subsequently 
335 Ibid.
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recognise this enormity reproduced in the insane desire by the Nazis to annihilate 
European Jewry, so much so in fact, that she would, like Nietzsche and Rilke before 
her, interpret this as a moment demanding nothing less than a reconsideration of the 
frontiers within human experience. A second motif would concern the loss of the 
material world and the inwardness that this presaged. Echoing the poet’s advice to 
speak of ‘simple’ things Arendt would offer, in The Human Condition, a strikingly 
uncomplicated ontology, uncomplicated at least in technical terms, compared with 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, for example. And in ‘the third party’ Arendt and Stern 
identified a character who would reappear, as the spectator-judge, to play an 
immensely important role in her later political philosophy. However, before I say any 
more about these motifs I think it might be worthwhile to highlight certain aspects of 
life in the Weimar Republic at the time Arendt and Stern were collaborating on their 
commentary, which suggest that in some ways it, too, can be described in terms of the 
loss of the father, or, at least as Peter Gay depicts it, as a struggle between father and 
son.
337 
From a political perspective, Weimar Germany was, at the end of the nineteen 
twenties, dubiously perched at the point of no return. Events were rapidly and 
irrevocably shunting aside the ‘Stresemann era’ of relative calm and stability for the 
Republic  following   the  uncertainties  and  turbulent  years   that  accompanied  its 
“inception”.
338  In September of 1930, the National Socialist Party (NSDAP), now 
under Hitler’s unquestioned leadership, would make enormous gains in the Reichstag 
elections reflecting its steadily growing influence across society achieved through the 
337 Gay, Weimar Culture.
338 The Republic was constitutionally established in 1919, but Detlev Peukert’s observation that its ‘temporal 
boundaries’ are, in fact, ‘open to dispute’ that is, its precise starting point unclear, is worthy of note. See Peukert, 
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establishment,   frequently   by   individual   party   activists,   of   National   Socialist 
associations with strong popular appeal. Not only had a strategy of measured 
permeation of existing professional bodies and special interest groups resulted in the 
infiltration of, for example, the Nationalist League of Commercial Employees, 
representing white-collar workers, and the Reich Agrarian League, but new ‘party 
“formations”   (Gliederungen)’  such  as   the   National  Socialist   German  Students’ 
Association and the Hitler Youth, both formed in 1926, enjoyed a wide following. The 
NSDAP had in place, and ready to be implemented, a political programme considered 
by many now to be traceable back as far as 1920. The two central tenets of this 
programme, racial theory grounded in anti-Semitism and the concept of Lebensraum 
(living space), suggesting as it did military conquest, forewarned of what some would 
have envisaged as a dark and threatening world (the product of “non-thinking” in 
Arendtian terms) into which Europe could be plunged if the NSDAP were ever to 
achieve ultimate power. The National Socialists, on the other hand, looked forward 
with much hope and expectation to precisely just such a prospect.
339
National Socialism, at one and the same time, represented a new departure as well as 
the hope that respect for authority and tradition could be recovered. The Nietzschean 
tension between the forces of past and future (‘He who cannot sink down on the 
threshold of the moment and forget all the past [...] will never know what happiness 
is’
340 ) can already be seen in Hitler’s efforts to remove von Hindenburg as Chancellor. 
Hitler was the charismatic younger statesman, a young pretender with growing 
popular appeal trying to oust von Hindenburg, the respected elder statesman and 
defender of tradition, authority, and cultural and moral values. Hitler, of course, once 
339  Kolb, The Weimar Republic, 101.
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von Hindenburg had been removed, would soon become a father figure in his own 
right. His character would mirror National Socialism’s own schizophrenia, its 
‘reactionary modernism’, which was at once driven by the possibilities offered by 
advances in science and technology and yet rooted in mythology, in nostalgia and 
German romanticism.
341 Such tensions can be detected also, I think, in the German 
society of the time more broadly conceived.
 
Quite literally, the circumstances many young Germans found themselves in as a 
consequence of the First World War, was to be without a father. They were brought up 
under the parental guidance of their mother alone because their father was either off 
fighting in the trenches or had been killed in action or was seriously wounded. 
Demographic change that, as Detlev Peukert (1993) reliably informs us, had begun 
prior to the war exacerbated this state of affairs in Germany. During the decade and a 
half between 1910 and 1925, for example, the population had carried on growing, 
which meant that by 1925 all age-groups from twelve year-olds upwards were larger 
than they had been in 1910.
342  In contrast, the ravages of the European conflagration 
had impacted significantly on the male population between the ages of twenty-five 
and fifty. Most notably, the biggest losses were of those aged between thirty and 
thirty-five resulting in the fact that, again, to take 1925 as a reference point, there 
were actually fewer men in this age range at this time than fifteen years earlier. Given 
that there had been particularly high birth rates in the first decade of the twentieth 
century this implies that many of the fatherless during and after the war and into the 
341 Though failing to gain a majority in the presidential election of 1925, Hindenburg was, nevertheless elected, 
initiating, what Gay describes as ‘the revenge of the father’. On ‘reactionary modernism’ see,  Jeffrey Herf, 
Reactionary Modernism: Technology,  Culture, and  Politics in  Weimar and  the Third Reich  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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era of the Weimar Republic, were adolescents, at an extremely impressionable and 
developmentally sensitive stage of their lives. There was a disconnection of sorts here 
too then, in society itself, with all the accompanying insecurities and vulnerabilities 
this brings.
It was at this moment, conceptually speaking, that German youth was, in fact, 
officially born in the sense that  Jugend  (youth) started to gain currency as an 
expression implying a ‘breakdown of traditional ties and social controls’.
343  The 
young   were   suddenly   attracting   notice.   ‘Der   Jugendliche’  (young   person),   an 
expression, which Peukert observes, only entered the German vernacular in the last 
twenty years of the nineteenth century became, during the Republic, an abbreviation 
associated with negative connotations used just as much to refer to der jugendliche 
Arbeiter  (the young worker) as to refer to  der jugendliche Kriminelle  (the young 
criminal) and indicating a “problem”, something to be disapproved of, in one sense or 
another.
344  To be sure, the suggestion is not that the social problems confronting 
successive governments throughout the time of the Republic can all be attributed to 
the lack of paternal guidance alone, which affected an entire generation of German 
youth during and after the First World War. The causes of the social problems 
confronting the Republic were obviously far more diverse and much more complex in 
nature than that. However, if a  variety of economic, political and social issues 
including the failure of the emerging welfare state system to fulfil its fiscal promises, 
for instance, combined to bring down the Republic, the concept of the fatherless 
society is suggested more as a means of getting a sense of the spiritual fatigue and 
fragility typical of the times. This was the context in which Arendt and Stern co-
343 Ibid., 89.
344 Ibid.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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authored their commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies, a poem which spoke of man’s 
despair in the face of his abandonment by God. 
Family cohesion was beginning to come unstuck and, of course, the politicians of the 
day recognised that a generation of fatherless adolescents spelled problems. The 
seriousness with which the whole issue was treated was reflected in legislation passed 
during the 1920s. This legislation included, for instance, the Reich Youth Welfare Law 
and the Reich Juvenile Court Law of 1922 and 1923 respectively, laws ‘which 
established the principle of educational rehabilitation for juvenile offenders’.
345 
Additionally, at the end of 1926, the Reichstag passed the Law to Protect Youth from 
Trashy and Filthy Writings. This law, supported by an array of interested parties 
amongst whom were numbered teachers, social workers and clerics, for example, was 
embraced because its intention was to protect young people from writing which, even 
though it was hardly pornographic at all (when judged, for example, against twenty-
first century standards) was, nevertheless, taken to appeal ‘to the most basic human 
instincts’ thereby threatening to undermine all ‘respect for authority’.
346 The fact that 
this   writing   was   composed   largely   of   ‘heart-thumping,   horseback-mounting, 
detective-revolver-packing romance and adventure stories’ that were readily available, 
is, in a sense, neither here nor there.
347 The point is, the state authorities clearly felt 
legislation was demanded, presumably because of a lack of parental guidance that 
might otherwise have naturally deterred the young from the appeal of such material. 
345 Ibid., 131.
346 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 106. 
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So, growing social tensions within the Weimar Republic, challenges to traditional 
ways of behaving and demonstrating respect for authority, and the manner in which 
the Republic’s politicians attempted to address these problems, can be seen, on one 
level, as intimately bound up with real losses in the adult male population. The hiatus 
created by these losses was a product of broad unanticipated demographic variations 
and developments in German society and the equally unplanned consequences of war. 
In this sense therefore, the loss of the father was not something that was either chosen 
or wished for. It was not anybody’s fault. 
In a contrasting sense though, the loss of the father was something very much wished 
for by some within Weimar society; it was a condition to which an amorphous 
collection of artists, cartoonists, film-makers, novelists, playwrights, sculptors and 
poets, for example, very much aspired. Known as the Expressionists, though lacking 
anything that could begin to look programmatic, they consciously strove, in their own 
individual ways, to stir up “trouble” (surely the prerogative of the young) by 
questioning the established order of things. The Dadaists, whose discontent with the 
waste and futility of war (the First World War) turned to disgust with the society that 
had sanctioned it, did much the same. Even those amongst the Expressionists whose 
subject matter seemed on the surface peaceable enough were, if one scratched below 
the surface, “dangerous”: ‘the inherent artistic direction of their work was as 
subversive of established tradition as George Grosz’s savage drawings of revolting 
plutocrats, coquettish prostitutes, and maimed veterans’.
348  Their revolt too, as Gay 
has summed it up, was ‘the revolt of the son’ against the father, the revolt of those 
who, in the wake of the destruction wrought by the First World War, wanted to 
348 Gay, Weimar Culture, 110.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 142
broadcast their repugnance and disapproval as loudly as they could from the rooftops. 
This was a rebellion of those who sought spiritual renewal for society against those 
who   were   perceived   as   the   representatives   of   unfashionable   and   reactionary 
tradition.
349  The looseness of this grouping of individuals working in a range of 
different spheres apart and the lack of a concerted political approach or direction, 
acknowledged, the Expressionists were, nevertheless, unanimous in their repudiation 
of the past and their hopes for a new reality. From Kafka’s unsent letter to his own 
father written in 1919, we can distil the essence of their grievances.
350  (It is 
noteworthy that Scholem too had major differences of opinion with his father. Like 
Benjamin he became something of ‘a restless and rebellious son, fiercely resisting 
assimilation into the world of philistine respectability’.
351 On the other hand, Hannah 
Arendt’s father died when she was still a child and though her mother remarried 
Arendt, in a sense, spent her life always looking for fatherly recognition either from 
Karl Jaspers or Martin Heidegger.) Written by a son in reaction to an all-knowing, 
overbearing paternal presence unable to accept him for what he was in his own right, 
Kafka indicted his father for encouraging behaviour in him that reflected only his 
(Kafka senior’s) values and sense of self-importance, not behaviour that had anything 
to do with the younger Kafka’s future development as an autonomous individual, 
who, as we now know, would have something of his own to say. Indeed, anything 
expressing Kafka’s  own creativity or distinctiveness  was at best belittled and 
dismissed but, more often, firmly quashed by his father, if Kafka’s charges are to be 
believed.
349 ‘The Revolt of the Son’ is the title of the fifth chapter of Gay’s, The Weimar Republic.
350 Franz Kafka, Letter to My Father, translated by Howard Colyer (North Carolina: Lulu, 2008).
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Personal as it was, Kafka’s letter remains symbolic of the wider challenge to tradition 
posed by the Expressionists (and by Benjamin and Scholem too, for that matter). This 
challenge   frequently   manifest   itself   through   a   questioning   of   the   father-son 
relationship echoing Kafka’s except that, unlike his letter at least, it was intended for 
public consumption. It is perhaps no accident that in 1910 Freud’s research into the 
psyche led him to classify, feelings of guilt and castration anxiety on the part of the 
son as nothing less than a ‘complex’, ‘the father complex’ to be precise, as it initially 
came to be known and discussed by him in a paper entitled ‘The Future Prospects of 
Psycho-Analytic Therapy’. What Freud thought he had clinically identified was filial 
expression of hostility and fear in relation to the father. After 1910 he used the idea 
almost synonymously in the now more widely recognised ‘Oedipus complex’, which 
has since come to replace the older theory.
352 
The challenge to tradition was evident in other ways too, through a loathing of 
militarism, for example, and anything that called for obedience, and through an 
almost mystical vision of mankind living in a rejuvenated and harmonious society. 
Plays by Walter Hasenclever, Der Sohn, for example, written in 1914, or Leopold 
Jessner’s   1919   production   of   Schiller's  Wilhelm   Tell;   Kirchner’s,   Klee’s   and 
Kandinsky’s respective artistic experiments in portraiture, fantasy and abstractions in 
search of an alternative reality; and, the original pacifist plot of The Cabinet of Dr 
Caligari, written by Hans Janowitz and Carl Mayer, but edited by director Robert 
Wiene in such a way as to make the 1920 release of the film more of an apology for 
352 See for example, Sigmund Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, translated by Angela Richards (New 
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the wickedness inherent in authority that the authors had set out to expose, are just a 
small sample of the Expressionists’ assault upon tradition.
353
It is worth noting here that Expressionist calls for the regeneration of man were not 
the only ones being voiced in Germany in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Martin Buber, for instance, whom I have already mentioned, in papers he wrote and 
lectures he began delivering in the first decade of the twentieth century, and 
particularly in his “Three Speeches to the Jews” between 1909 and 1911 delivered to 
the Prague Jewish student organisation  Bar Kochba, called for a total renewal, a 
Nietzschean transformation of values no less, not just piecemeal  reform, on the 
grounds that a much more personal experience of Judaism was called for.
354 Indeed, 
Buber was highly influential amongst many young Jewish intellectuals at the time 
though he failed to win over the likes of Walter Benjamin or Hannah Arendt, each of 
whom was never fully drawn into parochial debates about how Judaism needed to 
develop as a religion at the expense of wider, much less particularistic concerns about 
cultural, social and political issues affecting society as a whole. All of which brings 
me back to those central motifs in Arendt’s and Stern’s commentary on Rilke’s Duino 
Elegies. What exactly are the key points that we can distil from their discussion? What 
impressions are we left with after reading the commentary?
First, of overriding significance to the commentators was the concern expressed for 
the ‘echolessness [...] from which’, they suggested, the Elegies ‘spring’.
355 As quoted 
above ‘[...] who and where the Almighty is – this remains in the form of a question 
353 See Gay, The Weimar Republic, for a valuable and informative account of this.
354 Buber, ‘The Renewal of Judaism’.
355 Ibid., 22.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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that no longer hopes for an answer’.
356 Clearly this signalled that a profound change 
was required in the way we seek to make our lives intelligible. As already indicated, 
Hannah Arendt would assent, in The Human Condition for instance, to the idea of 
God’s departure by attributing human existence on earth to an unspecified gift from 
nowhere rather than divine creation. Yet, none of this should be taken to imply that 
Arendt and Stern believed, for instance, that what Rilke had thereby demonstrated 
was that God does not exist, that He is dead:
For the impossibility of encountering God is not 
proof of his non-existence as far as the Elegies are 
concerned;   this   impossibility   explicitly   becomes 
God’s distance from us – a distance that can be 
experienced, in its negativity, again and again, and 
thus becomes a religious fact.
357 
If anything, the authors concluded their commentary by drawing attention to the new 
grounds of religiosity observing, ‘the despair of being able to encounter Him [...] 
becomes the last residuum of religiousness, and elegy becomes the last literary form 
of religious certification’.
358 What the authors seemed to be implying was that religion 
was not a thing of the past but it did now need to be conceived in terms of wholly 
different human experience. If this was the message on which the commentary was 
concluded, there were, however, some other significant points that I think we would 
do well not to lose sight of. 
For example, Rilke, indeed like Nietzsche, knew that the response to abandonment 
had, of necessity, to be in the form of a fundamental shift in the boundaries of human 
experience. That is to say, as Erich Heller has noted, it was not simply ‘nuances’ that 
would be argued over in future: 
356 See footnote 305 above.
357 Arendt, RLC, 23.
358 Ibid.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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The word nuance presupposes an order of firmly 
established ideas and objects between which an 
indefinite   number   of   subtly-colored   shades   may 
playfully mediate, whereas Nietzsche’s and Rilke’s 
sensibilities tend towards a radical denial of that 
very   principle   of   separation   –   philosophically 
speaking, the  principium individuationis, within a 
world   perceived   under   the   dual   aspects   of 
immanence   and   transcendence   –   on   which   our 
intellectual perception has been based throughout the 
centuries.
359  
The Shoah would, for Hannah Arendt, demand revisions of a just such a profound 
nature post-1945. Thus, her discussions of freedom, equality, indeed the very nature of 
politics itself would still reverberate decades later with the poet’s observation in the 
First Elegy: ‘All of the living, though, make the mistake of drawing too sharp 
distinctions’.
360 For one who made very ‘sharp distinctions’ herself between work and 
labour, for instance, or between the public and the private realms this may seem 
ironic. However, like Rilke and Nietzsche before her, it was the frontiers of the 
conventional conceptual terrain at the time that, we must recognise, Arendt was 
concerned with. For example, the liberal idea of freedom as freedom from politics, 
formalised by Isaiah Berlin as the negative concept of liberty, seemed to her, in The 
Human Condition, to be a nonsense.
361 The whole point about freedom is that it ‘is 
exclusively located in the political realm’, she observed, not in activities located 
outside this realm.
362 If negative liberty offered anything, she thought, it was precisely 
that, no liberty at all.
This warning about making ‘too sharp distinctions’ seems to have a deeper 
significance in Arendt’s work, though. I have previously argued that it was in terms of 
359 Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche, 104.
360 Rilke, Duino Elegies, Leishman and Spender translation, First Elegy.
361 See, Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
362 Arendt, HC, 31. Emphasis added.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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human history that Arendt formulated her lines of reasoning against Heidegger. As we 
have seen, where he used fundamental ontology to establish the grounds of ‘being-
with-one-another’ the young doctoral student took an empirical turn by way of 
Augustine and looked to the generations leading back to Adam and the Christian 
concept of grace, for truths of human history that would support a theory of social life. 
The appearance of totalitarianism and the Shoah changed everything, though. In the 
wake of the Second World War Arendt would be struck by the necessity to completely 
rethink what we are doing in order to secure afresh the moorings that make human 
experience intelligible and communicable. And this rethinking would involve an 
excursion into ontology whose terminus would be the publication of The Human 
Condition. This did not imply, however, that for Arendt history was now dead. Quite 
the contrary, I think, history and ontology in her post-war writings came to share a 
symbiotic relationship much like Immanuel Kant’s concepts and intuitions. The one 
was nothing without the other, the sharp distinction between them in a sense 
dissolved. So, history cast into relief those phenomena of origin whose significance 
we might otherwise overlook, the American and Hungarian revolutions, for instance, 
or the student protests of the late nineteen sixties, while the source of illumination for 
such events could be traced to the ontology of the human condition. Arendt would 
come to the realisation, I think, that Historie without ontology remains blind, but 
ontology without Geschichte will be empty.          
   
A second key idea from the commentary connects the estrangement from material 
things in the world indicated by Rilke, to the ‘striking’ loss of experience Hannah 
Arendt would herself point to three decades later in The Human Condition.
363 The 
363 See footnote 69 above.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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dwindling of ‘outwardness’ will translate into the incapacity to be articulate about the 
world around us. The poet was in essence then, presaging that breakdown in 
communication, which the political philosopher thought reconstituting public 
discourse would correct. Our vanishing surroundings were indicative, according to 
Arendt and Stern, of ‘solitude’ arising from ‘the transience and unreliability of this 
world’.
364 I take this to be an early indication of Arendt’s subsequent critique of 
introspection in general and Cartesianism in particular which, she argued in The 
Human Condition, for example, had grown at the expense of common sense.
365 The 
more inward looking we are the more deprived of and the less articulate about the 
world we become. Translating lines from Rilke’s Seventh Elegy, Arendt and Stern 
observed that ‘Where there was once an enduring building, a mental image suggests 
itself’.
366 By the 1960s Arendt would bemoan the fact that ‘modern man [...] did not 
gain this world when he lost the other world [‘Christian otherworldliness’], and he did 
not gain life, strictly speaking, either; he was thrust back upon it, thrown into the 
closed inwardness of introspection, where the highest he could experience were the 
empty processes of reckoning of the mind, its play with itself’.
367 
The final idea I want to draw attention to concerns the concept of the ‘third party’ that 
Arendt and Stern discussed in relation to love. For Rilke, they state, ‘love refers 
primarily to the situation of objectless being-in-love, in which, conversely, the 
beloved person is forgotten and surpassed in favor of a transcendence’. The beloved 
may be the occasion for the expression of love but only by ceasing to be fixated upon 
or obsessed with the beloved can access to the ‘“angels’ hierarchies”’, have a chance 
364 Arendt, RLC, 12.
365 Arendt, HC, 280–284.
366 Arendt, RLC, 8.
367 Arendt, HC, 320.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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of being turned into an achievement.
368 Were this not the case, love would simply be 
“squandered” on the beloved. Yet, love as the ‘guarantee of being’, it turns out, can be 
more than just the achievement of the lovers alone, that is, it can be the 
accomplishment of a ‘third party’ too, who is, in effect, a ‘questioner’.
369 If the love 
expressed by lovers indicates ‘pure duration’, it is the third party’s questioning, the 
commentators notice, that beyond this, elicits that their ‘embraces almost promise 
eternity’:
370 
Lovers, gratified in each other, I am asking you
about us. You hold each other. Do you have proof?
(Second Elegy)
Arendt and Stern observed that questioning transformed ungratified lovers, for whom 
the present would naturally melt away, into ‘those “gratified in each other”, for whom 
[instead] the present is absolutized and elevated to “eternity” in the fulfillment of the 
moment. [...] Time and and transience are thereby paralyzed, and an existence rescued 
from transience is guaranteed within the fullness of love’.
371
Arendt’s and Stern’s brief discussion of ‘the third party’ within the overall 
commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies is important for two reasons, I think. First, it 
pointed to meaningfulness as a possibility lying beyond the mute actualities of an 
activity. If love was for Rilke, according to his commentators, ‘an exemplary 
situation, for love is principally love of the abandoned’,
372 politics would subsequently 
become an exemplary situation for Hannah Arendt, for every political act would be 
confirmation anew of the conditions of human life on earth. (Ontology without 
Geschichte is empty.) In addition to this, however, Arendt and Stern located in the 
368 Ibid., 15–16.
369 Ibid., 18.
370 Rilke, Duino Elegies, Leishman and Spender translation, Second Elegy, 37.
371 Arendt, RLC, 19.
372 Ibid., 13.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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‘third party’ a significant other, I would argue, whose role as an interrogator of 
actualities was perceived to be crucial to the disclosure of their meaning. We have 
here not only the suggestion then, that being with others is fundamental, even though 
on a first reading this does not seem to be an idea central to the commentary but, we 
have the prefiguration too, of the spectator-judge in the guise of a questioner whose 
role in Hannah Arendt’s later political philosophy it would be to think critically about 
events from the vantage of a unique understanding distance making possible the 
disclosure of these events’ original significance. Before we consider this spectator-
judge, however, who he or she is and what he or she does, we need first to consider 
what was a truly significant point of departure in Hannah Arendt’ life, an event that 
provoked substantial rethinking on her part – the Shoah, a crime we might describe as 
one against Being perpetrated upon beings. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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CHAPTER 5
Crimes against Being Perpetrated upon Beings 
Heidegger has not really established his ontology, since the 
second volume of Sein und Zeit has never appeared. To the 
question concerning the meaning of Being he has given the 
provisional answer, in itself unintelligible, that the meaning of 
Being is temporality. With this he implied, and with his 
analysis of human reality (i.e., of the Being of Man), which is 
conditioned by death, he established that the meaning of Being 
is nothingness.
Hannah Arendt
373
Finally, it dawned on me, that I was not engaged in writing an 
historical book, [The Origins of Totalitarianism] even though 
large parts of it clearly contain historical analyses, but a 
political book [...].
Hannah Arendt
374 
[...] there was a kind of prohibition on the very quality of 
coherence. To make a sequential narrative of what happened 
would have been to make indecently rational what had been 
obscenely irrational. It would have been to normalize through 
familiar form an utterly aberrant content. One was not to 
make a nice story out of loathsome cruelty and of piercing, 
causeless hurt.
Eva Hoffman
375
                                                          
In my discussion thus far, I have drawn on texts that Hannah Arendt composed in the 
late 1920s through to the mid-1930s that, I think, demonstrate how much she relied 
upon history and what she judged to be historical evidence to support her arguments. 
So, for example, in order to express her unease with Heidegger’s claims about Dasein 
in Being and Time, she turned to the works of Saint Augustine to look for the 
historical foundations of social life which, I think, she felt offered a convincing 
373 Hannah Arendt, ‘What is Existenz Philosophy’, in Partisan Review 1, 13 (1946): 46.
374 Cited by Richard J. Bernstein in his, ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism: Not History but Politics’. This paper 
was delivered at the conference on Hannah Arendt: Politics and Responsibility, organised by the Institute of 
Contemporary History and Wiener Library, New York University in London, and the Forum for European 
Philosophy, 10 November 2002. The original source is not indicated.
375  Eva Hoffman. After Such Knowledge: A Meditation on the Aftermath of the Holocaust (London: Secker & 
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alternative to Heidegger’s ontological analysis of ‘Being-with-one-another’. It was 
her confidence in history that also led her to be critical with the Jews for living in 
what she might be seen to have regarded as a ‘long present’, that is, determined by 
ideas essentially belonging to the past. Things could be different. Arendt recognised 
that we do not have to be slaves to “laws” established by our ancestors (and where 
religious laws, supposedly passed down by God) from which we are then unable to 
extricate ourselves. We can change. To this extent Arendt agreed with Heidegger. One 
could still be a Jew, she seemed to be arguing, a Jew who was certainly 
knowledgeable about his or her historical roots, but whose behaviour as a Jew, 
crucially, had been re-evaluated. There was something clearly Nietzschean in this, 
hence my reference to re-evaluation, an ambition central, of course, to On the 
Genealogy of Morality.
376 
Between the mid-nineteen thirties and the late nineteen forties, Arendt worked on a 
biography of the eighteenth-century German Jewess, Rahel Varnhagen. She was 
interned by the Nazis in occupied France though, she would escape and flee to the 
United States of America carrying the manuscript of Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations 
with her. She got divorced from Günther Stern and married Heinrich Blücher. And, in 
America, she wrote for the German émigré newspaper Aufbau, added her voice to 
calls for a Jewish army during World War Two and became directly involved, for a 
short time at least, in plans to establish a federal state of Jews and Palestinians in what 
is now the State of Israel. During this time she also made a tiger’s leap, intellectually 
speaking, discovering in politics something  fundamentally human that she had 
previously failed to notice. Combining Kantian critical philosophy with the hunt 
376 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, 
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amongst the ruins of a broken tradition for remnants of genuine historical experience 
(inspired by Benjamin), she would, between the late nineteen forties and the 
beginning of the nineteen fifties present us with the image of a new form of terror-
based government, namely totalitarianism that, she judged, meant we would have to 
think differently in future about the conceptual frameworks we use to orient ourselves 
in the world. Totalitarianism, and in particular the attempt by the Nazis to rid Europe 
of its Jews was, she thought, profoundly disturbing. Indeed, it surely altered the way 
we would have to think about ourselves and our relations with those around us from 
this point forward. In terms of Heideggerian Geschichte, for example, the Shoah 
represented for Hannah Arendt as significant and deep an imprint on human 
consciousness as the appearance of Christianity had made. It changed everything. Her 
former teacher did not seem to agree. 
Ironically, it was her major historical study of totalitarianism, published in the early 
nineteen fifties, that opened her eyes to what she would describe, by the close of the 
decade, as the human condition. The human condition, to all intents and purposes 
amounted to ‘nonappearance [sic] in the appearances’,
377 and it involved more than 
just history: it implied ontology as well. In the present chapter I will consider The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, a book whose tripartite divisions mimicked Nietzsche’s 
On the Genealogy of Morality. In this book Arendt presented totalitarian government 
in terms of the desire to deny individuals their humanity so that they ended up living 
with each other but not in terms of anything approaching plurality. As Robert 
Eaglestone has observed, ‘The book is an attempt to reframe the terms of reference for 
the times in which we find ourselves’.
378 Totalitarianism, to this extent, represented the 
377 See Arendt, LKPP, 79.
378 Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern, 208.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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death of politics. It addition to the disrespect, degradation, humiliation and torture, 
employed to strip away men’s humanity in totalitarianism’s death camps and Gulags, 
it seems to me, however, that it was Hannah Arendt’s recognition that this was 
ultimately most successfully achieved by destroying the space that individuals need in 
order to be with one another as political equals that was, perhaps, her most noble 
contribution to political philosophy. 
Amongst the more abstruse texts that Arendt composed between the mid-nineteen 
thirties and the late nineteen forties was her 1946 paper on the question of ‘Existenz 
Philosophy’.
379 In it she was highly critical of the significance she judged Heidegger 
to have attributed to time in regard to the meaning of Being because, ultimately, 
according to Arendt, ‘despite all tricks and sophistries […] Being in th[is] 
Heideggerian sense is the Nothing’.
380 In the latter half of this chapter, I will return to 
her development of this argument and the philosophical support she implies 
Heidegger’s analysis, perhaps inadvertently, lent Nazism. For the moment it will 
suffice to point out that almost two and a half decades after having published the 
‘Existenz’ paper, the distinction Arendt drew in her lectures and seminars on Kant’s 
political philosophy, between memory and imagination, also rested upon denying that 
the latter was in any sense time-bound. Memory, she wrote, is the means of making 
present that which has passed and, in similar fashion to our anticipations of the future 
that make present that which has yet to be, it involves detecting associations or 
making connections in time between that which no longer exists and that which still 
does. ‘Imagination’, on the other hand, she argued, ‘does not need to be led by this 
379  Arendt, ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’, 35–56.
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temporal association; it can make present at will whatever it chooses’.
381 
Consequently, she also believed imagination to be at the heart of that branch of 
metaphysics known as ontology which concerns itself, and here she echoed Kant, 
‘with what lies beyond physical reality and still, in a mysterious way, is given to the 
mind as the nonappearance [sic] in the appearances’.
382 Where however, she went 
beyond Kant in her existential adaptation of his critical philosophy was in believing 
that the ‘nonappearance’ in appearance that she had identified was essentially spatial 
as opposed to temporal in nature. 
Before we consider the connection between imagination, a crucial aspect of Kant’s 
critical philosophy, and ontology, schemata, space and totalitarianism I think the 
following points are worth making. First, Arendt was keen to highlight a note Kant 
attached to A120 in the first version of the Critique of Pure Reason in which he stated 
that ‘Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary 
ingredient of perception itself’.
383 This was a valuable observation for her, I think, 
because given that Kant conceived of the imagination as being not only a ‘faculty’ 
totally distinct from any other in the mind, but in addition not derivable from any 
other faculty either, for example, not derivable from reason or from understanding, 
this provided room to think in a way that was not dependent upon conventional 
rational analysis. So, for example, when it came to discussing Nazism and Stalinism 
her imagination (in a Kantian sense) exploited a schema quite at odds with what we 
might expect conventional thinking to have produced. For example, she explored a 
counter-historical ‘subterranean stream of European history’ suggesting various 
381 Arendt, LKPP, 79.
382 Ibid., 80, emphasis added.
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unlikely connections of which enlightened thinkers, she believed, were simply 
unaware. By enlightened thinkers Arendt appears to have had in mind those whose 
thinking reflected a liberal, rationalist and progressive approach to historiography.
384 
And she also refused to categorise totalitarianism as simply another form of 
dictatorship, identifying it instead as a radically new political phenomenon based on 
terror, the destruction of individuality and, all importantly the obliteration of public 
space. In other words, it was the schema she employed that made it possible to 
identify (to perceive) the significance of features of both Nazism and Stalinism that 
she thought others had simply missed.
Secondly, and here Arendt jumped to a theme Kant developed in the third Critique, 
she argued that particulars or ‘examples’ as used in making judgements were 
analogous to the schemata he discussed elsewhere in his writings in relation to 
cognition. For Kant, schemata, of course, were supposed to be what connected on the 
one hand sensible intuitions and on the other the concepts and categories of 
understanding. Arendt stated:
In the Critique of Judgement, i.e., in the treatment of 
reflective judgements, where one does not subsume 
a particular under a concept, the example helps one 
in the same way in which the schema helped one to 
recognize the table as a table. The examples lead 
and guide  us, and  the judgement  thus  acquires 
“exemplary validity”.
385
Thus, when we reflect on the word ‘courageous’, she noted, we envisage a particular, 
an example, ‘that contains in itself, or is supposed to contain, a concept or a general 
rule’.
386 Imagination is exercised here producing a schema, the general “image” that is 
384 Arendt, OT, 15.
385 Arendt, LKPP, 84.
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only “visible” to the mind’s eye. It is this that makes the particular image recognisable 
at all. So an ancient Greek, she hypothesised, would, on hearing or using the word 
‘courageous’, have conjured up an image of Achilles or one of the other heroes. That 
is, Achilles would have been made present even though he was absent, as it were. 
Similarly, describing somebody as ‘good’, Arendt observed, means that somewhere 
‘in the back of our minds the example of Saint Francis or Jesus of Nazareth’ is likely 
to be present. (It is interesting in the light of my earlier discussion of her Jewishness 
that her examples here are of Christians.
387) However, she went on to emphasise a 
further point when she adopted and adapted these Kantian ideas for her own political 
purposes. 
Having already given two instances to establish the connection between examples and 
the role of the imagination she felt obliged to relate a third. She stated, ‘in the context 
of French history I can talk about Napoleon Bonaparte as a particular man; but the 
moment I speak about Bonapartism I have made an example of him’.
388 She continued:
The   validity   of   this   example   will   be 
restricted to those who possess the particular 
experience   of   Napoleon,   either   as 
contemporaries or as heirs to this particular 
tradition. Most concepts in the historical and 
political sciences are of this restricted nature; 
they have their origin in some particular 
historical incident, and we then proceed to 
make   it   “exemplary”   –   to   see   in   the 
particular what is valid for more than one 
case.
389 
This is, I think, particularly important. What Arendt seems to have suggested here is 
that access to the meaningful past, on the one hand, and the plausibility of political 
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
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ideas on the other, are derived from particular experienced incidents. In this she was 
acknowledging that Kant had made a valuable distinction between determinant 
judgements in which particulars, he thought, were subsumed under a general rule and 
reflective judgements in which, conversely, the rule was derived from the particulars 
(B104).
390 To recall, I quoted her above as having stated that ‘[...] thought itself arises 
out of incidents of living experience [I interpret this to be consistent with particular 
events] and must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take its 
bearings’.
391 In her own case, it was the experience of Nazism understood as one 
single event, and Stalinism as another, from which she was able to derive the concept 
of totalitarianism as a new political phenomenon.
One last point to note is this: schemata were not only crucial for perception but, 
Arendt recognised, they are the condition of being able to articulate something 
meaningful; that is, schemeta make communication itself possible. The logical 
implication here seems to be that without the application of something resembling 
Kantian schemata in thinking about political and historical events, Arendt would have 
regarded herself as having been just as inhibited in her attempts to communicate the 
significance of the Shoah and the rupture in Western history it signified as the 
“enlightened” philosophers, historians and political scientists of whom she was so 
critical. It is clear from her seminar notes on the imagination, that she was employing, 
though adapting, Kantian ideas to indicate that the political voice is dependent upon 
something akin to the role the imagination plays in the critical philosophy, without 
which communication could not take place. 
390 See Arendt, KLPP, 83.
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1 On the Importance of Equality and Plurality
In 1948, Hannah Arendt began working as executive director of the Jewish Cultural 
Reconstruction Organization (JCRO). The Organisation had been formed by a number 
of Jewish groups including the American Jewish Committee and the World Jewish 
Congress, and was successor to the Commission on European Jewish Cultural 
Reconstruction. (The latter had itself replaced the Conference on Jewish Social 
Studies established in the early 1930s.) Arendt had been director of the Commission 
in 1944 at which time her remit had been ‘to prepare four instalments of a “Tentative 
List of Jewish Cultural Treasures in Axis-Occupied Countries” [to be] published in 
the 1946 to 1948 issues of Jewish Cultural Studies’.
392 The preparation of these lists 
required interviewing Jewish refugees who had worked in Europe in museums or 
schools, for example, or as librarians. The newly formed JCRO was charged with 
acting in a different capacity, though – that of temporary custodian of the hundreds of 
thousands of Jewish books, religious and cultural artefacts and artistic works, stolen 
by the Nazis from around 1934 onwards as part of their “research” into the impact of 
the Jews on German society or looted by clusters of special units, called 
‘Sonderstäbe’, which accompanied the Nazi military machine as it moved across 
Europe.
393 Arendt, a representative of the JCRO, contributed to the effort to identify 
and locate the rightful owners of displaced items which included, in addition to books, 
works of fine art, historic musical instruments and manuscripts. Thousands of books 
were delivered, for example, to Austria’s National Library following the annexation of 
that country in March 1938 and the arrest and deportation to Dachau of its Director, 
392 Young-Breuhl, Hannah Arendt, 187.
393 Willem de Vries, in his Sonderstab Musik (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996) describes the 
organization of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), which was responsible for the unlimited and 
systematic theft of artistic and cultural items in Europe, and in particular the functions of the Sonderstab Musik in 
France, Belgium and Holland after the Nazi invasion in June 1940. A number of Sonderstäbe were created by the 
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Dr Joseph Bick. His replacement, a confirmed Nazi, Dr Paul Heigl, devoted his 
energies ‘to acquiring the stocks of Jewish-owned publishers and the private 
collections of many Jewish citizens’ such as those of Serbia’s foremost publisher, 
Geca Kon.
394 The restitution process is one that, sixty-five years after the end of the 
Second World War, is still far from complete. Only in 1992, for example, was the 
Dutch musicologist, Willem de Vries, able to locate in Nuremberg several missing 
manuscripts belonging to the late French composer Darius Milhaud.
395 
In February of 1949, the JCRO took delivery of some half a million books as a result 
of a signed agreement with the Offenbach Archival Depot on the basis that these 
‘unidentifiable items for which no claims had been received were to be distributed to 
public or quasi-public religious, cultural, or educational institutions. The materials 
were to be used in the interest of perpetuating Jewish art and culture’.
396 Under terms 
laid down in the Inter-Allied Agreement of 1945, they would pass from the JCRO’s 
trusteeship to places of safety in either the countries from which they had originated, 
if these could be established or, if this proved impossible, they would be placed in 
alternative homes, most probably in the nascent state of Israel but, in America too. 
Hannah Arendt’s new supervisory role within the JCRO meant that she was now 
required not merely to conduct interviews with fellow refugees in her adopted home, 
the United States of America, but in order to prepare the reports required by the 
Organisation’s president, Salo Baron, she needed to assess the situation on the ground, 
as it were, which meant travelling to Europe.
397 This she did between November 1949 
394  Richie Robertson, ‘Literary Loot’, in The Times Literary Supplement (11 March 2005), 13.
395 Ibid.
396  Martin Dean,  Offenbach Archival Depot: Restitution Operations and Disposal of Unidentified Items 
[Website],  available from: <http://www.ushmm.org/oad/hist3.htm> (Accessed 1 February 2005).
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and March 1950. It was a trip that catapulted her back into the Old World for the first 
time since she had been forced to flee the Nazis a decade earlier. It was a trip that 
would also be somewhat risky, presenting personal challenges as a result of bringing 
her into contact again with her former teacher, Martin Heidegger, with whom, as we 
have already noted she had as a young student at Marburg been in love.
In some respects, the post-War Europe into which Hannah Arendt flew with all the 
wide-eyed excitement and anticipation of one who has never before experienced the 
wonders of flying in an aeroplane, was still the familiar world she had left behind: 
‘Today, [met] Nina Gourfinkel, completely unchanged, like everything else in 
France’.
398 Other letters written during her relentless criss-crossing of the continent 
from her base in Wiesbaden and a report entitled, ‘The Aftermath of Nazi Rule’ 
published in October 1950, following her return to New York, paint a more 
considered picture of Europe four years after the end of the war. Paris, for example, 
unsettled her.
399 The French, she believed, had been made lazy by the money flowing 
into the country for reconstruction via the Marshall Plan. ‘They aren’t producing [...] 
practically no iron and steel production’.
400 London, on the other hand, was a hubbub 
of activity ‘bristling with life’.
401 The English, she thought, were hard-working, but 
not, as the Germans, to the point of becoming ‘dangerous’.
402 ‘Everything was very 
calm, quiet, friendly’.
403 The police, she observed, were ‘truly there to protect the 
public’. By way of contrast, she no doubt had in mind her experience of the French 
398  Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher, Within Four Walls: The Correspondence Between Hannah Arendt and 
Heinrich Blücher, 1936–1968, edited by Lotte Kohler and translated by Peter Constantine (New York: Harcourt, 
Inc., 1996), 116.
399  Ibid., 127.
400  Ibid., 116. 
401   Ibid., 114.
402 In ‘The Aftermath of Nazi Rule’, Arendt remarked that ‘their [the Germans’] present industriousness seems 
at first glance to give substance to the opinion that Germany is still the most dangerous European nation’. Hannah 
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gendarmes in rounding up for deportation the foreign Jews in Paris after the defeat 
and division of France in June 1940, part of the ‘Westfeldzug’. (She was, perhaps, 
unaware of the failure of the British police to exercise their duty of care and 
protection when it came to the population of the Channel Islands in the spring of 1942 
and early 1943. In compliance with the instructions of the German occupying 
authorities, Jews were told to report to the British authorities in order to be taken 
under police escort to the German military for subsequent deportation to Auschwitz 
and Buchenwald.
404) It was Germany, however, which worried Arendt the most when 
she returned to Europe at the end of 1949. Save for Berlin, she described it as a 
shallow unreal world, a world deeply scarred by totalitarianism, whose inhabitants 
frantically sought to keep busy in order that reality be held safely at a distance (the 
spatial connotation is revealing given Arendt’s subsequent thoughts about the public 
sphere), its intellectuals ‘robbed of all spontaneous speech and comprehension’ 
making it a place ‘oppressed by a kind of pervasive public stupidity which cannot be 
trusted to judge correctly the most elementary events’.
405 The picture Arendt painted 
was of a country deprived of that ‘non-time-space’, the occasion or condition, of the 
possibility for thinking itself, that Arendt, as we have seen, would refer to in her 
‘preface’ to Between Past and Future.
406
It is clear from her letters home that, despite the many joys roaming about the world 
brought with it, the demands of this ‘dog’s work’ (Hundsarbeit) for the JCRO were 
draining in all manner of ways.
407 The itinerary, the rushing from place to place by car, 
by aeroplane, by train was physically tiring to the point, in early February 1950, of 
404 Lawrence Rees, Auschwitz (London: BBC Books, 2005), 145–149.
405   Hannah Arendt, ‘The Aftermath of Nazi Rule’, in Commentary 10 (1950): 345.
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‘slowly becoming unbearable’.
408 On top of this there were, of course, the regular 
reports which had to be written and sent off to Baron. Arendt was naturally homesick, 
testament, I think, to just how much America had, after a difficult start, now become 
home, a place that, unlike the similarly exiled Adorno, for instance, she did not long to 
escape from. A continuous flow of letters between her and Heinrich Blücher sustained 
them both. Their exchanges revolved around all manner of subjects – who Hannah 
had met on her travels, what was happening back at home in New York, how different 
members of their ‘tribe’ of friends were fairing as well as “serious” ideas, both 
political and philosophical. And the love she and Blücher had for each other is clearly 
felt in the strokes of affection and tenderness that each of them expressed in their 
regular dispatches to each other. Blücher’s letters ‘protected’ Arendt in the months she 
spent away and if the flow slowed temporarily because ‘Monsieur’, as Arendt was apt 
to refer to him, failed to send the one letter a week, at the very least, she demanded 
notwithstanding her continuous toing and froing and changes of address, she severely 
berated him.
409
 
Arendt threw herself into her work, despite all the challenges it presented, with 
characteristic wholeheartedness. It was, however, not the only work concerned with 
‘Jewish affairs’, in a practical sense, with which, over the past two decades, she had 
been absorbed. She had, for example, been a secretary with ‘Agriculture at Artisanat’ 
in 1930. This involved working with the hundreds of refugees fleeing both Germany 
and Eastern Europe who were looking for work in Paris. Then, following a spell with 
Baroness Germaine de Rothschild overseeing the contributions the Baroness was 
making to charitable organisations, Arendt joined another Jewish organisation, ‘Youth 
408 Arendt and Blücher, Within Four Walls, 127.
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Aliyah’, whose task it had been to help Jews to migrate to Palestine. Two years prior 
to her directorship of the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction in 
1944 she had formed, together with Joseph Maier, what was known as ‘The Young 
Jewish Group’ (Die junge jüdische Gruppe) which had called for the establishment of 
a Jewish Army and appealed ‘to those who are convinced of the bankruptcy of past 
ideologies and are ready to tear out their hair in order to develop a new theoretical 
basis for Jewish politics’.
410 And there were her activities throughout the 1940s in 
support of a Palestinian political entity in which neither the Jews nor the Arabs would 
have had majority or minority status, and this brought her into collaboration, for a 
short while, with Judah Magnes and his campaign for a federal Palestine rather than 
separate Jewish and Arab states.
411 
In December 1945, Arendt was able to renew contact with the philosopher Karl 
Jaspers, who, as we have seen, had been her doctoral research supervisor. She and 
Jaspers had been out of touch throughout the war years, he not knowing what had 
happened to her after she fled from Germany first to Paris and then to the United 
States, she relieved now to learn that he and his wife had come ‘through the whole 
hellish mess unharmed’.
412 In a letter, dated 2 December 1945, Jaspers mentioned that 
the first issue of Die Wandlung, his recently founded periodical, was ready to be 
published.
413 The journal was to remain in publication for only four years, but during 
its lifetime it included articles by contributors ranging from Bertold Brecht, to Martin 
Buber, Jean Paul Sartre to Thomas Mann. Jaspers wanted to know whether his former 
410 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 177. Young-Bruehl has the spelling as ‘jungejüdische’ both in the main body 
of her text and in the index.
411 Ibid., see chapter 6.
412 Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence 1926–1969, edited by Lotte Kohler, and Hans Saner, 
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student, whose essays and articles in Partisan Review and Politics he had been 
reading, would write something for the journal. In a lengthy reply, dated 29 January 
1946, Arendt expressed a certain discomfort with the invitation: ‘it is not an easy 
thing for me to contribute to a German journal’, she admitted.
414 The reason for this 
was bound up with the considerable numbers of Jews (in refugee camps inside and 
outside Germany) wishing to leave Europe behind altogether. This potential exodus 
troubled her. For herself, she declared:
If the Jews are able to stay in Europe, then they 
cannot stay as Germans or Frenchmen, etc, as if 
nothing had happened. It seems to me that none 
of us can return (and writing is surely a form of 
return) merely because people once again seem 
prepared   to   recognize   Jews   as   Germans   or 
something else. We can return only if we are 
welcome as Jews. That would mean that I would 
gladly write something if I can write as a Jew on 
some aspect of the Jewish question.
415
This was a response from someone who had begun to recognise in the Shoah not 
purely a crime against the Jewish people alone, but rather, a crime against the whole 
of humanity, a crime which breached the limits of human existence by attempting to 
annihilate an entire race – who happened to be Jews. The breach of these boundaries, 
ontological ‘conditions’, as she was subsequently to describe them in The Human 
Condition, demonstrated that humans could now meddle, it seemed, with metaphysics 
itself, with the very ontological foundations of human life on earth, one of whose 
conditions was plurality. Arendt’s response to Jaspers mirrored views she had begun 
to express even when writing her doctoral dissertation. Amongst other significant 
essays which may be relevant to my discussion here, however, she also wrote a short 
414  Ibid., 31. 
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piece entitled, ‘Against Private Circles’.
416 In it she warned against the dangers of an 
exclusive Jewish education system. This time it was her commitment to equality, also 
traceable to the dissertation, that was her focus of attention.
Though in early 1933 Jewish children were not yet excluded from German schools – 
the Nuremberg Laws were not introduced until 1935 –  by late April restrictions were 
being put on the numbers of Jews who could attend both schools and universities. 
Arendt referred to an ‘emigration’ of [Jewish] children from German schools but 
worried that if matters were left to ‘wealthy Jewish families’ alone to try and address, 
a system of exclusive Jewish education would more than likely be created that would 
pose great dangers in that it would encourage the very isolation of Jews that many had 
for a long time been resisting. Something ‘urgent’ was required. Of course, Arendt 
wrote, such a system of education had to promote understanding of Jewish history 
including the history of assimilation and of anti-Semitism. She called though, with no 
small measure of defiance, for Jewish schools not to succumb ‘to a principle of racial 
purity’. A Jewish school ‘must from the start’, she recommended, ‘be prepared to 
accept half- or quarter-Jews, that is, everyone who has been forced into its arms by 
the political situation’.
417 This was a somewhat unfortunate way of phrasing matters as 
her reference to ‘half’ and ‘quarter-Jews’ seemed to echo the National Socialist racist 
taxonomy of ‘Jewishness’. Arendt’s remarks however, were, I think, consistent with 
the earlier critical stance she had adopted in that she was confronting entrenched ideas 
within the Jewish community about what constituted being a Jew. Jew, ‘half-Jew’, 
‘quarter-Jew’, it does not matter, I think she was arguing. To discriminate against 
those who were not acknowledged to be fully Jewish (in the sense of being children 
416 Arendt, ‘Against Private Circles’, TJW, 19–21. 
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born of mixed marriages) would be to put at risk what had been achieved through 
assimilation, ‘whatever one may think of this assimilation’. In other words, Jewish 
schools must be prepared to open their doors to all without discrimination. No Jewish 
child must feel cut off because of a sense of not belonging.  Were this to happen 
because of a decision by Jewish community leaders Jews would be in ‘danger of 
[becoming] ‘alienat[ed] from reality’, the reality being that we live in a world in 
which all are equal.
418 The warning not to allow Jewish schools to discriminate against 
those deemed not to be fully Jewish was audacious but it was also consistent with 
Arendt’s commitment to counter-history, to her challenge to the hallowed words of 
the sacred texts and to the concept of election. It was, I think, an early demonstration 
of her growing commitment not just to pluralism but to equality too.
So, in her 1946 response to Jasper’s request for a learned paper Arendt was restating, I 
would contend, her commitment to values, already evident in her days as a research 
student and just after. And this in spite of her general attitude: ‘to be perfectly honest, 
it doesn’t matter to me in the least on the personal and individual level’ she had 
responded to Jaspers when he had asked her whether she regarded herself as a 
German or as a Jew.
419 What was important to her self-image was for her to appear as 
a Jew in public, to demonstrate ‘solidarity’ with other Jewish people, even if the 
nature of her personal commitment to being Jewish was very different to theirs.
420 
When the chips were down, a phrase that she was fond of using, this was when it was 
important to be seen as a Jew, much like Marcel Proust, of whom she noted that 
‘himself half Jewish […] in emergencies [he was] ready to identify himself as a 
418 Ibid., emphasis added.
419   Ibid., 70. 
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Jew’.
421 Accordingly, when one of her essays arrived on Jaspers’ desk in March 1946, 
he was able to accommodate his former student’s worries with ease. ‘Your essay will 
appear in our Wandlung [...] A short note will convey, as you rightly request it should, 
that your point of view is entirely that of a Jew’.
422
The key that unlocks the conundrum of Arendt’s Jewishness is, in fact, the same key, I 
believe, that can be used to unlock the enigma of what she intended us to understand 
by the expression ‘political’. It all comes down to considerations primarily of “space”, 
a category through which much of Arendt’s mature political thinking was filtered. As 
we have seen, she felt that there was no discrepancy at all in portraying herself, in 
public, as a Jew concerned with Jewish issues while in private the observance of 
Jewish laws and compliance with Jewish rituals and dietary restrictions were, with 
some qualifications it is true, all but irrelevant to her. That was because in public she 
perceived herself as appearing before others as the representative of a group of people 
which itself was one amongst a plurality of nations notwithstanding the fact that, even 
in America, as I will indicate below, it was a people against which society 
discriminated. And her pride in her Jewishness in this sphere, the public sphere, was 
intended to be a confirmation of that plurality. In private on the other hand, she 
appeared purely as an individual amongst her family and her friends – the ‘tribe’. Her 
Jewishness there was ultimately of little, if any, significance because she was 
accepted, indeed loved, for who she was without having to fight her corner. Of course, 
it helped that, like Benjamin and Scholem, she had also been brought up in a 
comfortable assimilated bourgeois family unburdened by theological angst and not 
encumbered by the demands of daily religious ritual. 
421 Arendt, OT, 80.
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Similarly, the meaning and significance she attached to acting ‘politically’ in contrast 
to say, moving in social circles, had the same rationale. It was all a matter of keeping 
things in their rightful place. In the 1940s, while her political analyses were still 
maturing, her “grievances” with society might have appeared defensive in a more 
personal than a political sense in that she seems to have believed that good manners as 
much as anything else threatened what she might attain intellectually. (‘Social 
nonconformism, is the sine qua non of intellectual achievement’.
423) Writing to 
Jaspers after their reunion, in a letter already quoted from above, she observed, 
however: ‘As you see, I haven’t become respectable in any way. I’m more than ever 
of the opinion that a decent human existence is possible today only on the fringes of 
society, where one then runs the risk of starving or being stoned to death’. She 
continued: ‘If I had wanted to become respectable, I would either have had to give up 
my interest in Jewish affairs or not marry a non-Jewish man, either option equally 
inhuman and in a sense crazy’.
424 This was more than just a throw-away comment. 
There was good reason for her to be prickly in nineteen fifties America. Good 
manners it seems, had much to do with one’s attitude to the Jews and to being Jewish. 
This was corroborated in 1958 when, for instance, only a few years after the 
publication of Origins of Totalitarianism, the production company of the Anti-
Defamation League of B’nai B’rith released a short educational film entitled ‘An 
American Girl, The Problems of Prejudice’. A little less than half an hour long, the 
film was ‘dedicated to America’s teen-agers [sic] and to their unerring instinct for 
juvenile decency’. It sought to confront the effects of anti-Semitism tangible within 
American society. Supposedly ‘based on actual incidents that happened in a real town 
423 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, xv.
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with real people’ the film portrayed events involving a non-Jewish American 
adolescent by the name of Norma Davis who was introduced to viewers reading the 
Diary of Anne Frank in the comfort of her middle class family home. Norma’s 
problems start when she is attracted by and purchases a bracelet to which is attached a 
Star of David. Believing the star to be a good luck charm and wearing the bracelet 
every day, Norma loses her school friends, as a result. Even her best friends, Lucile 
and Wendy, shun her, and her relationship with her boyfriend becomes strained. The 
film tries to show that despite what Norma’s father says when he sees her reading 
Anne Frank’s diary, “The war is over. The Nazis are finished. This kind of thing 
doesn’t happen anymore’, prejudice and discrimination were alive and well in 
America.
425
Reaffirming her philosophical commitment to both equality and pluralism, by 
demanding she be identified as a Jewish contributor to Die Wandlung, was therefore, 
not at all dissimilar from Hannah Arendt’s resolve not to be bound by social rules, 
expectations, manners or prejudices, in the broadest sense. There was no contradiction 
in avowing her Jewishness in the public political sphere, as she would subsequently 
refer to it, while at the same time renouncing rabbinic injunctions or cocking a snook 
at social prejudice and intolerance. Arendt’s Report on the Eichmann trial written in 
the early nineteen sixties troubled many and even lost her friends. Amongst her critics 
was Gershon Scholem who reproached her for failing to demonstrate, on the one 
hand, ‘Ahabath Israel’, that is ‘love of the Jewish people’, and on the other 
‘Herzenstakt’ or ‘sympathy’. Nonetheless, he still tried to claim her ‘wholly as a 
425 ‘An American Girl, The Problems of Prejudice’, a Presentation of the Audio-Visual Divison of the Dearborn, 
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daughter of our people and in no other way’.
426 Arendt responded somewhat 
dismissively: 
I have never in my life “loved” any people or 
collective – neither the German people, nor the 
French, nor the American, nor the working class or 
anything of that sort. I indeed love only my friends 
and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is 
the love of persons. Secondly, this “love of the 
Jews” would appear to me, since  I am myself 
Jewish, as something rather suspect. I cannot love 
myself or anything which I know is part and parcel 
of my own person. [...] I do not “love” the Jews, nor 
do I “believe” in them; I merely belong to them as a 
matter of course, beyond dispute or argument.
427
For Arendt, it was entirely possible to be a proud Jew yet not to love the Jewish 
people in the sense of feeling honour bound to defend, in public, everything Jewish as 
a matter of course. It was possible too, for a decent and human life to be led in which, 
for one and the same individual, political integrity might happily coexist with social 
indiscretion. She would reaffirm her views on this a few years later when she became 
involved in the open debate over the issue of segregation at Little Rock, Arkansas. It 
was, for Arendt, all a matter of which space one happened to be occupying, which 
sphere one was moving in at any particular moment, that counted.
2 On Spatiality and Temporality
That Arendt came to attach such importance to what I am labelling considerations of 
spatiality over all others, I would argue, was at root the product of her having been so 
taken with Kantian transcendental philosophy. The Transcendental Aesthetic in the 
first Critique was, of course, where Kant gave space its fullest treatment. However, it 
426 Hannah Arendt, ‘The Jew as Pariah’, in The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, 
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was in reaction to Heidegger, with whom she had studied during the crucial years in 
which he was working on time and being and composing Being and Time, that her 
initial thoughts about space, I would contend, began to take shape. Being, as 
Heidegger understood it, and as I have indicated above, was lived not just in time, as 
if the latter were an abstract flow, something external to the self, but was, crucially, 
temporally constituted. Dasein’s being, as Heidegger framed it, is time. Its temporality 
is key to both its self-transcendence and to the unconcealment of Being through the 
questions it, Dasein or being, poses. Being temporally constituted, life is not passively 
conducted, but therefore involves the organisation of time as such, much as music 
involves the organisation of time in terms of rhythm and melody. As Michael Wood 
and Robert Bernasconi have noted:
An existential account of temporality is essentially 
participatory. It treats subjects both as embodied – 
and thus from the beginning “in-the-world” – and as 
mortal. It is participatory in the sense that it claims 
that we are temporal in our very being and that the 
most basic temporal patterns which affect us are not 
those that organise the persisting objects around us, 
but those that involve our actions and our self-
understanding as finite beings.
428 
When we consider Arendt’s thought and writings though, it is an existential account 
of spatiality as much as temporality that she can be detected as having emphasised 
because it was space, and the ways in which men protect and organise it and shape 
their affairs within it, that she believed was fundamental to understanding and making 
judgements about how they conduct themselves in the world. It was the issue of 
spatiality that, just as much as temporality, would come to dominate her ontological 
perspective in regard to the human condition.
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By the 1940s, the “being question”, to which Arendt had initially been exposed while 
with Heidegger in the 1920s began to take on a new significance for her. In contrast 
to Heidegger, she now began distancing herself even further from his largely 
temporal interrogation of Being. It was not the Heideggerian ‘horizon’ conducive to 
Being’s temporal unconcealment that she regarded as being all important. Her former 
teacher’s environmental concern with Dasein and with ‘being-with-one-another’, in 
her own work was transformed into a consideration of the political conditions of 
being with others. And what this meant was that she began to forefront the spatial 
possibilities for human togetherness in non-practical terms in contrast to what 
Heidegger himself had sought to establish. 
Heidegger had not neglected to think about space in Being and Time. Indeed, as we 
have seen, he had discussed Dasein’s worldliness ‘as Being in-the-world’ and he had 
acknowledged that Dasein is essentially ‘de-severance’ – that is, it is ‘spatial’. He 
stated that, Dasein had ‘discovered a “world”’ and ‘that [...] Being-in-the-world is 
spatial’.
429 In his development of ‘The Worldhood of the World’, Division One of 
Being and Time, several sections are actually devoted to considering space and 
Dasein’s spatiality. For Heidegger, Dasein essentially was spatial and existed spatially 
and it existed spatially in a very anti-Cartesian sense. Descartes had mathematised 
space, making it possible to fix spatial locations according to co-ordinates in relation 
to which Dasein and objects in the world could then be measured. Heidegger, on the 
other hand, discussed Dasein’s ‘spacial relations with objects as a matter of near or 
far, close and distant’.
430 And how near to or far away from Dasein an object was, 
429 Matin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1962), 145.
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impacted upon that object’s practical purpose, its ‘handiness and unhandiness’.
431 
However, by the mid-nineteen forties and with the publication of Arendt’s ‘Existenz 
Philosophy’ paper it was becoming apparent that there were significant differences in 
their understandings of spatiality that separated Arendt’s ontological perspective from 
that of Heidegger’s, even though she too rejected Descartes’ pure co-ordinate 
approach. Fundamental to understanding their differences is, I would argue, the fact 
of Heidegger’s emphasis of the connection between spatiality and practicality. 
Heidegger observed in Being and Time:
Whenever one comes across equipment, handles it, 
or moves it around or out of the way, some region 
has already been discovered. Concernful Being-in-
the-world is directional – self-directive. [However,] 
relationships of involvement are intelligible only 
within   the   horizon   of   a   world   that  has   been 
disclosed. Their horizonal character, moreover, is 
what first makes possible the specific horizon of the 
“whither” of belonging-somewhere regionally [...] a 
bringing close (de-severing) of the ready-to-hand 
and   present-at-hand   [is]   grounded   in   a   making-
present of the unity of that temporality in which 
directionality too becomes possible.
432  
What this indicated was that the spatiality of Dasein fundamentally involved its 
positioning itself in the vicinity of objects as demanded by the specific requirements 
of its practical endeavours. This already presupposed though, what Heidegger 
labelled the ‘work-world’.
433 More than this, however, it presupposed the world as 
such, which he argued has to be understood temporally. This suggests that spatiality 
was regarded by Heidegger as in some sense deferential to temporality.  
 
431 Ibid., 53.
432 Heidegger, Being and Time, 70: 420, emphasis added.
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In fact, in Being and Time Heidegger did subsume spatiality under temporality. He 
stated, for example, that ‘[t]emporality is the meaning of the Being of care. Dasein’s 
constitution and its ways to be are possible ontologically only on the basis of 
temporality [...]. Hence Dasein’s specific spatiality must be grounded in 
temporality’.
434 It was with this grounding of spatiality in temporality and the 
interpretation of the former in terms only of practical activities alone that, I would 
argue, Hannah Arendt took issue. In her later distinction drawn between the practical 
activities of the private realm as opposed to the entirely non-practical activities she 
associated with the public realm we can see how she tried to discuss modes of 
spatiality in a more distinctive, in a more fundamentally human way, than Heidegger. 
And in indicating a ‘non-time’ space, to which I have previously referred, we can see, 
I believe, how she also sought to release spatiality from its Heideggerian grounding in 
temporality. These are themes to which I will return. 
Arendt’s “political turn” had begun to take on some prominence with her columns in 
the American German-language newspaper Aufbau to which she began contributing 
from the middle of November 1941 onwards.
435 Her articles included, for example, 
‘Active Patience’ (28 November, 1941), written in the wake of the British 
government’s refusal to create a Jewish army and ‘The Devil’s Rhetoric’ (8 May 
1942) in which she chided the Allies over what appeared to her to be a ‘conspiracy of 
silence about the fate of the Jews’.
436 New political heights were reached, however, 
with the publication of The Origins of Totalitarianism, a book that she had been 
researching and writing for some five years before its completion around September 
434 Ibid., 70: 418, emphasis added.
435 She had, a little earlier than this, on 25 October 1941, written an ‘open letter’ to the bulletin which had 
attracted the attention of its editor, Manfred George, suggesting her potential as a journalist. See Young-Bruehl, 
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1949. Her experience of Nazism and her reflections on the book after its completion 
had, as I have previously intimated, the impact of an epiphany: ‘Finally, it dawned on 
me that I was not engaged in writing an historical book, even though large parts of it 
clearly contain historical analyses, but a political book’.
437 What I believe she meant 
by this, was that she had come to realise that she had not been writing historie at all, 
but that her analyses had thrown into relief something much deeper that had more to 
do with Geschichte on the one hand, and spatiality,  ontologically understood as the 
very core of the political, on the other hand. Arendt had, with the publication of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism come of “political” age. The detail of the ontological 
foundations underpinning and distinguishing political from non-political activity 
would have to await a further publication, The Human Condition, for their 
clarification. However, what is clear is that with The Origins Arendt had begun to 
find a political voice and was interrogating Being in a manner that distinguished her 
from Heidegger in that she was raising questions which, demonstrated her unease in 
regard to Being and Time’s treatment of spatiality as much as its treatment of 
temporality.
438 
The title, The Origins of Totalitarianism was, in itself, misleading giving the 
impression that the author was going to concern herself with or would reveal the 
precise causes of what she was labelling an entirely new form of government. Arendt 
was actually intent upon investigating what she had identified as ‘the subterranean 
stream of Western history’, much to the bemusement of her friends and critics alike 
but, she expressed no wish to try and unearth, to pinpoint in terms of a specific 
437 See footnote 374 above.
438  ‘Die Schatten’, ‘The Shadows’, is the title of a piece of early self-reflection that Hannah Arendt undertook. 
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moment in time, that is, the causes of Nazism and Stalinism, because this was simply 
impossible.
439 Her intention to identify a ‘subterranean stream of Western history’ 
indicated instead, something Nietzschean, the quest for a more genuine history. As 
noted previously, the tripartite structure of The Origins resembled On the Genealogy 
of Morality. And, similar to Nietzsche, who expressed a wish ‘to isolate the different 
roots of that complex structure that is called morality’, Arendt hoped to isolate that 
conglomeration of elements that produced totalitarianism.
440 Thus, like the 
Genealogy, the separate ‘treatises’, as it were, that comprise The Origins ‘should be 
regarded as parts of a unified theory and critique’.
441 It is not purely the structure of 
The Origins, however, that suggest something Nietzschean. Arendt’s approach, like 
her predecessor’s, involved re-evaluation too, in her case of anti-Semitism, for 
example, which, in the first part of the book she argued was, in the twentieth century, 
completely different from previous manifestations in that it was essentially political, 
not at all, contrary to common perception, motivated by religious antagonisms. And 
what about totalitarianism itself? This too required to be re-evaluated. Its interpreters 
were missing the point completely. Nazism, for example, was not simply dictatorship 
by another name; it was something unique in terms of government, a political 
phenomenon never before witnessed in the course of human history. Indeed, its 
consequences would have an indisputably deep historical impact, according to 
Arendt.
In addition to comparisons that can be made with Nietzsche, however, there were in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, also immensely strong echoes of Kant, once again. In 
439 Arendt, OT, ix.
440 Friedrich Nietzsche, cited in David Owen, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), 
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the preface to the first Critique Kant had stated ‘that reason has insight only into that 
which it produces after a plan of its own, and […] it must not allow itself to be kept, 
as it were, in nature’s leading strings, but must itself show the way with principles of 
judgement based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to questions of 
reason’s own determining’ (Bxiii).
442 This implied, as we have seen previously, that 
though arising out of experience, Kant believed knowledge is not based solely upon 
it, as the manifold of experience has to be interpreted or processed by concepts and 
categories – ‘principles of judgement’. For Kant, one such principle or category was 
permanence. A further extract from the first Critique concerning permanence may 
help clarify Arendt’s own position. Kant defined it as, 
what alone makes possible the representation of the 
transition from one state to another, and from not 
being to being. These transitions can be empirically 
known only as  changing  determinations  of that 
which is permanent. If we assume that something 
absolutely begins to be, we must have a  point in 
time in which it was not. But to what are we to 
attach this point, if not to that which already exists? 
For a preceding empty time is not an object of 
perception. But if we connect the coming to be with 
things which previously existed, and which persist 
in existence up to the moment of coming to be, this 
latter must be simply a determination of  what is 
permanent in that which precedes it (B231).
443
In other words, what is permanent serves as the condition of the possibility of 
identifying change because change amounts to alteration in terms of what already is in 
permanent existence. Absolute beginning, in the sense of an initial starting point or 
origin of something taken in isolation to that which already has stable existence, that 
which is permanent, is therefore, incomprehensible. ‘By definition’, as Catherine 
Labio observes, ‘origins and permanence are antithetical’.
444 
442 Kemp Smith, Kant’s Critique, 20.
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It is my contention that Arendt too, thought about transition in this way, that is in 
relation to permanence, and that this, in a rudimentary sense, reflected, as we shall 
see, a critical attitude towards historical reasoning. As we have already noted, 
however, she did not just adopt but she also adapted Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
to the existential requirements of her own evolving political ideas. In this context, I 
believe she took the position that transition, ‘the flux of change’, as she described it, 
implied the ever changing and ever changeable affairs of men as they are acted out in 
multifarious manifestations and scenarios across the ages, frequently described and 
remarked upon, of course, by historians and political analysts amongst numerous 
other commentators. Permanence, on the other hand, suggested to her ‘a framework of 
stability’ indicated by the legal systems which superintend, as it were, the affairs of 
men. In her essay on civil disobedience collected in Crises of the Republic, published 
some years after both The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition, she 
stated:
No civilization […] would ever have been possible 
without a framework of stability, to provide the 
wherein for the flux of change. Foremost among the 
stabilizing   factors,  more  enduring than   customs, 
manners and traditions, are the legal systems that 
regulate our life in the world and our daily affairs 
with each other. […] The variety of such systems is 
great, both in time and in space, but they all have 
one thing in common – the thing that justifies us in 
using the same word for phenomena as different as 
the Roman lex, the Greek nomos, the Hebrew torah 
–  and  that is that they were designed to ensure 
stability.
445
However, we must be cautious about precisely what Arendt wanted us to understand 
by this statement, in particular, we must be attuned to what she had in mind, or at least 
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what she did not have in mind, when referring to ‘legal systems’. The clue is in what 
she later wrote in The Human Condition where she observed:
The   law   originally  was   identified   with   th[e] 
boundary   line   [between   households],   which   in 
ancient times was still actually a space, a kind of no 
man’s land between the private and the public, 
sheltering and protecting both realms while, at the 
same time, separating them from each other. The 
law   of   the  polis,   to   be   sure,   transcended   this 
understanding from which, however, it retained its 
original spatial significance. The law of the city-
state was neither the content of political action […] 
nor was it a catalogue of prohibitions, resting, as all 
modern laws still do, upon the Thou Shalt Nots of 
the Decalogue. It was quite literally a wall, without 
which there might have been an agglomeration of 
houses, a town (asty), but not a city, a political 
community.
446 
Thus, for Arendt, stability was inextricably bound up with the nature and shape of 
what she would come to describe as the ontologically underwritten spatial 
conformations in which human activities take place in the world. It is the existence of 
and men’s attitude towards (and, their degree of contempt for) the public, private and 
social spheres in which their activities are “enclosed” and conducted that, for Arendt, 
was the key to understanding and making judgements that could be communicated to 
others about what it is men do (‘What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is 
nothing more than to think what we are doing’
447), and how they might be with one 
another. In other words, she was perceiving human relations as much in spatial as in 
temporal terms, but the nature of the spaces she was beginning to identify departed 
from Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time. The schemata, which made possible an 
understanding of events that she could communicate to others, conjoined her own 
lived experiences with her developing philosophical ideas, by grounding both in 
446 Arendt, HC, 63–64. 
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spatiality. So, for example, her emerging political theory was founded upon the 
identification of spatial distinctions between the public, private and social realms 
while she perceived Nazism and Stalinism as prime examples of an insane desire to 
destroy the very public space that served as a condition for being with others in a 
political sense.
The Origins of Totalitarianism, in some ways is similar to Walter Benjamin’s Arcades 
Project too, of which it has been remarked that it combined ‘the transcendence of the 
conventional book form […] with the blasting apart of pragmatic historicism – 
grounded, as this always is, on the premise of a continuous and homogeneous 
temporality’.
448 Certainly The Origins, is a book that struck, and continues to strike, 
many readers as an eccentric disconnected and meandering work, to say the very 
least. However, I would argue that this is short-sighted because what Arendt was 
doing in this book was, similar to Benjamin, drilling down into the past in counter-
historical fashion, and bringing to the surface from their original subterranean, and 
therefore no longer visible contexts, much as he did with his collectibles, remnants of 
seemingly disconnected information that she judged combined to disclose ‘“a world 
of secret affinities”’.
449 Arendt’s counter-historical approach in The Origins, a book 
researched in the late nineteen forties, reflected her similar approach to her doctoral 
dissertation completed two decades earlier.
We get a sense of what Arendt’s concern with spatiality involved when we consider 
what she wrote, for example, about the perpetual motion of totalitarian dictatorships, 
Trotsky’s ideal of ‘permanent revolution’. She described the absurd paradox the 
448 From the translator’s ‘Forward’ to, Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, translated by H. Eiland, & K. 
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totalitarian dictator faces because, on the one hand, he (or she) is attempting to create 
a new governmental entity with its own laws and institutions, yet, on the other hand, 
‘he [or she] must prevent this new world from developing a new stability’.
450 There 
must be constant movement, continuous instability, the obliteration of boundaries 
realised through world domination. ‘The moment […] revolutionary institutions 
bec[o]me a national way of life […] totalitarianism would lose its “total” quality and 
become subject to the law of the nations according to which each possesses a specific 
territory, people, and historical tradition.’
451 Borders no longer serve their traditional 
purpose then, spatial divisions and their boundaries have to be erased. This hunger for 
expansion, this impossible yearning to acquire even the heavens themselves if only 
this were possible, because, as Cecil Rhodes declared, ‘“Expansion is everything”’, 
characterised the heady imperialism of the nineteenth century’s ‘scramble for Africa’ 
with which totalitarianism has, in this sense, something in common.
452 Rhodes ‘had 
discovered’, Arendt wrote, ‘the moving principle of the new, imperialist era’ and then 
she provided a thought-provoking list of the territorial acquisitions and the 
accompanying increases in population that applying this principle made possible for 
such nation-states as Britain, France, Germany and Belgium.
453 It was a crazy 
principle, however, and Rhodes was aware of this, she noted. He ‘recognized […] its 
inherent insanity’, but not because of economic or commercial considerations. Rather, 
and her observation here prefigured an ontology yet to be committed to print, it was 
because even he understood the ‘contradiction’ of such a principle ‘to the human 
condition’.
454 The intimation here, I would suggest, is precisely that the principle of 
450 Arendt, OT, 391.
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expansion, of aggrandizement, is a principle at odds with all respect for boundaries, 
with the idea that spatiality could and should be inviolable because it is the essence of 
stability. The principle of expansion, that is, was seen by Arendt as being inimical to 
‘the framework of stability’ within which human action and motions can take place, 
which is a determination of spatiality. 
The Origins of Totalitarianism in each of its three divisions, is very much a thesis that 
returns again and again to the concept of spatiality, I think, as the condition for being 
with others, until ultimately it addresses the brutal offensive upon public political 
space that, Arendt argued, takes place whenever totalitarian regimes, like those in 
Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, seek to obliterate all signs of human plurality. 
Nowhere was this more true than when its author discussed the relationship between 
‘The Jews and Society’, for example, in the third chapter of the first part of the book. 
While Arendt reserved her admiration for those Jews who remained, like the pariah, 
on the ‘fringes of society’, something as we have seen, she herself aspired to achieve, 
she directed her scorn at those other nineteenth-century Jews, the parvenu, who 
‘exchanged equal rights for personal privileges’ in an attempt to gain a passport into a 
society that otherwise shunned them.
455 Yet, ‘the social destinies of average Jews [by 
definition the majority] were determined by their eternal lack of decision’ and they 
must have ended up living, she concluded, ‘in a twilight of favour and misfortune and 
knew with certainty only that both success and failure were inextricably connected 
with the fact that they were Jews.’
456 To put it another way, they just did not know, in a 
sense, which way to turn, which sphere it was “proper” for them to occupy.
455 Ibid., 66–67.
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In contrast, Rahel Varhagen, had, in eighteenth-century Berlin, engaged in an 
experiment – ultimately it petered out – to create a unique type of space, a social 
space, which nonetheless stood ‘outside of official society’.
457 A Jewess, who, largely 
owing to her Jewishness was unable to gain access to official society, Rahel 
established a Salon in which a Hohenzollern prince like Louis Ferdinand might, as we 
have seen, find himself gossiping with a writer of the Romantic school such as 
Friedrich Schlegel or parleying with a political publicist and diplomat like Friedrich 
Gentz, because in this and similar meeting places ‘nothing really mattered but 
personality and the uniqueness of character, talent, and expression’.
458 Charming as 
this “social” experiment was however, one senses that Arendt was sceptical about 
what it might have achieved even if it had survived beyond 1806 when, as a result of 
military defeat and the institution of Napoleonic legislation which changed the 
fortunes of the Jews for the better, its death knell was sounded and its ‘innocence and 
splendour’ were doomed to be no more.
459 This was because, Arendt’s contention ran, 
the Jews, irrespective of whether they were desirous of entering official society or of 
creating an alternative social space open to all without restriction, missed the point 
entirely that social anti-Semitism was not actually the most significant threat that 
faced them; a source of humiliation and misfortune maybe, it was political anti-
Semitism, Arendt judged, that was the real danger. The public space was where 
equality and plurality really mattered. That is, the tendency was for Jews themselves 
to attach far too much importance to entering a society, which, more often than not 
only let individual Jews in because they were either odd to some degree, and a source 
of amusement and entertainment, or eccentric or simply risqué. In showing society 
such respect, the Jews had, with what would be disastrous consequences for them, 
457 Ibid., 66.
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Arendt believed, pinned their hopes on achieving “membership” of the “wrong” sort 
of space.
460
The first part of The Origins then, boils down to Arendt’s concerns about the nature of 
anti-Semitism in relation to the threats or pseudo-threats posed to the Jews by lack of 
political engagement on the one hand and social exclusion on the other. Part two, in 
contrast, having begun with the immense hunger for territorial and commercial gain 
displayed by nineteenth-century imperialists in Britain, France, Germany and 
Belgium, for example, continues with a series of twists and turns of its own to 
consider the consequences of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire, for 
example, and the apparent demise of one type of political space in particular, namely 
the nation-state. Though, once again, this is to reduce to its barest essentials what 
Arendt discussed in great detail using philosophical, psychological and sociological 
analyses, which included numerous examples, we might summarise the second part of 
The Origins as a whole as the author’s analysis of the consequences of ineluctable 
pressure put on political and legal entities to continue to provide stability and give 
protection in the face not only of international conflict on a scale previously unseen, 
but disintegrating empires, the collapse of the class system, and the appearance of 
millions of displaced persons on the world stage too. In regard to the latter, what this 
‘scum of the earth’, illustrated was the complete ineffectiveness human rights 
because, according to Arendt, such rights, which are supposedly guaranteed by the 
Declaration of Human Rights established in the eighteenth century are, in her 
estimation, ‘unenforceable’.
461 Without a home of their own, without the security 
provided by their former political communities, the millions of Germans, Jews, 
460 Arendt   believed   that   in   Europe  social   anti-Semitism   ‘had   little   influence   on   the   rise   of   political 
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Hungarians, Poles, Russians and so forth uprooted by war, showed only too clearly 
‘that loss of national rights was identical with loss of human rights, that the former 
inevitably entailed the latter’.
462 Arendt was in no sense defending the nation-state 
system when she argued this, indeed she was critical of it, but what she did want to 
demonstrate was the significance that attachment to, and not simply association with, 
an entity defined by distinct political borders ultimately had. If you were a German or 
a Russian or Polish national, for example, you were protected, she argued, under that 
country’s national law. She quoted Burke, who wrote of ‘an “entailed inheritance” of 
rights which one transmits to one’s children like life itself’, and  who also referred to 
‘the “rights of an Englishman”’.
463  However, because of a ‘paradox involved in the 
declaration of inalienable human rights’ if you were a German, Russian or Polish 
refugee, you were definitely not protected because the anomaly in the declaration 
‘was that it reckoned with an “abstract” human being who seemed to exist nowhere, 
[and even] savages lived’, she observed, ‘in some kind of social order’.
464
At least one of the logical conclusions we can draw from the second part of The 
Origins then, is that the rights of any individual are inextricably bound up with his or 
her membership of a public political entity (or, in abstract terminology, spatial 
conformation) and that attempts by well-intentioned jurists and humanitarians to 
protect stateless individuals via the declaration of universal and inalienable human 
rights demonstrated that, at precisely the moment they were most needed, or as Arendt 
might have said, when the chips were down, these rights were “flaky”, to say the 
least. 
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The third part of Arendt’s first major political publication moved away from this 
analysis to focus on the brutal, indeed malevolent, assault upon the public sphere 
mounted by Nazism and Stalinism, the attempt, that is, to obliterate the very space 
that Arendt regarded as a necessary condition for protecting the rights of the 
individual. Part three of The Origins does not make for pleasant reading. Arendt’s 
analysis of, for example, the destruction of what she described as the ‘juridical person 
in man’ and of ‘moral man’ is nothing if not disturbing.
465 She wrote: 
The   real   horror   of   the   concentration   and 
extermination camps lies in the fact that the inmates, 
even   if   they   happen   to   keep   alive,   are   more 
effectively cut off from the world of the living than 
if they had died, because terror enforces oblivion.
466
A little further on she continued:
It is not so much the barbed wire as the skillfully 
manufactured unreality of those whom it fences in 
that   provokes   such   enormous   cruelties   and 
ultimately makes extermination look like a perfectly 
normal measure. Everything that was done in the 
camps is known to us from the world of perverse, 
malignant   fantasises.   The   difficult  thing   to 
understand   is   that,   like   such   fantasies,   these 
gruesome crimes took place  in a phantom world, 
which, however, has materialized, as it were, into a 
world which  is complete with all sensual data of 
reality but lacks that structure of consequence and 
responsibility without which reality remains for us a 
mass of incomprehensible data. The result is that a 
place   has   been   established  where   men   can   be 
tortured   and   slaughtered,  and   yet   neither   the 
tormentors nor the tormented, and least of all the 
outsider, can  be aware that what is happening is 
anything  more than a cruel game or an absurd 
dream.
467 
In the dark and despairing private world of the concentration and extermination 
camps the victims were so effectively cut off, by their captors, not just from their 
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friends and family but from all of the outside world, that they were reduced to a state 
in which they felt ‘as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no 
longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead and some evil spirit 
gone mad were amusing himself by stopping them for a while between life and death 
before admitting them to eternal peace’.
468 If this in itself was a crime, though as 
Arendt contended in respect of the accusation of murder, the unprecedented nature of 
Nazi atrocities exploded our legal, moral and political concepts to such a extent as to 
make such a charge meaningless, it was only part of the macabre story. In addition to 
removing millions of human beings from the public political sphere and pressing 
them into a mass within the camps in which the world once common to them as well 
as the space between them was now utterly and completely destroyed, what remained 
of the public sphere was also turned by the Nazis into ‘a fictitious, topsy-turvy world’ 
of unreality. Such a world was characterised by, for example, a willingness on the part 
of the vast majority of the non-totalitarian population to acquiesce in (Arendt argued, 
they ‘shirked’ their responsibilities) and turn a blind eye to what amounted to ‘real 
insanity’. ‘This common-sense disinclination to believe the monstrous’, she stated, ‘is 
constantly strengthened by the totalitarian ruler himself, who makes sure that no 
reliable statistics, no controllable facts and figures are ever published, so that there are 
only subjective, uncontrollable, and unreliable reports about the places of the living 
dead’.
469 Furthermore, unpredictability about who might next be ‘declared unfit to 
live’, that is, selected at random as opposed even to being unjustly accused and found 
guilty of some apparent crime like being a “counter-revolutionary” against the Soviet 
state or of being some sort of “undesirable”, as the Nazis labelled the mentally ill, 
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created an atmosphere of ‘consistent arbitrariness’ that served to abrogate ‘human 
freedom’ and certainly destroyed any vestige of open public protest.
My argument thus far in the current chapter has been that a combination of Kantian 
ideas existentially adapted, as I have previously observed, and the emerging 
ontological perspective that humans are beings whose every moment of existence is 
conducted in some sort of spatial conformation, enabled Hannah Arendt to forge 
connections between a manifold of otherwise ‘inconceivable analogies’ (Benjamin) 
and apparently unrelated happenings that ultimately helped her to make sense of and 
communicate what appeared to be incomprehensible atrocities perpetrated by the 
Nazis.
470 The idea of spatiality that was key to Arendt’s imaginative thinking however, 
and the Nazi “crimes” against humanity that I have only been able to touch upon in 
my text, were merely part of her argument. The concept of plurality was, of course, as 
we have seen, also central to her thinking and it was this concept together with her 
imaginative application of ideas about spatiality that disclosed a further Nazi crime, 
one which has been described as a crime against humanity but which additionally, 
surely counts in Arendtian terms, as a crime against Being, that is, a crime against 
ontology.  
3 Ontology and its Enemies
If Hannah Arendt was unconcerned about social and religious comments from others 
relating to her private life it was testament to the bond of friendship she had with 
Jaspers that she was very anxious about what his reaction would be to the fact that she 
had been intimately involved with Heidegger in the mid-nineteen twenties while still 
470 Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism’, in Selected Writings: Volume 2, Part 1 1927–1930, translated by Rodney 
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his student and wanted to make him, Jaspers, aware of everything. Jaspers was 
something of a father figure for Arendt, someone who she very much respected. In 
1945 when she had first started corresponding with him again after the war she was 
nervous about his learning of things she had thought or done since they had last been 
in contact that would ‘put [him] off’.
471 She told him that ‘there is hardly anything 
I’ve done that I didn’t do without thinking how I would tell you about it or justify it to 
you’.
472 How then, would he react when learning that she and Heidegger had been 
lovers? When, finally, all was revealed, Jaspers’ reaction was made, as she wrote in a 
letter to her husband dated 18 December 1949 ‘with openmindedness [sic] and [...] 
trust’ and in an ‘entirely inimitable [...] unflappable’ fashion.
473 Meeting with Jaspers 
in Europe at the end of the nineteen forties was, therefore, a very significant moment 
in her life.
Yet, despite this and despite, for example, her achievements on behalf of Jewish 
Cultural Reconstruction, the excitement of her visits to England, France, Switzerland 
and West Germany, her delight at seeing old friends after so long – Alexandre Koyré, 
Jean Wahl, and Ann Weil amongst them –  it was the reunion in Freiburg, with Martin 
Heidegger, around which Arendt’s entire extended European trip at the end of 1949 
seemed, in a sense, to revolve. Arendt never acknowledged this. Actually, and there is 
no reason to doubt her sincerity, it was, indeed, her meeting with Jaspers that 
apparently affected her more than anything else. As she wrote to him from New York 
in April 1950:
The few weeks that I have been back have flown by. 
Much of that time has been spent, of course, in 
471 Arendt and Jaspers, Correspondence, 23. 
472  Ibid. 
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lengthy talks  about Basel. With the trip in the 
immediate past, I realize more clearly now than I 
could during those hectic months how much it 
centred around my visit with you in Basel. That 
always fresh joy of being able to speak without 
reservation, a happiness that I otherwise know only 
at home and that has become a vital factor of my 
world because it is once again possible (outside 
one’s   own   home,   which   one   has,   after   all, 
constructed oneself).
474
Nevertheless, the unfolding drama of her, relatively brief, encounter with Heidegger 
twenty five years after their first liaison, was not without its own significance. The 
stage was set. Hannah Arendt and her one time teacher and lover Martin Heidegger 
have not seen each other in more than seventeen years. She has never forgotten him; 
their earliest walks together and conversations about language are still fresh in his 
mind. During the intervening years though, the author of Being and Time has publicly 
celebrated ‘the greatness, the nobility of [the] national awakening’ fostered by Hitler 
and has played a not insignificant role as a member of the Nazi Party.
475 His erstwhile 
student meanwhile, is currently in the process of creating a public persona of her own 
and is establishing a reputation for herself as a political theorist in America. In the 
first of their two meetings, which took place in February 1950 as a result of 
Heidegger appearing at her hotel room in Wiesbaden soon after her return there from 
Basel, Hannah Arendt reported to her husband that ‘The two of us had a real talk, I 
think, for the first time in our lives [...]’.
476 She asked Blücher for his counsel. The 
following morning she and Heidegger are reunited for a second time, but on this 
occasion Heidegger’s wife is present too. What is described by Arendt as nothing less 
than a ‘fantastic scene’
477 ensues involving an ‘aggravating conversation’.
478 The 
474  Arendt and Jaspers, Correspondence, 147. 
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atmosphere must have been reminiscent of Strindberg. The gist of what was reported 
by Arendt during this second meeting is as follows: Heidegger, who she knew to be a 
‘notorious liar’ about everything given the chance, had had every opportunity during 
the twenty-five years they had been out of touch to reassure his wife that she, Hannah, 
had not in fact ‘been the passion of his life’.
479 Yet, he had neglected to do so. Nor had 
he refuted the idea that she had actually been the driving force behind his research. 
‘Frau Heidegger’s jealousy,’ we are told, ‘was swift and violent. “She [Arendt],’ came 
the retort, ‘alas, is simply stupid [mordsdaemlich]”’.
480 Hannah Arendt interpreted the 
absence of any lies about these matters as confirming the reverse, namely that she had 
after all been the passion of Heidegger’s life and that she had inspired his work. 
Which of these two revelations wounded Frau Heidegger more deeply we are left to 
judge for ourselves. Was it the thought that her husband had in fact been passionately 
obsessed with Arendt all along, rather than with her; or, was it that she had apparently 
been his muse? The answer to these questions we can only guess at. What we learn 
from Arendt, however, is that Frau Heidegger’s anti-Semitism was exacerbated by 
her, Arendt’s, appearance and that she was, according to the latter, ‘absolutely 
horrendous’, made Heidegger’s ‘life a hell on earth’ and would probably have been 
‘prepared to drown any Jew in sight’ while Arendt was alive.
481
What is to be made of these high expressed emotions? Is there anything more to this 
than a storm in a teacup, a tale of entangled passions and jealousies? In a somewhat 
unforgiving paper, Ernest Gellner, described the reporting of these events as just ‘a 
tiny bit disingenuous’ in that Hannah Arendt’s descriptions were in fact written ‘to a 
479  Ibid. 
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481 Arendt and Jaspers, Correspondence, 128–9.  Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 193
third party – not even to Heidegger himself.
482 ‘How trustworthy’, he asked, ‘is a 
woman’s uncorroborated claim that a man told her [or did not refute] that she was the 
passion and inspiration of his life?’ Notwithstanding the truth of a claim is it not ‘a 
biographer’s duty’, Gellner’s forensic analysis continues, ‘to make plain the 
unsymmetrical nature of the evidence, and to distinguish between an ex parte claim 
and an established fact’.
483 In a court of law, such interrogation of the facts would 
indeed have a place, but one is left thinking that an important point is nevertheless in 
danger of being missed here; a point which, it appears, does not depend at all upon the 
veracity of what Heidegger is alleged to have either said or remained silent about. For, 
quite clearly and irrespective of whether Heidegger ever denied his feelings about 
Arendt to Elfrieda or used or refrained from using particular words, the point, surely, 
is that it was Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of events that is crucial. For, what is 
revealed is just how much it meant to her, not simply to have been the object of 
Heidegger’s desires, but to have been regarded as a significant intellectual other by 
this towering thinker (Denker) and poet (Dichter); significant, that is, not just because 
of their friendship, but because her research, too, counted for something in his eyes. 
What greater testimonial could she have had than that of being inspirational to his 
thinking? What greater endorsement could there have been that The Origins of 
Totalitarianism marked her out as a thinker in her own right, a worthy occupant of 
that space Heidegger had created for thought?
484 Arendt’s past was intellectually as 
well as emotionally bound up with her present. 
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The Origins of Totalitarianism is a book that, as we have seen, takes risks, the most 
significant of which concerns its very credibility as a contribution to “serious” 
historical scholarship. Its author herself acknowledged that it was not, in fact, in 
essence at least, an historical work at all and, certainly, there have been and are many 
respected historians and scholars who have gone further by disparaging and 
dismissing its historical explorations and meanderings. Isaiah Berlin, for example, is 
reported as having claimed, ‘[s]he doesn’t get a single fact about Russia right’.
485 
However, as I have suggested, I think the book offers deep historical judgements and 
certainly there are strong indications that opinion is shifting on this matter. In the 
introduction to a recent publication, historians suggest that a ‘new perspective on 
Arendt’ is required, one which ‘shift[s] attention away from Arendt the political 
philosopher […] towards Arendt the historical thinker’ and that such a perspective is 
one they ‘are trying to develop’.
486 In contrast, while some historians are now 
discovering Arendt for themselves, The Origins has achieved relatively little 
acknowledgement from professional political scientists.
487 
The intimation that this would also be a work of counter-history or genuine history 
recalling both Nietzsche and Benjamin, a book that would not easily fit in with 
established categories of scholarship, was already suggested by the author’s 
determination to explore what she referred to at the very outset as ‘the subterranean 
stream of Western history’.
488 Her continued confidence in this idea survived revisions 
485 See Derwent May, Hannah Arendt (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), 70.
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made to the first edition. For example, in the extended ‘Preface to Part One’ written in 
July 1967 she wrote:
Moreover,   what   is   true   for   the   history   of 
antisemitism, that it fell into the hands of non-
Jewish crackpots and Jewish apologetics, and was 
carefully avoided by reputable historians, is true, 
mutatis mutandis, for nearly all elements that later 
crystallized in the novel totalitarian phenomenon; 
they had hardly been noticed by either learned or 
public   opinion   because   they   belonged   to   a 
subterranean  stream  of  European history  where, 
hidden from the light of the public and the attention 
of enlightened men, they had been able to gather an 
entirely unexpected virulence.
489
And again, in the third part of the book, the part which dealt with the gruesome 
phenomenon of totalitarianism itself, in a chapter entitled, ‘A Classless Society’, 
Arendt described as a coming together ‘all the subterranean, nonrespectable [sic] 
elements of European history into one consistent picture’.
490
As I have already remarked, this continual and consistent reference to ‘subterranean 
elements’ troubled Arendt’s foes and friends alike. Gellner, for example, in the paper 
previously cited took issue with her again and could scarcely conceal his 
astonishment this time (‘What on earth was she up to?’), that she discounted what he 
and others identified as “mainstream” intellectual antecedents of totalitarian 
dictatorship that could, fairly straightforwardly, be traced back to both Enlightenment 
and Romantic thinking. ‘Hannah Arendt’, he remarked, ‘must have been 
incomparably more familiar with the details of this part of intellectual history than I 
am. All this being so, why on earth did she go out of her way to try and exonerate 
489  Ibid., 15. 
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European thought in the way that she did?’
491 In a similar fashion, Karl Jaspers wrote 
the following to her in a letter dated 3 April 1953:
What begins to take shape in your essay [Ideology 
and Terror] is a sense that there is a mysterious 
history inherent in a totality of events that is calling 
completely new forces into existence. These forces 
are melting down everything that has preceded them 
and are themselves absolute in nature.
492
Nevertheless, Jaspers warned:
What has made this type [of rule – totalitarianism] 
possible? Your book provides a number of important 
answers to that question. But all of this, the entire 
insight that emerges from it, is limited [...] you have 
opened up a line of investigation but not explored 
the reality of the totalitarian mode to its full extent 
within the overall human reality. For that is an 
unattainable goal, indeed, an absurd one. If we do 
not keep reminding ourselves of these limitations, 
we’re in danger of falling prey to a new demon of 
the philosophy of history.
493
Arendt’s investigation of the ‘full extent’ of what totalitarianism meant in terms of 
‘overall human reality’, as Jaspers put, its character as a new form of government 
totally antithetical to pluralism and political activity, would have to await publication 
of The Human Condition. Her focus, in The Origins however, on subterranean 
elements, was designed precisely to avoid falling prey to a new philosophy of history, 
which would, in her eyes, have made her work derivative in character from Hegel, 
and given the impression that she was seeking to attempt afresh an absolute unity of 
thought and being, that is, a complete knowledge system of natural and historical 
phenomena. Very much in the style of Walter Benjamin, her friend and a kindred 
491 Gellner, ‘From Königsberg to Manhattan’, 108.
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spirit, she bore into the layers of historical ruin, as he had before her, in order to bring 
to the surface previously unnoticed events and happenings, fragments of genuine 
historical experience, which conventional scholars would judge diverse and 
unconnected.  Maintaining though, her distance from Benjamin’s systematic treatment 
of historiography in, for example, his ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, she was, nevertheless, able to distil the essence of his 
message and write with freedom and imagination aimed ultimately at achieving a new 
‘now of recognizabilitly’ (Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit). In her case there was not quite 
Benjamin’s ‘lightening flash’ of recognition (in her case rather, ‘Finally, it dawned on 
me [...]’) nor was their a dialectical resolution exactly, bringing past and present to a 
standstill in a new ‘image’ (Benjamin’s term).
494 In Arendt’s case, research for The 
Origins had  eventually disclosed not so much an image as ‘the novel totalitarian 
phenomenon’, the product of a ‘crystallizing catastrophe’.
495
At least one explanation for The Origins of Totalitarianism’s failure to achieve 
recognition from a number of historians and political scientists is that at the heart of 
the book there are profoundly felt, though unstated, philosophical concerns being 
addressed, which are not part of the analytical and empirical traditions in historical 
and political thinking. However, while the focus on subterranean elements in history 
echoed Hannah Arendt’s historiographical method as far back as her dissertation, it is 
also true that her overriding substantive concern was one that could be traced back to 
her consideration of Saint Augustine too, and at least one of her targets in developing 
her argument was, again, her former teacher, Martin Heidegger. 
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Arendt has frequently been viewed as basking in Heidegger’s “glory”, her work 
interpreted as being dependent upon his. In addition, as suggested earlier, ungenerous 
critics have condemned her for being his post-war apologist too, seeking, perhaps as a 
“spin-off”, to promote her own thought by means of generating broader acceptance 
for his. These claims, as I have attempted to argue, are unjustified. The Origins of 
Totalitarianism was, in fact, the development of a critique of Heidegger’s 
metaphysics that Arendt was already expressing unease with as early as her 
dissertation, and certainly her growing disagreement with her former teacher was 
clear in the 1946 paper published in Partisan Review entitled, ‘What is Existenz 
Philosophy?’.
496 It is her critique of Heidegger’s position that I shall now focus on. 
Though stated somewhat esoterically, Arendt’s 1946 criticisms penetrated, I think, to 
the very heart of her former teacher’s interpretation of Existenz philosophy and aimed 
to be damning. However, the consequences of the destructive tendencies she 
identified as the logical outcome of following the path Heidegger had cleared, and 
others, Sartre amongst them, would follow and broaden, would only be spelt out in 
graphic terms with the publication of The Origins of Totalitarianism. The book was an 
exposé of possibilities, realised in the most violent of terms by National Socialists, 
amongst others, with which, a type of synergy existed vis-à-vis the analysis of Being 
and time promulgated by Heidegger. To use the language of Goethe and Benjamin 
there was something of an elective affinity, I think, between what totalitarianism 
sought to do on the ground, as it were, and aspects of what Heidegger’s philosophy 
sought to achieve intellectually. We know of the philosopher’s anti-Semitism, this is 
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now no longer a secret. For example, in a letter to Victor Schwoerer written in 
October 1929 Heidegger stated:
In what follows, I want to make more explicit what I 
could only indirectly hint at in my recommendation. 
Nothing less is at stake than our undeferrable facing 
of the fact that we are confronted by a crucial 
choice: Either [sic] to infuse, again, our  German 
spiritual life with genuine indigenous forces and 
educators, or to leave it at the mercy, once and for 
all, of the growing Jewish contamination, both in a 
larger and in a narrower sense. We can only regain 
our own path, if we prove capable of helping fresh 
forces to prosper, without the usual baiting and 
fruitless controversies.
497
However, I think that what Arendt tried to demonstrate was that, without ever directly 
stating his support for Nazi atrocities (his celebration of their coming to power in 
Germany notwithstanding), Heidegger’s project, which aimed at rescuing Being from 
oblivion, actually afforded a type of legitimacy to the National Socialist programme 
of destruction. How was this so?
The clue to The Origins’ philosophical significance in this sense is revealed in one of 
the titles under which it failed ever to appear: The Three Pillars of Hell, a title 
resonant of classical formulation and a further indication of the influence of 
Nietzsche’s tripartite division of On the Genealogy of Morality, was rejected by the 
American publishers who opted instead for The Origins of Totalitarianism though 
when published in England by Secker and Warburg it was as The Burden of Our Time, 
a title, we are told, Arendt did not approve of at all.
498 The three pillars in question 
were, of course, anti-Semitism, imperialism and racism, areas Arendt was to explore 
in some depth within the book’s three treatises. The force of The Origins is not 
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inherent, however, in the density of detail related by a meandering text rich in novel 
and often provocative counter-historical insights. Rather, what is most jarring is the 
conclusion that the reader is led to draw, namely, that given the nature of the pillars 
supporting it, the hell alluded to is rooted firmly within the world of mortal human 
beings. Evoking Sartre’s portrayal in No Exit of hell as other people (L’Enfer c’est les 
autres), which departed from the Christian depiction of hell as an extra-worldly realm 
spewing fire and brimstone and promising torment without relief to all those deemed 
to have spent their lives sinning on earth, so too, Arendt’s was a vision of evil stripped 
of this image punishment. (In attempting to reorient thought Arendt had realised that 
evil, as much as any other concept, of course, was open to re-evaluation.
499) Except 
that in contrast to Sartre, whose victims are condemned to their fate once their life on 
earth has come to an end, Arendt’s is a visualization which, as we have seen, is as 
non-dependent upon death as it is on the requirement for a devilish fallen angel to 
conduct the grisly proceedings. In fact, hell, as depicted by her, can involve little more 
than what is achieved by the unthinking bureaucratic functionary, an Adolf Eichmann, 
going about his everyday job in the office scheduling trains. The Origins is therefore, 
a book which courted the controversy that The Banality of Evil actually attracted. It 
prefigured the latter, published in 1963 as a ‘Report’ on the Eichmann trial, yet despite 
provoking criticism did not unleash nearly the same barrage of complaints and 
disapproval. Yet, its portrayal and assessment of evil, made with similar conviction, 
differed hardly at all.
What type of hell was it, then, that Arendt was pointing to? The most logical response 
would surely direct the poser of the question to the unbearable details of the Nazi’s 
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Page 201
brutal and sadistic acts of cruelty, humiliation and torture against the men, women and 
children selected as their victims. It would suggest similar violence and degradation 
perpetrated upon those unnamed millions slaughtered by Stalin or condemned to 
suffer in the prisons of the furthermost reaches of the Soviet empire, the Gulag. There 
is no famine when it comes to the record of Man’s inhumanity towards his fellow 
beings. Yet, such an answer would fall short of Arendt’s intended message. 
Arendt’s revised thoughts about hell related to a much bigger picture, the wider 
context as it were, of Man’s activities. It derived from Augustine’s concept of evil, 
which, he in turn derived from Plotinus.
500 According to Augustine, the evil man is the 
man who lacks harmony and balance.
501 Homo ordinatissimus, ‘“the well-ordered 
man”’, is the individual who comprehends and accepts his place in the cosmos, and 
understands ‘that the laws determining the motions and actions of the parts [of the 
universe] are necessarily derived from the law of the encompassing whole’.
502 For 
Augustine, this order originated, of course, in God, the creator of all that exists, the 
source of all that is good. This is a portrait of conditional liberty and autonomy. While 
Man is granted the freedom and responsibility for fashioning, in imitation of God’s 
creation, a world in which he and his fellow men can fulfil their needs for physical, 
emotional, cultural and intellectual sustenance, for reproduction, security and the 
exercise of free will, the all-encompassing universe into which he is born without 
inquiry, and from which his departure, after only a temporary residence that may by 
his endeavours be postponed but never halted, is beyond his power to change. It 
followed then, in Augustine, that ‘wickedness’ was the attempt (which, it was 
500 Charles T. Mathewes, Evil and the Augustinian Tradition, discusses Hannah Arendt’s concept of Augustinian 
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believed must fail) ‘to escape the predetermined harmony of the whole’.
503 It 
characterised the failure of a man to accept, to comply with, the mysterious but stable 
workings of the universe into which he had been delivered and to live a life in which 
his own will could operate to effect change for himself while being in harmony with 
his more permanent surroundings. Wickedness was taken to be the angst of not feeling 
at home in the world made all the worse because escape from the conditions 
according to which life on earth had been granted to men was impossible. (Only with 
Camus would suicide, as a means of escape, be discussed, though ultimately 
discounted, as a possibility.)
He who has become wicked out of [his own] will 
and has lost the universe he possessed through 
obedience to God’s precepts, still remains fitted 
(ordinatus) [as part into the whole] in such a way 
that he who did not wish to act lawfully is acted 
upon by the law.
504
To comport oneself in such an imbalanced fashion was therefore, according to Saint 
Augustine, to have become evil or to have become a wicked man. 
In contrast, the fanaticism of the Nazi obsession to annihilate European Jewry in its 
entirety, marked for Hannah Arendt a frightening new departure, a paradigm shift in 
human conduct, the likes of which had never before in human history been witnessed. 
It marked a turn from the wickedness of individuals, in Augustinian terms, simply not 
at home in their world, to the extremism of groups of men playing God and seeking to 
revise the very mechanics of the world around them. Intellectually, this was mirrored 
in a philosophical revolution in the true sense of the word, a return, as it were, to the 
503 Ibid.  
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idea that man could once again adopt the mantle of, in Arendt’s description, ‘Master 
of Being’.
505
In her 1946 paper on ‘Existenz Philosophy’ she explored the consequences of the 
‘demolition’ undertaken by Kant of the ancient idea, echoed in Hegel, that men could 
achieve direct and certain knowledge of all that surrounded them, a complete and 
unadulterated unity of Being and thought. And, as we have seen, Kant shattered the 
belief in the immediate perception of objects making the conditions of the possibility 
of knowledge dependent upon the exercise, by human beings, of concepts and 
categories that would, in fact, reveal only phenomena which were subject, for 
example, to spatial and temporal relations. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason let fall a 
bombshell, which exploded the ancient assumption of a ‘pre-established coincidence 
of essence and existence [the idea that] everything thinkable also exists and every 
existent, because it is knowable, must also be rational’.
506 Man’s desire for indubitable 
knowledge of all that there is, which amounts, no less, to a desire to become God, was 
suddenly shattered. In the wake of the resulting destruction, Arendt argued that 
philosophers either attempted to re-establish some sort of identity of Being and 
thought, here she cited the examples of pragmatism and phenomenology, or they 
rebelled against any such temptation, though with varying degrees of success, and 
here she drew attention to the work of Schelling and Kierkegaard.
Heidegger was someone she counted as an example of the former type of philosopher, 
one whose mission it was to breathe new life into ontology, his philosophy peppered 
with innovative analysis and unique terminology. Except that in so far as Arendt 
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interpreted him, Heidegger’s quest for unity suggested a somewhat disturbing turn. To 
recall, Arendt criticised Heidegger for having made ‘the meaning of Being [...] 
temporality’ and thus, in her estimation, having reduced the meaning of Being to 
‘nothingness’.
507 What are we to make of this? In relation to the attempt to acquire 
certain knowledge of the world around us through pure contemplation, Arendt 
understood Heidegger to be arguing that this, indeed, was not possible. There could be 
no such knowledge arising out of this type of deliberation: this was, she admitted, 
‘philosophy revolting against philosophy as pure contemplation’ – Platonism.
508 
However, what Heidegger’s metaphysics was attempting was in effect to bypass not 
just pure contemplation, but, indeed, any form of reflection that could moderate 
action in order to ‘progress immediately to the deed’ itself.
509 This was because it was 
the immediacy of the deed that was now understood as re-establishing the unity of the 
acting Being with the Being being acted upon. However, if at the core of Being there 
was Nothing (temporality), then Man was surely, according to Arendt’s 
understanding, at liberty to conduct himself in much the same way as God had in 
creating the world, the entire universe, which He had achieved by starting out with 
nothing, save that in contrast to God, who created something, Man had a licence to 
“create” Nothing. ‘[T]he nihilation of the nothing’, was the occasion for action alone, 
unreflected upon and far beyond the gaze of the spectator (all that ‘I propose, [...] is 
very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing’, Arendt would, with 
caution, counsel in later years
510), aimed at dismantling, at destroying what already 
existed in a display of new found “Mastery of Being”. 
507 Ibid., 46.
508 Ibid., 47.
509 Ibid.
510 Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, in Heidegger, BW, 107. Arendt, HC, 5.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 205
Furthermore, Arendt was critical of Heidegger because she argued, his ‘ontological 
approach hides a rigid functionalism in which Man appears only as a conglomerate of 
modes of Being, which is in principle arbitrary, since no concept of Man determines 
the modes of his being’.
511 This criticism reflects, I would argue, Arendt’s rejection of 
Heidegger’s having grounded spatiality in temporality. Not only was Heidegger’s 
Dasein a being, as we have seen, that was both self-ish, that is, concerned only with 
itself, and additionally not characterised by ‘spontaneity’ or ‘human dignity’ she 
stated, but we have no indication even about where the philosopher’s ontological 
depiction of Dasein originated. Of course, it would be wrong to try and attribute to 
Arendt in 1946 the sophistication of the ‘proposal’ in relation to thinking about what 
men do that she expressed fifteen years later in the book entitled, The Human 
Condition. However, there was, in embryo, in the earlier work, I think, a strongly felt 
unease with her former teacher, much as there had been when she was writing her 
dissertation, for having missed something fundamental out of his supposedly 
‘fundamental ontology’.
512 And what he had missed was that in his actions man is 
capable, as Arendt put it, of ‘intend[ing] more than himself’.
513 Heidegger’s ontology 
that is, its focus upon various modes of temporality notwithstanding, just did not 
allow room for what Arendt would subsequently identify as political man, which 
involved at the very least, a type of being with others that was conditional upon what 
she would come to describe as a public space devoid of practical-environmental 
anxieties and burdens. To this extent then, Heidegger’s ontology could only be 
regarded as ‘provisional’.
514 Dasein, she intimated, was unbalanced, disharmonious, 
potentially evil; and, Heidegger’s depiction of ‘being-with-one-another’, we ourselves 
511 Ibid., 48, emphasis added.
512 Heidegger, BT, 34.
513 Ibid.
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might judge, was heavily dependent upon and skewed by an extremely gloomy 
portrayal of das Man. Arendt’s perception of political man would constitute a major 
reorientation of thought and was certainly a rejection of das Man as characterised in 
Being and Time. Political man was to be distinguished, ‘de-severed’ even, we might 
say using Heideggerian terminology, from both private and social man and on the 
basis not of competing practical or self-serving endeavours but rather, because of 
something fundamentally human about his politics and his genuine concern to be with 
others for reasons other than the environmental-practical projects that Heidegger put 
at the core of ‘being-with-one-another’. In contrast to Dasein, political man would 
present a more fully human voice. He was shown by Arendt to thrive on the company 
of others in contrast to Dasein who was simply swallowed up by das Man from whom 
he was therefore, continually bidding to extricate himself.  
What had changed, with the development of Arendt’s concept of evil derived as it was 
from Augustine, was not its nature, but the manner in which and the extent to which 
the man without balance was able to exhibit it. Totalitarianism represented something 
new and extreme in as much as this manifestation of wickedness was charged with 
bringing about fundamental change, nothing less in fact, than ontological destruction 
of the spatiality and plurality essential to the expression of human life on earth. It was 
a demonstration of hubris, the conceitedness of men determined to tamper with the 
very ontological conditions of their existence that it was simply not in their gift to 
meddle with. There was an extreme evil at work here, Arendt believed, but not a 
radical evil because evil is ‘never radical’ in the sense of being metaphysically 
distinct, built into the system, as it were; it can only ever be ‘extreme’ because the Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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product of the imperfection of human vanity.
515 (Men can change, for the worse as 
much as for the better; it is within their power to make alterations to the way they are 
with each other.)
The detail of her own ontological proposal would be set out in The Human Condition, 
a work which was written after The Origins of Totalitarianism. At the time of writing 
the latter though, Arendt’s dedication to the fundamental value of plurality was 
already undeniable. It had informed, for example, her warnings in regard to exclusive 
Jewish education, her support in the late 1940s for a government of both Jews and 
Arabs in partnership in a federated Palestine, even the demands she made of Jaspers to 
be recognised as a Jew when contributing to his learned journal. It was at the heart of 
the work she had undertaken for the JCRO and the inspiration for the exhausting 
Hundsarbeit to which she subjected herself in the early nineteen fifties. The horror of 
Auschwitz was that it represented the attempt to erase from the face of the earth an 
entire people; the horror of Nazism more broadly conceived, and Stalinism too 
according to Arendt, was that it was spatiality and room for politics as a fundament of 
human existence that was destroyed. If the  Shoah  was a crime against humanity 
perpetrated upon the Jewish people, the calamity of totalitarianism was that it 
constituted a crime against Being  perpetrated against ‘political’ beings. This, the 
warning about the sheer anti-political nature of totalitarianism remains, I think, the 
most important message of The Origins, not just the resolve to make the gruesome 
and the unimaginable comprehensible.
515  Hannah Arendt, ‘Eichmann Jerusalem’ in Encounter (January 1964), 56. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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CHAPTER 6
 Space for Freedom and for Gazing: 
Political Discourse and the Spectator 
So, after all, we have not failed to make use of the spaces, 
these generous spaces, these, our spaces.
Rainer Maria Rilke
516
Dasein’s own spatiality is essential to its basic state of Being-
in-the-world.
Martin Heidegger
517
Of course the third party asks very different questions: for him, 
the lovers seem the most indubitable guarantees of human 
existence   in   general,   although   not   guarantors   of   a 
transcendent world. 
Hannah Arendt
518
When Hannah Arendt observed in a book review published in 1945 that ‘the problem 
of evil will be the fundamental question of postwar [sic] intellectual life in Europe – 
as death became the fundamental problem after the last war’, she was of course, 
writing in the shadow of the Nazi atrocities perpetrated against European Jewry.
519 
However, by the time she came to publish The Human Condition a little over a decade 
later, one might be forgiven for assuming that her now ontological as well as 
historical analyses in that book were targeted against not just the horrors of totalitarian 
evil but, additionally, against the nefariousness of mass society, demonstrated only too 
well a few years later by the events in and around Little Rock, Arkansas. It was in the 
midst of this mass society that Arendt now resided, a citizen grateful for having been 
allowed to stay in the United States of America. In The Human Condition she 
516 Leishman and Spender, Duino Elegies, 75. Emphases in original.
517 Heidegger, BT, 148.
518 Arendt, ‘Rilke’s Duino Elegies, 18.
519 See footnote 15 above.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
Page 209
identified the public realm as a space of sheer appearance, in which the political voice 
by means of which an individual’s presence is noticed and registered, is somehow 
discharged from having to articulate those economic, social and general welfare 
vulnerabilities that burden our everyday lives and which we have come to expect our 
elected representatives to address on our behalves through serious and vigorous 
parliamentary debate. A strict demarcation (de-severance as Heidegger might describe 
it) of the public, the private and the social spheres was now seen as ontologically 
guaranteed. And defence of the public realm was Arendt’s means of preserving space 
for the expression of the individual ‘political’ voice exempted from peer pressure to 
mimic or to echo shared beliefs through displays of partisan attachment, and absolved 
from having to ‘act as though [it] were [the single voice] of one enormous family 
which has only one opinion and one interest.
520 (When Norma Davis’ father tried to 
console his, clearly, disconcerted and perplexed daughter, shunned by her friends for 
wearing a ‘Jewish star’, he observed that she could, of course, make life easier for 
herself by simply not wearing the bracelet to which the star was attached and thus 
going along with the crowd.
521) If, however, The Human Condition sought to address 
the erasure of difference typical of mass society, it also reflected, I think, Arendt’s 
ongoing disagreement with Heideggerian ontology, which its author now confronted 
on its own terms. In this sense the book was a response to Heidegger’s portrayal of 
Dasein’s authenticity as rooted in practicality and it was a rejection of the picture 
painted by Heidegger of ‘being-with-one-another’ coloured largely by his anxieties 
over das Man.  So, in defending public space against what she estimated to be the 
encroachment of the private/social realms whose activities were, she judged, 
520 In regard to the concept of the ‘individual voice’ I will be drawing upon David Owen’s paper, ‘Cultural 
Diversity and the Conversation of Justice: Reading Cavell on Political Voice and the Expression of Consent’, 
Political Theory 27 (1999): 579–596. The words quoted from Arendt come from HC, 39. 
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dominating the lives of human beings, Arendt was at once defending, I believe, a 
concept of spatiality essential to human life on earth that Heidegger as well as liberal-
minded theorists of culture, society and politics had failed to notice and, she was 
defending too, a way of being with others in public space that owed more to 
Aristotelian civic friendship than to either the interrogation of Being or the solution of 
practical problems.
At its most fundamental level the Arendtian public realm, for all the bigotry, 
inequality and neglect in society to which it demonstrates unconcern and for which 
Arendt has been subjected to biting criticism is, nevertheless, portrayed as an 
invisible, in the sense of an insubstantial dimension, a place without location, as it 
were, rather than an actual physical ‘locale’.
522 All the same, it surely depends, I will 
argue, upon certain material, and not just constitutional, conditions being met. Were 
this not the case then ‘the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives’, which 
Arendt believed, constituted freedom would hardly be sufficient to preserve it. The 
fact that human consciousness might somehow be purer, unadulterated, more 
independent and uncorrupted by pressures to conform, typically present in social 
settings would surely be insufficient to secure it in the absence of substantial 
guarantees.
523
Published in 1958, The Human Condition was the book in which Hannah Arendt drew 
a number of important distinctions between, for example, what she called ‘the modern 
522 For a discussion of the concept of ‘locale’ see Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the 
Theory of Structuration, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 118–122. 
523 Collingwood describes ‘the corruption of consciousness’ as ‘the worst disease of the mind’. See R. G. 
Collingwood, The Principles of Art (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 336. The words quoted from Arendt 
come from HC, 57. A little earlier in this book, Arendt also writes about ‘conformism inherent in every society’. 
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age’ and ‘the modern world’, and between what she regarded as fundamentally 
different modes of human conduct, namely labour, work and action. In respect of the 
distinctions she drew between the public, the private and the social realms,  she 
warned of the dangers the latter posed by encroaching more and more upon the public 
realm. This led her into some particularly tricky territory, I am thinking here of her 
‘Reflections on Little Rock’. However, I believe that there is not just a logic to what 
she had to say but that her judgement was also morally sound.
524 Before I come to this 
though, I want first to establish that for Hannah Arendt making distinctions was 
synonymous with understanding, and then I want to go on to chart the very rigid 
ontological boundaries she believed she had discovered, which separate the private 
from the public realms and the social from both.
There is a very literal sense in which boundaries are highly significant to Judaism. For 
example, the mehitzah or barrier serves an extremely symbolic role, dating back to 
biblical times, in separating men and women in the synagogue. The origins of this, the 
Talmud tells us, can be traced to the festivities of Simchat bet HaShoeva at the end of 
the festival of Sukkot. Such was the exuberance of the rejoicing between the men and 
women who mingled together on this happy occasion that the authorities eventually 
erected a balcony along the perimeter of the Ezrat Nashim (the open area on the 
Temple Mount) from which the women could view the dancing and high-spiritedness 
below from a safe and secure place. Today, Norma Baumel Joseph (1992) explains, 
the mehitzah is a physical symbol that distinguishes the interior of Orthodox 
synagogues, which retain them, from the interiors of non-Orthodox ones, which do 
not. They are still regarded she notes, as ‘provid[ing] the best defense against 
524 Arendt, ‘Reflections on Little Rock’, PHA, 231–246.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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mingling and frivolous behavior’.
525 An ‘eruv’ meanwhile, is another type of 
boundary, this time a boundary outside of the synagogue in the street. Acknowledged 
in Jewish law, it marks an area within which certain activities like ‘carrying and 
pushing wheelchairs, prams and baby buggies’, even carrying reading glasses or 
house keys, otherwise prohibited on the Jewish sabbath, are permissible.
526 The ‘eruv’ 
can be identified by poles ‘joined by invisible wire’ over roads or junctions but for the 
most part existing physical features, walls, hedgerows and so forth are used to specify 
the perimeters, which, from time to time are subject to repositioning. Since we have 
already established however, that Hannah Arendt was not brought up in a particularly 
observant Jewish household, and that Jewish ritual or attendance of synagogue 
services were of little importance in her life, we might well be dubious about the 
extent to which it was Judaism that was at the root of her penchant for making 
distinctions and establishing boundaries.
What we do know however, is that she regarded as central to thinking “proper”, as it 
were, and to understanding, the making of distinctions that, all importantly, would 
remain distinctions in perpetuity, that is, distinctions that would persist without 
resolution. Thinking, she believed, should articulate multiplicity, it should bring into 
relief alterity and irreducible plurality as opposed to seeking a terminus in unity 
through the pursuit of absolute knowledge or higher truth, something which Hegel, in 
contrast, thought was the outcome of sublation and dialectic. In her essay ‘What is 
Authority?’ Arendt stated her case thus:
525 Norma Baumel Joseph, ‘Mehitza: Halakhic Decisions and Political Consequences’, in Daughters of the 
King: Women and the Synagogue, edited by Susan Grossman and Rivka Haut (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1992), 19.
526 See,   for  example,  NW  London   Eruv  [website]   available   at   http://www.nwlondoneruv.org/what.shtml 
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It is obvious that these reflections and descriptions 
are based on the conviction of the importance of 
making distinctions. To stress  such a conviction 
seems to be a gratuitous truism in view of the fact 
that, at least as far as I know, nobody has yet openly 
stated that distinctions are nonsense.
527
Rilke, as we have seen, cautioned against making ‘too sharp distinctions’.
528 
Nevertheless, it was clear that Arendt perceived a problem in American thinking in the 
nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties, almost a type of intellectual indolence, as a result 
of which simplicity was being allowed to trump complexity and language, as a result, 
was being corrupted because of the disappearance of distinctions. There was, she 
suggested, ‘a silent agreement in most discussions amongst political and social 
scientists that we can ignore distinctions and proceed on the assumption that 
everything can eventually be called anything else and that distinctions are meaningful 
only to the extent that each of us has the right “to define his terms”’.
529 Her very 
identification of totalitarianism as a unique form of government, for instance, was an 
example of her fundamental disagreement with those in the political and social 
sciences who, she argued, would see in Nazism and Stalinism simply transformations 
of the already recognised type of government we describe as tyrannical.
To be clear about this, Arendt was making a point here that will become crucial to my 
discussion as it develops below.  She was highlighting what was essentially a lack of 
insight in relation to drawing distinctions that she accused contemporary academics 
of when it came to matters political. For her, as we shall see, it was the public 
intellectual as I am labelling him or her, who, as occupant of the public space and not 
527 Arendt, BPF, 95.
528 See page 146 and footnote 360 above.
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simply a wanderer in the groves of academe, was more likely to recognise distinctions 
and make the unlikely connections needed to understand contemporary experience.    
A key distinction Arendt drew that I now want to focus on in particular concerns that 
between the public and what she labels, in The Human Condition, the ‘social’ realms. 
She associated the appearance of the latter with the advent of the ‘modern age’, itself 
distinct from the more recent emergence of the ‘modern world’, which ‘was born with 
the first atomic explosions’.
530 By the modern age Arendt was referring to such events 
as ‘the discovery of America […]; the Reformation […]; [and] the invention of the 
telescope’.
531 I am not going to focus on her historical account of the links between 
developments she attributed to the modern age and the rise of the social realm, 
though. Rather I want to concentrate here on the actual constitution of this realm or 
‘sphere’ as she referred to it within the overall structure of the ‘vita activa’, and its 
relationship to both the private and public realms.
532 
At the outset of The Human Condition Arendt identified a number of distinct 
subdivisions within the vita activa. In the first place, the overarching distinction was 
between the private and the public realms. The former she associated with labouring; 
the latter with work and what she labelled, ‘action’. By labour, work and action, 
Arendt wanted us to understand three basic human activities or modes of experience, 
we might say, each of which required its own “space” in order to take place. ‘Labor’, 
she wrote (and I will quote at length),
530 Arendt, HC, 6.
531 Ibid., 248.
532 Arendt distinguished, again, between the vita activa about which she wrote in The Human Condition and the 
vita contemplativa about which she wrote separately. These are, of course, Augustinian terms. With respect to the 
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is the activity which corresponds to the biological 
process of the human body, whose spontaneous 
growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound 
to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life 
process by labor. The human condition of labor is 
life itself.
In contrast,
Work   is   the   activity   which   corresponds   to   the 
unnaturalness  of human existence, which is not 
imbedded   in,   and   whose   mortality   is   not 
compensated   by,   the   species’  ever-recurring   life 
cycle. Work provides an “artificial” world of things, 
distinctly different from all natural surroundings. 
Within its borders each individual life is housed, 
while  this  world itself is  meant to  outlast and 
transcend them all. The human condition of work is 
worldliness.
  
Finally,
Action,   the   only   activity   that   goes   on   directly 
between men without the intermediary of things or 
matter,   corresponds   to   the   human   condition   of 
plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the 
earth and inhabit the world.
533
Labour, work and action are real aspects of human existence on earth. That is, they 
are dimensions or modes of conduct demanded by the fact of being human. We can 
see here her determination to add more colour, greater depth, to her consideration of 
the range of human activities than she judged Heidegger had achieved with his 
portrayal of Dasein or his analysis of ‘being-with-one-another’. Labour is a necessity 
if one is to physically survive on earth and is concerned with consumption and with 
birth and death. It is a private activity according to Arendt, and because its products 
are consumed it leaves no trace of them behind it. Work is similarly necessary in 
order to provide shelter for men and women to both live in and work in. It does bring 
men into contact with each other and its products remain after its conclusion in a state 
of semi permanence. Action is a less easily defined activity. It can involve actors 
533 Ibid., 7.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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taking part in politically motivated events, protests and demonstrations, for example, 
revolutionary upheavals or resistance against an enemy. It always involves others and 
cannot be conducted in private. It does not involve material ‘things’, however, so it is 
non-practical in nature, not focused on measurable and manageable or realistic tasks. 
It is never possible to predict just where the results of action will lead, what 
consequences they will have or how they can be assessed. Once again, in contrast to 
Kant (in the CPR), who, as I have already discussed wrote about concepts and 
categories in terms of being transcendental conditions of the possibility of knowledge 
and experience for any rational creature, in the case of labour, work and action these 
are real activities associated with existing human beings; they are not transcendental, 
although Arendt believed that in any human community one would expect to see 
evidence of them. 
In her later writings though, for example, the lectures she delivered and published on 
Kant’s political philosophy, it is clear that Arendt intended us to understand by 
political “engagement” (to my knowledge, this was not an expression she was apt to 
employ) not just the activities of student protestors or revolutionaries. It was not, in 
fact, men of action at all, but those onlookers who could judge action from a safe 
distance, from the critical distance that is essential for illuminating the meaning of 
political events, who now became important to her. This seemed to indicate the return 
of the ‘third party’, newly kitted out in political garb, who had first made his 
appearance in her commentary on Rilke’s Duino Elegies four decades earlier.
534 It was 
not so much that thought now represented something superior to action in Arendt’s 
mind as the idea that action without thought was recognised to be directionless (in 
534 See page 148 above. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Kantian terms, blind). While actors, like Rilke’s lovers, indicate human life, it was the 
gaze of the subject, the spectator (again she was indebted to Kant in this respect), that 
she came to see as indispensable for disclosing, for unconcealing pace Heidegger, the 
meaning of experience. It was the spectator, we might describe him or her in more 
familiar terms as the public intellectual who, from the understanding distance of a 
unique perspective, was understood to bring clarity of thought to bear upon the 
actions of those who, because of their involvement in events, could be expected to 
relate no more to us than simply an account of their actual experiences.
535 
However, although it may be hard to conceive of a community in which at least 
labour and work are not in evidence (the absence of action may be a different 
proposition) Arendt argued that it was possible for the relationships between the 
spheres in which these activities take place to alter. That was so because of the fact 
that she did not think there was any predetermined pecking order associated with 
them or any natural congruity. Thus, in addition to establishing the structure of the 
human condition, she was keen both in the book of that title and in her subsequent 
writings to chart the shifting boundaries of the private and the public spheres in 
relation to each other and in particular to warn of the threats to both posed by the 
appearance and insatiable appetite of (mass) society.
‘The emergence of society’, Arendt stated, which amounted to ‘the rise of 
housekeeping, its activities, problems and organizational devices’ marked a transition 
‘from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, 
[which] not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, [but] also 
535 See footnote 56 above.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their 
significance for the life of the individual and citizen’.
536 The problem here, it seems, 
was one of metabasis. In her paper on ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’ 
Arendt had observed that ‘the truths of history are accidental, the truths of reason are 
necessary, and accident is separated from necessity by a “nasty wide ditch”, which to 
leap across would require a “μεταβασις είς άλλο γενος” [a transgression to another 
field]’.
537 The logical error involved in such a leap, which protects one sphere or field 
from a foreign or unrelated one is, it would appear, precisely what Arendt was getting 
at in relation to the ‘rise of the social’ to use the title of one of her chapters in The 
Human Condition. The activities of the private sphere she seemed to be arguing, are 
essentially distinct from those of the public and to bridge the enormous divide 
separating them would require a logical error of the proportions of a metabasis eis 
allo genos. Such an “error” was represented in her view by the emergence of society. 
‘[...] each time we leave the protective four walls of our private homes and cross over 
the threshold into the public world, we enter first, not the political realm of equality, 
but the social sphere’, she wrote.
538 Society then, was seen by her as sitting in the 
cavity between the private and the public spheres, exposing and elevating to the level 
of public display what would normally be the hidden activities and preoccupations of 
the household. It is not proper for this to happen though, according to Arendt, because 
the life processes, which form part of the realm of necessity, ought, in her judgement, 
to remain unseen. 
536 Ibid., 38.
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What precisely did Arendt mean by this? What did she mean by life processes? And 
why did she judge it important that they stay hidden from public view? The concept 
of ‘living space’ or Lebensraum may help to answer these questions, though it is not 
my intention to draw any parallels between this concept and the myth of Lebensraum 
that inspired Nazi Germany’s military campaign against Soviet Russia in 1941.
539 In 
terms of what Arendt says about the expansion of the social realm it is clear that this 
could be described as a type of expansion of ‘living space’ in the sense that she wrote 
about the development of the social, as we have seen, as a ‘rise [in] housekeeping, its 
activities, problems, and organizational devices’. Furthermore, the development was, 
she implied, quite aggressive. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, for example, has gone so far as 
to describe Arendt’s analysis as being about an ‘attack’, an ‘attack of the blob’ as she 
labels it. She observes:
In The Human Condition, society is variously said to 
“absorb,” “embrace,” and “devour” people or other 
entities; to “emerge,” “rise,” “grow,” and “let loose” 
growth; to “enter,” “intrude” on, and “conquer” 
realms or spheres; to “constitute” and “control,” 
“transform” and “pervert”; to “impose” rules on 
people,   “demand”   certain   conduct   from   them, 
“exclude” or “refuse to admit” other conduct or 
people; and to “try to cheat” people. The social, 
then, is very lively indeed.
540 
What precisely is it though, that an increase in living space, or Lebensraum, in this 
context could be expected to achieve? Precisely what did Arendt mean to imply was 
being devoured or conquered or absorbed by society? After all, when we allude to the 
public realm or to the social realm we are not talking about actual physically bounded 
539 See Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London: Pan Books, 2001). Burleigh’s is both an 
informed and elegantly written account of Nazi Germany’s war against the Soviet Union. See also, Kenneth R 
Olwig, ‘The Duplicity of Space: Germanic “Raum” and Swedish “Rum” in English Language Geographical 
Discourse’, in Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 84 (2002), for a discussion of Lebensraum.
540 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Chicago: Chicago 
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spaces, or to put it another way, identifiable places. Even if we have in mind 
particular individual examples, a parliamentary building, for instance, where 
legislation is debated and enacted (though Arendt, as we shall see, would not have 
agreed that even this constituted a public space), or a pub where we regularly meet 
our friends and colleagues to relax, neither of these exhausts all possibilities nor could 
either be taken to constitute what the public realm or the social realm as such refer to. 
In what sense then does someone leaving the private sphere in order to ‘cross over’ 
into the public sphere enter the social sphere first?  
The answer to the question concerns, I believe, the logical geography of concepts 
according to which we navigate our way around the world. Linked to this is the extent 
of our conceptual consciousness of the importance and value attaching to certain types 
of activity. What Arendt was arguing was that, with the decline in experience since the 
beginning of the modern age, there had been a concomitant loss of consciousness as 
well, apparent not purely in the way the meaning of certain words has become totally 
unfamiliar to us, but due too, to a depletion in the activities from which they, the 
experiences and the words, derive. This was why, as we have already seen, she 
proposed, in The Human Condition, ‘nothing more than to think what we are doing’ 
and this was also why she was fond of using such expressions as ‘without even 
realising’ and ‘as long as one remains aware that’.
541 Her judgement in regard to the 
rise of the social was that we have become preoccupied with, absorbed and 
transformed by, even perverted by activities that may well be worthwhile but not to 
the extent of deserving public prominence, a prominence, that is, which may either 
541 ‘The disappearance of prejudices simply means that we have lost the answers on which we ordinarily rely 
without even realizing they were originally answers to questions’, in ‘The Crisis in Education’, BPF, 171. And, 
‘[a]ll is well as long as one remains aware that these usages, legitimate or not, do not constitute the proper 
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mask an activity’s real value or simply distract our conscious awareness of other 
activities. It is worth noting that Theodor Adorno wrote: ‘Distraction which engenders 
fears and anxiety about unemployment, loss of income, war, has its “non-productive” 
correlate in entertainment; that is, relaxation which does not involve the effort of 
concentration at all.’
542 
In her essay entitled ‘The Crisis in Culture’ Arendt observed:
The trouble with the educated philistine was not that 
he read the classics but that he did so prompted by 
the   ulterior   motive  of   self-perfection,  remaining 
quite unaware of the fact that Shakespeare or Plato 
might have to tell him more important things than 
how to educate himself; the trouble was that he fled 
into a region of “pure poetry” in order to keep 
reality out of his life – for instance, such “prosaic” 
things as a potato famine – or to look at it through a 
veil of “sweetness and light”.
543 
The argument then, was that, while one’s knowledge of Shakespeare and of Plato may 
well contribute to one’s “self-improvement”, the belief that that is all that Shakespeare 
and Plato are good for and the lack of insight that The Tempest or The Republic have 
anything in addition to impart about the nature of the world and man’s place within it, 
was troubling. There are echoes here of Arendt’s criticism of those nineteenth century 
Jews who had been so dazzled by the possibilities offered by Bildung, (‘self-
improvement’, ‘formation’) that they embraced it, as Mosse observes, as a 
Weltanschauung.
544 As we have seen, in the process, Arendt remarked, they forgot 
who they were as Jews and where they had come from in terms of Jewish history. 
They too had experienced, in a sense, a loss of consciousness. In her essay on culture, 
542 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On Popular Music’, in Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1, IX (1941): 37–38; 
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by John Cumming (London: 
Verso, 199).
543 Arendt, BPF, 200, emphasis added.
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Arendt went on to observe however, that what was just as disturbing was that in mass 
society, in particular, cultural artefacts were no longer appreciated for their cultural 
value in relation to what they disclosed about reality, but they had become no better 
than wares to be consumed, offered by the entertainment industry for our enjoyment 
in addition, in certain instances, to our edification. 
It may be valuable, I think, again to note briefly what Adorno had to say in regard to
culture. In pieces ranging from ‘On Popular Music’ published in 1941 to Dialektik der 
Aufklärung (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1947) co-authored with Max Horkheimer, 
and the 1963 lecture entitled, ‘Culture Industry Reconsidered’, Adorno consistently 
expressed anti-bourgeois criticisms of what he considered to have become nothing less 
than our contemporary ‘culture industry’.
545 And one of this central criticisms 
concerned ‘the stunting of the mass-media consumer’s powers of imagination and 
spontaneity’, for example.
546 His analysis had an economic underpinning, the critique 
of capitalism, that was absent in Arendt. So, whereas she all but blamed individuals for 
allowing themselves to be deceived into thinking that trashy imitations of cultural 
treasures could actually be edifying, he blamed matters on a conspiracy generated 
within the ‘culture industry’ itself in respect of which the individual was almost 
helpless. This was a conspiracy aimed at automating and standardising not just cultural 
products, ‘a Beethoven symphony [...] crudely “adapted” for a film sound-track [or] a 
Tolstoy novel [...] garbled in a film strip’, but the consumer of those products too.
547 
‘[...] sustained thought’ on the part of ‘the spectator’, for example, was ‘out of the 
545 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Culture Industry Reconsidered’, translated by Anson G. Rabinbach, New German 
Critique 6 (1975), 12–19.
546 Adorno, Dialectic, 126.
547 Ibid., 122.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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question. [...] no scope [was] left for the imagination’.
548 Their differences apart, one 
can see here, I think, worries that Arendt and Adorno shared in common with respect 
to the way in which American mass culture was perceived as administering analgesics 
that only served to anaesthetise the spectator, deadening his or her senses rather than 
stimulating them, and making that spectator far less perceptive to what was going on 
around him or her in the process. In terms of the importance Arendt attached to the 
role of the political spectator the implications of this loss of consciousness were 
extremely significant.   
Arendt’s critique of culture was not aimed at descrying entertainment per se. She 
believed, quite the contrary, ‘that we all stand in need of entertainment’, that it is 
highly important, providing much needed relief from the intense stresses and strains 
of public life.
549 However, ‘entertainment, like labor and sleep is irrevocably part of 
the biological life process’.
550 The problem for her was therefore, that ‘biological life 
is always, whether laboring or at rest, whether engaged in consumption or in the 
passive reception of amusement, a metabolism feeding on things by devouring 
them’.
551 And here we get to the essence of Arendt’s concerns relating to what has 
become of culture, namely that in being exposed to classic works of art and literature, 
which are being relentlessly adapted for our amusement, passivity blocks our 
becoming conscious of their real message. Such adaptations, which strive, for 
example, to make ‘Hamlet […] as entertaining as My Fair Lady’ neither leave behind 
them what we have come to expect from the classics, an artificially created world 
548 Ibid., 127.
549 Arendt, BPF, 203.
550 Ibid., 202.
551 Ibid., emphasis added.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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from which we can take our bearings, nor do they help us understand reality by 
casting any of their light upon it.
552
An increase in living space then, was for Arendt akin to an increase in the amount of 
“room” we take up, we might say mental energy we expend, in order merely to meet 
life’s basic demands. In other words, it indicated our having become too much 
concerned or too taken up with those purely life affirming activities, broadly 
understood, to which we are frequently all too ready to submit. We have then, become 
lost in our conceptual terrain and disorientated. The manner in which we conduct 
ourselves demonstrates a type of ‘corruption of consciousness’, though not in the 
sense that R.G. Collingwood intended, which was ‘characterized […] in terms of 
dishonourably motivated failures of self knowledge’, but rather, in the sense of a 
different ethical condition distinguished by a willingness to relinquish all too easily 
our responsibility for being spectators of world events and for engaging critically with 
others in public.
553 Arendt deemed such behaviour essential to what being human 
means. That is not to say that she neglected to consider the possibility that the 
distractions of the social sphere lead to the corruption of consciousness in terms of an 
alignment with what David Owen has described as ‘Emerson’s concept of 
“conformity”’.
554 Arendt was only too aware that in the social sphere ‘we become 
subject to the old adage of “like attracts like” which controls the whole realm of 
society in the innumerable variety of its groups and associations’.
555 However, she was 
not overly concerned by this because she believed that ‘personal identity has its 
552 Ibid., 204.
553 David Owen, ‘Cultural Diversity and the Conversation of Justice: Reading Cavell on Political Voice and the 
Expression of Consent’, Political Theory 27 (1999) 581. Arendt discusses the importance of the spectator critic in 
her Lectures on Kant, for example. R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art.
554 Owen, ‘Cultural Diversity’, 581.
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source beyond the social realm’, and the means by which groups of people in the 
social sphere discriminate against each other on the bases ‘of profession, income, and 
ethnic origin’, for example, ‘is as indispensable a social right as equality is a political 
right’.
556 If, for Collingwood, ‘the community’s medicine for the worst disease of the 
mind, the corruption of consciousness’ was art, poetic and artistic expression,
557 which 
serves to distinguish and individualize, for Arendt, in contrast, it was public political 
engagement with others that was identified as the key to restoring health by bringing 
people together to articulate their distinct perspectives. What exactly constitutes 
‘public health’, though? It is here that the role of the political spectator comes into its 
own.
In On Revolution Arendt analysed two historical events, namely the French and the 
American revolutions from the standpoint of what they achieved in political terms.
558 
Her evaluation was dependent upon gauging the success or the failure, on the one 
hand of the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution, and on the other of the 
revolutionaries who declared the First Republic, in refusing to make social issues their 
priority. To what extent, Arendt wanted to know, did questions of social hardship and 
inequality, for example, determine the directions taken by the revolutionaries in each 
case? In respect of the French, she observed that it was ‘not the conspiracy of kings 
and tyrants but the much more powerful conspiracy of necessity and poverty [that] 
distracted them long enough to miss the “historical moment”’.
559 She was fully aware 
of the violence with which the attempt to satisfy the life process manifested itself, 
namely, at that very moment during the Revolution, ‘when the poor, driven by the 
556 Ibid., 238.
557 R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, 336.
558 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973).
559 Ibid., 61, emphasis added.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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needs of their bodies, burst onto the scene’.
560 In contrast to the French Revolution 
however, it was the very absence of a ‘social question’, as it were, in the American 
context, that enabled the Founding Fathers to establish a truly public space that would 
establish and protect freedom, according to Arendt. Of course, this was made easier to 
the extent, as she herself admitted quoting Jefferson, that in the case of the French 
Revolution, ‘“of twenty millions of people … there are nineteen millions more 
wretched, more accursed in every circumstance of human existence than the most 
conspicuously wretched individual of the whole United States”’.
561 (This does not 
seem to take any account though, of the position of the slaves.) The point however, is 
that in contrast to the American Revolutionary context, in the case of the French 
Revolution, events were re-routed, as it were, by expressions of compassion due to the 
fact that the focus of the revolutionaries themselves had been redirected by the 
ferocious upsurge of necessity, which had caused them to lose sight (consciousness) 
of the true meaning of freedom. As Arendt put it:
When they [the poor] appeared on the scene of 
politics, necessity appeared with them, and the result 
was   that   the   power   of   the   old   regime   became 
impotent   and   the   new   republic   was   stillborn; 
freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the 
urgency of the life process itself.
562
There remains outstanding, of course, the whole issue of how Arendt thought that the 
‘social question’ could be tackled and this was bound up with what she had to say 
regarding technology, for example. However, this is not an issue that I will be dealing 
with here. Rather, my point is to draw attention to the fact that in evaluating the 
achievements of the American Revolution in contrast to the failings of the French, 
560 Ibid., 59.
561 Ibid., 67. Ellipsis in original.
562 Ibid., 60.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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Arendt was retrieving from the ruins of history and reaffirming in the process an 
exemplar of politics that she believed we had lost consciousness of, namely a concept 
of politics in which administrative, social and welfare concerns, for example, are not 
the priority of the political actors seeking to found a political constitution. And it was 
this, the ability to employ history to constitute and indeed reconstitute the reference 
points from which we can take our moral and political bearings that Arendt associated 
with the political spectator. His or her significance lay precisely in being able to 
recognise exemplars (Kant), the American Revolution, or National Socialism, and 
what is more, in identifying such exemplars recognising in them something universal, 
the meaning of politics, or, as in the case of the novel phenomenon of totalitarianism, 
the very essence of anti-politics. Historical exemplars are, in fact, phenomena of 
origin in that they suggest something hidden to the eye, something ontological. 
Exemplars could, in Arendt, as in Kant, subsequently be used to derive the universal, 
the meaning of ‘politics’ in her case, rather than the other way around. This I think 
was what she intended in relation to totalitarianism and it was what she meant by 
talking about her realisation that in writing an apparently historical book about it she 
had in fact hit upon ‘politics’. She had, that is, discovered politics to be an ontological 
condition of human life on earth.
In her lectures on Kant Arendt observed:
The condition  sine qua non  for the existence of 
beautiful objects is communicability; the judgement 
of the spectator creates the space without which no 
such objects could appear at all. The public realm is 
constituted by the critics and the spectators, not by 
the actors or the makers.
563
563 Arendt, LKPP, 63.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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For her, the sine qua non of the public realm was about the communication that 
comes from being in certain relations with others, communication dependent upon the 
judgements of individuals coming from unique perspectives to “appear” in public and 
to make their voices heard on political matters. It was such individuals, public 
intellectuals, rather than professional academics, for example, who Arendt believed 
occupy the space that drives public debate and ensures the protection of freedom 
through the recognition and reaffirmation of what politics is all about. Public 
intellectuals are not unlike sentinels (were it not for the unwanted connotations of 
Paul Nizan’s Marxist characterisation, we might suggest they are rather like 
‘watchdogs’
564) who continuously patrol our logical geography alert to crimes of 
trespass, vigilant always for signs of the unauthorised crossing of conceptual 
boundaries – for example, the harmful because confusing equation of commerce or 
business with politics. If frontiers have been crossed, because, for instance, their 
perimeters have become obscured and signposts to forewarn us of their proximity, 
their exact location even, have been lost amongst the debris of history, then the 
sentinel is there to make us aware of any metabasis eis allo genos, or logical error of 
leaping from one field to a foreign one and of our having forgotten, for instance, that 
such distinctions as those between private and public or between forgiveness and 
judicial pardon do actually exist.
565 This was, I would contend, behind Hannah 
Arendt’s whole attempt to reorient our thinking, by reclaiming from the ruins of the 
past broken signposts and battered reference points, that might help us again, when 
conjoined with our own living experience, to find our way around the world. 
564 Paul Nizan,  The Watchdogs: Philosophers and the Established Order  (London: Monthly Review Press, 
1971).
565 W. H. Auden was one of the very few people who pointed out to Arendt a distinction, the veracity of which 
she accepted, namely the distinction between judicial pardon and forgiveness that she had failed to acknowledge in 
The Human Condition. Arendt accepted that such a distinction indeed existed and that she had missed it and was 
thereafter grateful to Auden for having illuminated it for her. A digitised version of her letter to Auden, dated 
February   14,   1960   can   be   accessed   from   the   online   archives   of   her   correspondence   at: 
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The extract from Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy that I have just 
quoted from above suggests something else too, however, something which should, I 
would argue, remind us of Aristotle. We know from Kant’s essay ‘What Does it Mean 
to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ that he judged that thought itself depended upon 
communication. To recall the first epigraph to chapter three of this thesis, ‘how 
correctly would we think’, he asked, ‘if we did not think as it were in community with 
others to whom we communicate our thoughts and who communicate theirs with 
us!’
566 Communication then, played a crucial function in Kant’s critical philosophy 
and it was a function that I think was at the heart of Arendt’s work, too. Her public 
realm is a space, however intangible, where public intellectuals, the guardians of the 
conceptual landscape come together precisely to gaze, to communicate and thus, to 
think – to gaze upon particular events, daily happenings and occurrences  on the 
world stage, and to articulate judgements that offer understanding. Peg Birmingham 
has helpfully noted:
the spectator, whose vision is neither contemplative 
nor   introspective,   looks   at   the   singular   and 
contingent. This vision does not gaze up to the 
eternal or necessary forms; rather; it looks out to 
those   events   through   which   thinking   is   given 
something   to   think   and,   moreover,   to   critically 
change its ways of seeing.
567 
Hannah Arendt’s public intellectual is neither in quest of Platonic Truth, nor for that 
matter is he or she self-obsessed, nor does he or she yearn to belong to some sort of 
self-congratulatory honour society. Arendtian public space is, in Heideggerian 
language, where human beings can be with each other, not in a condition of 
566 Kant, RRT, 16. See footnote 203 above.
567 Peg Birmingham, ‘Hannah Arendt: The Spectator’s Vision’, in Hermsen, Joke J. and Villa, Dana R. (eds.), 
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averageness, but rather in conditions of equality and plurality where each is given 
equal voice and equal respect. Each expresses their own ideas and are receptive to 
those of others, fellow “occupants” of this “place”, to whom they in turn listen. And 
this stimulates thinking some more, intelligibility and ultimately understanding. What 
this suggests is that, first, the public realm functions, in part, as a repository of 
collective memory. In terms of a community it serves as a ‘yardstick’, that is, similar 
to the one that Hannah Arendt referred to in relation to individual memory in her 
doctoral dissertation. It enables time to be measured, because each of the occupants of 
the public realm, wearing his or her sentinel’s hat, brings to this space their own 
fragments of genuine historical experience that they have salvaged during their 
particular excavations into the wreckage of the past.
568 To recall, once again, ‘[...] 
every new human being as he inserts himself between an infinite past and an infinite 
future, must discover and ploddingly pave it [that ‘small non-time space in the very 
heart of time’] anew’, she remarked.
569
In addition to serving as a repository of collective memory though, a storehouse from 
which the remnants that have been salvaged from the past can help guide us in the 
present and towards the future, the public sphere also serves to generate, I think, a 
form of Aristotelian civic friendship. In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle observed 
of the happy man:
Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely 
happy man a solitary; for no one would choose the 
whole world on condition of being alone, since man 
is a political creature and one whose nature is to live 
with others. [...] even the happy man lives with 
others; [...] the happy man needs friends.
570 
568 See pages 29–30 above.
569 Arendt, Preface to BPF, 13. 
570 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 238– 
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Arendt’s public intellectual, it seems to me, is someone who relishes concord with his 
and her fellows within the public realm precisely because he or she experiences a 
form of happiness, ‘public happiness’, denied those who live in the isolation and 
solitude of mass society. Public happiness was something Heidegger simply could not 
identify with the public sphere of das Man. In The Origins, Arendt established how 
totalitarian governments eradicate all sense of individuality and community 
destroying the space between those imprisoned within their concentration camps and 
Gulags. In ‘mass culture’ too though, she identified ‘deep-rooted trouble [in the form 
of] a universal unhappiness’.
The happiness achieved in isolation from the world 
and   enjoyed   within   the   confines   of   one’s   own 
private existence can never be anything but the 
famous “absence of pain,” a definition on which all 
variations of consistent sensualism must agree.
571  
It is a feature, I think, of the activity of the public intellectual within the public realm 
that he or she demonstrates a bond of civic friendship (Arendt refers at times to 
‘sociability’) with his or her fellows in what Arendt describes in her Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy as a sensus communis.
572 Following Aristotle’s discussion 
in Books VIII and IX of The Nicomachean Ethics, living in isolation, it seems, can 
only lead an individual to become less rather than more continuously active at the 
things they most care about. On the other hand, where one is “engaged” with others in 
the pursuit of one’s interests, then one is likely to be more continuously active. 
However, we should be aware that being engaged with others does not mean simply 
being in their company, being that is, in close proximity and yet diverted still by one’s 
571 Arendt, HC, 134 and 112.
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own private pursuits. It suggests instead, as John Cooper has perceptively 
acknowledged, ‘making one’s fundamental life activities themselves activities shared 
in common with others’.
573 Politics, may be an occasion for discrimination, but it is 
additionally an occasion for the pleasure of sharing and one of the chief features of 
the public realm is the desire to share ones opinions and listen to those expressed by 
others.
574 This, I would argue, was something absent from Heidegger’s vision.
 
We have noted already Habermas’ consternation in regard to Arendt’s separating off 
from politics what are taken by many to be legitimate, indeed intrinsic, facets of 
political discussion:
a   state   which   is   relieved   of   the   administrative 
processing of social problems; a politics which is 
cleansed   of   socio-economic   issues;   an 
institutionalization   of   public   liberty   which   is 
independent of the organization of public wealth; a 
radical   democracy   which   inhibits   its   liberating 
efficacy at the boundaries where political oppression 
ceases and social repression begins – this path is 
unimaginable for any modern society.
575   
What I want to do in this final section of the chapter is address the issue from an 
alternative perspective though, from the direction, that is, of the public realm 
infringing upon what Arendt viewed as rightly the preserve of the adjacent social 
sphere. Doing this will, I hope, help us to make sense of both her political judgement 
and her role as a public intellectual; it will also force us to consider how the public 
realm, intangible though it is, is surely dependent upon certain material conditions 
being met if it is to endure.
573 John M Cooper, ‘Aristotle on Friendship’, in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 324.
574 See above, 21.
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For all of her criticisms, Arendt was not totally dismissive of the social sphere. What 
she did criticise was its gobbling up of more and more areas of public life implying 
that we think more and more in terms of such life-affirming concepts as say, our 
economic well-being and our personal development. The social realm, she thought, 
had ‘transformed all modern communities into societies of laborers and jobholders; in 
other words they [have become] centred around the one activity necessary to sustain 
life’.
576 However, she also thought that the social sphere played an “acceptable” role if 
that is not to put it too strongly, one that I have already intimated by describing it in 
terms of its capacity for discrimination, and she paid it a type of backhanded 
compliment by painting it in a favourable light, particularly in relation to mass 
society, which she described as attempting to level out all differences between people. 
So far as I can tell, Arendt was not averse to all demonstrations of social 
discrimination, so long as they were confined to situations in which people only 
‘congregate for the purpose of associating with each other’ by which she meant, 
purely doing no more than spending time in each other’s company in, for example, 
holiday resorts or, we might infer, private clubs and institutions.
577 Discrimination was 
another matter though, when it came to being discouraged or prevented from using 
‘services which, whether privately or publicly owned, are in fact public services that 
everyone needs in order to pursue his business and lead his life’.
578 In these situations, 
discrimination simply could not be tolerated and laws making it illegal had to be 
enforced. However, in September of 1957, there erupted what became known as the 
‘Battle of Little Rock’, which revolved around Central High School in Arkansas. It 
dropped something of a bombshell into the conceptual terrain causing nothing but 
confusion and disorientation, it seemed.     
576 Arendt, HC, 46.
577 Arendt, PHA, 239.
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In brief, Central High was a focal point for desegregation in the American South. In 
the Spring of 1957 the School Board, in compliance with its legal requirements, had 
stated its intention to rescind the practice of segregation and to implement a policy of 
full integration for black and white pupils. Plans were put in place to make this a 
reality (other schools in the South had already started doing this without any 
problems), by September of the same year. During the summer months a number of 
black children applied to the school and of these nine were duly selected. In early 
September, however, Governor Faubus attempted to get legislation passed that would, 
in fact, reintroduce segregation and, fearing trouble from white supremacists, he 
called in the National Guard, two hundred and fifty of whom surrounded Central 
High. Just what their orders were, that is, whether it was the school itself or whether it 
was the pupils, black and white, who were to be protected by these men, is somewhat 
unclear. After an additional day of closure (3 September), however, Central High 
reopened for the new semester. The school superintendent made clear though, that in 
doing so it was opening its doors to all; there would be no further policy of 
segregation at the school. 
I want, at this point, to jump to the image (literally – it was a photograph) of a young 
black child that appeared in newspapers across America at that time, one Elizabeth 
Eckford, who, for Hannah Arendt served to bring all of the events related to the 
‘Battle of Little Rock’ into sharp focus.
579 Elizabeth, a fifteen year old, was pictured, 
as described by Arendt, ‘accompanied by a white friend of her father, [actually, he 
579 A detailed account of the ‘Battle of Little Rock’ is provided by Danielle Allen in her essay, ‘Law’s necessary 
forcefulness: Ralph Ellison vs. Hannah Arendt on the Battle of Little Rock’, in Multiculturalism and Political 
Theory, edited by Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 315–
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was a New York Times reporter by the name of Benjamin Fine, and he was Jewish
580] 
walking away from the school persecuted and followed into bodily proximity by a 
jeering and grimacing mob of youngsters’.
581 In fact, we know that Elizabeth was 
confronted by a mob that included adults too, that ‘when she [...] tried to pass 
through, [into the school] the soldiers thrust their bayonets at her chest’, and that Fine 
helped her to escape and protected her that day from a mob baying for her to be 
lynched.
582 At this point, Elizabeth Jacoway reports, the mob actually turned on Fine 
too, hurling anti-Semitic abuse at him and threatening him with castration if he did 
not stop interfering.
583 
Two points can be made, I think. The first is that the brutality on show at Little Rock 
brought into a strange “alliance” two groups, one black one Jewish and demonstrated, 
according to  Elizabeth Jacoway, just how easily a baying mob (even in America) 
could shift ‘from racism to anti-Semitism’. (To recall, the Anti-Defamation League of 
B'nai B'rith had release its short film, ‘An American Girl, The Problems of Prejudice’, 
only a few years previously.)  The other point, and this was what Arendt was indeed 
trying to emphasise, was that the ordeal that Elizabeth was subjected to was clearly 
horrific and traumatic and raised the question as to whether this fifteen year old young 
black woman, should have been put into a situation that would have quite 
understandably terrified even someone older and more experienced in life than she 
herself. In other words, was the price of Elizabeth’s ordeal an acceptable one to pay in 
order to force the issue of desegregation? 
580 See Elizabeth Jacoway, ‘Turn Away Thy Son’, in The Washington Post [Online] (16 March 2007), available 
from,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/style/longterm/books/chap1/turnawaythyson.htm   (Accessed   5 
December 2009).
581 Arendt, PHA, 236.
582 Allen, ‘Law’s necessary forcefulness’, 321.
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We can, I believe, speculate with some degree of confidence, that in reflecting upon 
the issues surrounding Little Rock, Hannah Arendt had been led to recall what she 
later spoke about in a 1964 television interview regarding her own childhood 
memories of dealing with anti-Semitic remarks. She told her audience and the 
interviewer:
You see, all children encountered anti-Semitism. 
And the souls of many children were poisoned by it. 
The difference with me lay in the fact that my 
mother always insisted that I not humble myself. 
One must defend oneself! When my teachers made 
anti-Semitic   remarks   –   usually   they   were   not 
directed   at   me   but   at   my   other   classmates, 
particularly   at   the   Eastern   Jewesses   –   I   was 
instructed to stand up immediately, to leave the 
class, go home, and leave the rest to school protocol. 
My mother would write one of her many letters, 
and, with that, my involvement in the matter ended 
completely. I had a day off from school, and that 
was, of course, very nice.
584 
As far as Arendt was concerned, Elizabeth Eckford had been improperly and unjustly 
placed in the firing line. ‘The girl, obviously, was asked to be a hero’ she observed. 
‘Have we now come to the point’ she continued by inquiring, ‘where it is the children 
who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we intend to have our 
political battles fought out in school yards?’
585 Arendt, as she made clear in her essay 
entitled ‘The Crisis in Education’ regarded it as incumbent upon schools to serve as 
pre-political places of safety. Educational activity’s ‘task is always to cherish and to 
protect something – the child against the world, the world against the child, the new 
against the old, the old against the new’.
586 Clearly for Arendt, this duty of care and 
584 Young-Breuhl, Hannah Arendt, 11–12.
585 Arendt, PHA, 236.
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protection had been waived in the case of Elizabeth Eckford and the other Black 
children who were eventually admitted to Central High on 24 September following 
the arrival of federal troops. ‘Sure we’re in Central … but how did we get in?’, one of 
the children asked the following day. ‘We got in, finally, because we were protected 
by paratroops. Some victory!’
587 
For Arendt the entire affair ultimately suggested to her that the essence of public life, 
its equal treatment of all engaged in what she deemed political activity, was being 
forced upon those engaged in non-political activities, that is on those engaged in 
education. Yes, the law, quite rightly she admitted, had been changed to make the 
heinous practice of segregation illegal. However, to try and force the issue at Central 
High, to try and force those white children and adults to accept their Black 
neighbours, who they clearly hated, was an error of judgement. Discrimination, is an 
intrinsic characteristic of the social realm of which education also forms a part, 
(Arendt believed all three spheres, the public, the private and the social, in fact, have a 
vested interest in education
588) and to this extent if it is to be eliminated it cannot be 
because the values of the public realm are imposed but only by, as we might today 
describe matters, changing hearts and minds. And this, Arendt believed, was 
something in which religious institutions should take the lead: ‘The only public force 
that can fight social prejudice is the churches’, she stated, ‘and they can do so in the 
name of the uniqueness of the person, for it is on the principle of the uniqueness of 
souls that religion (and especially the Christian faith) is based’.
589 (In the case of 
Norma Davis in, ‘An American Girl, The Problems of Prejudice’, it was by speaking 
587 Cited in Allen, ‘Law’s necessary forcefulness’, 321–322. Ellipsis in original.
588 Arendt, PHA, 241–242.
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to her “friends” and their parents in public at a school meeting, and by reading to them 
from her own private diary, that she hoped to change their attitudes towards the Jews.) 
There is something odd about Arendt’s understanding of the education system, which 
she seemed to be bringing under the criterion of mere association simply involving 
people of like mind (or colour in this instance) choosing to be in each other’s 
company to the exclusion of those against whom they are prejudiced. She did not 
view it, that is, in terms of a service ‘that’, as quoted above, ‘everyone needs in order 
to pursue his business and lead his life’. However, the peculiarity of her interpretation 
was, I think influenced by the fact that children were involved here and that to force 
the matter, in line with legal requirements, risked placing them in situations of grave 
danger and sheer terror, which clearly would be wrong.
The line Arendt took won her ‘the 1959 Longview Foundation award for the year’s 
outstanding little-magazine article’.
590 However, as Young-Breuhl points out, it also 
brought her much criticism from the editors of and contributors to such journals as 
Commentary and Dissent. In particular, Arendt became involved in a public 
disagreement over Little Rock with the Black novelist, Ralph Ellison, author of, for 
example, Invisible Man.
591 Ellison took a very different line to Arendt on the matter 
and did not think that she at all understood either Black history or the situation Blacks 
at the time found themselves in in the United States of America. Danielle Allen has 
summarised the dispute well and in my following remarks I shall summarise her essay 
in an attempt to get to the nub of the dispute.
592  
590 Young-Breuhl, Hannah Arendt, 315.
591 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (London: Penguin, 2001).
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As far as Ellison was concerned, Little Rock was part of a much wider problem, and 
not just a problem experienced by Blacks in America, which revolved around the 
support any democratic system depends upon, in effect, the good will it requires from 
very many of its citizens, because of the inevitable losses they experience as a result 
of the way in which the outcomes of legislative procedures unfold in real life. Allen 
describes it thus:
law-making turns about and once again renders some 
citizens, and their interests, invisible insofar as the 
legislative bodies produce general rules as the basis 
for collective action  and so explicitly fail to respond 
to   the   diversity   of   citizens’   experiences   and 
circumstances. Although laws aim at the common 
good, they inevitably harm some citizens. Indeed, 
the legal system is, in an important way, a method of 
managing the variable distribution of harms and 
benefits throughout a citizenry.
593 
Invisibility was an important concept in Ellison’s writings and it was linked to the 
idea of sacrifice, to the fact that Black Americans, for example, were subject to laws 
which often benefited others rather than them, but which, nevertheless, they were 
expected to accept passively without making a fuss, as it were, for the greater good of 
the country as a whole. Full and enthusiastic consent within democracy is wishful 
thinking to say the least (contrary to the projects of some democratic theorists writing 
since Little Rock
594) but the sacrifices of the Black community, Ellison believed, and 
those of many other citizens for that matter, went largely unrecognised and yet the 
country depended upon these sacrifices being tolerated. Little Rock was an example 
of law-making intended to benefit the Black population of this Arkansas town, in 
theory, but which threatened to demand, in practice, just the type of sacrifice he was 
593 Ibid., 315.
594 Ibid., 326.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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highlighting. And this, in the context of the struggle for Black Civil Rights was, he 
judged, a sacrifice too far. 
For Allen following Ellison, the whole ‘Battle of Little Rock’ points precisely to the 
connection between the social and the public spheres rather than, as Arendt argued, 
their perceived separation. That is, Arendt is perceived as having drawn too sharp a 
distinction. In the context of Ellison’s ‘recuperation’ for political theory of the term 
‘sacrifice’, Allen writes, ‘the social is linked to the political not only because it is 
affected by political actions but because it secures the political realm’.
595 The 
implementation of laws that will not benefit certain sectors of the citizenry, which 
may indeed require losses or sacrifices on their part, reflects law’s forcefulness, but it 
also demonstrates that,
[i]n   a   law-oriented   politics,   citizens   grant   their 
representatives the power to make decisions that 
have widely ramifying effects; […] It is precisely 
because   law’s   effects   outstrip   its   intended 
consequences that our private and social worlds are 
so thoroughly tied to the political.
596
In the wake of the ‘Battle of Little Rock’ Hannah Arendt admitted that there were 
aspects of the whole episode that she had indeed misjudged, the level of violence 
being one of them. There were other aspects, the details of which are recounted in 
Allen’s paper, that Arendt simply got wrong. For instance, she took a snipe at the 
father of Elizabeth Eckford because of his absence on the morning of 3 September 
when the affray outside Central High took place insinuating that he was not there 
because he was an uncaring parent. As Allen demonstrates, however, this was unjust. 
595 Ibid., 340. Allen praises Ellison for recuperating the term ‘sacrifice’ on page 316. 
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The parents of each of the nine Black children at the centre of the episode had, in fact, 
been asked to stay away from the school by the superintendent in an effort to reduce 
the potential for violence and much as this went counter to their instincts they 
complied with the request, though at the cost of enormous personal anguish. However, 
on the central points Arendt stuck her ground, she never shifted position and the 
reason why, I believe, has to do precisely with her understanding of the nature of 
public political engagement and the relationship she saw between the public and the 
social realms.
We can take as our point of departure the case of Arendt’s own life to get a provisional 
answer to the question about what she understood public political activity to be. As I 
have already discussed above, Arendt advocated keeping to the margins of society, so 
we can assume that this was what she believed she herself was doing throughout her 
life. To recall, ‘social nonconformism, is the sine qua non of intellectual achievement’ 
she stated.
597 (She might just as easily have stated that it was the sine qua non of 
freedom, too.) However, if we accept that she kept her distance, at least in her 
estimation, from the lure of the social sphere, it is clearly the case also that the nature 
of her activity was certainly not confined to the private realm – that would obviously 
be a nonsensical claim. So, what are we left with? Presumably, Arendt herself must 
have believed that she moved in the public realm and was engaged in public political 
activity. What are we to make of this, though? Since she was not affiliated to a 
political party, nor actively working on behalf of one, or for that matter engaged in 
local or city politics or protests, in precisely what did her public political engagement 
consist? In answer to this question I would argue that it consisted in exactly that for 
597 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, xv.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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which we know her best: her writings on political, philosophical and historical 
themes; her willingness to raise her head above the parapet in order to comment, in 
open public debate, on what were frequently, controversial subjects, for example, the 
Eichmann trial and Little Rock, about which the majority of us would probably prefer 
to keep, at least a low public profile; and, it consisted in re-thinking the cultural, 
moral, philosophical and political, reference points we constantly use to navigate our 
way around reality, reference points which she believed had become obscured and 
which needed to be retrieved from the detritus of history and connected to 
contemporary experience in order that we might build a new conceptual framework. 
This, for Arendt was what occupying public space demanded. It was ‘public 
spiritedness’ of the highest order within a sensus communis demonstrated by someone 
conscious of the need to combat the dangers of ideological thinking and social 
conformity in mass society.
Where Arendt’s detractors misunderstand her and become confused is in attributing to 
her a sense of politics that conforms to conventional standards and expectations. 
Danielle Allen is guilty of this, for example, when, in the course of her critique of 
Arendt, she casually slips into her analysis, as we have seen, a conception of politics 
as ‘law-oriented’ to which she seems to think Arendt would have ascribed. And on 
these grounds, of course, it would be possible to totally undermine Arendt by pointing 
to ‘“the thick” context of interpersonal relations, habits and customs that determine 
the meanings and associated expectations of formal rules’.
598 On this basis, the 
political realm would indeed be dependent upon the frequently unacknowledged 
sacrifices of those in society whom the law simply does not benefit. However, it is 
598 Allen, ‘Law’s necessary forcefulness’, 339–340.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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clear that Arendt did not equate politics with law-making. The ‘triangular borderland 
of scholarship, journalism, and public debate’, which Bernard Wasserstein has 
recently described to criticise Arendt’s public activity, actually depicts fairly well, I 
would argue, the type of public realm cum sensus communis divorced from the law 
that she wrote about and promoted.
599 Allen actually remarks at one point that Arendt 
believed that in the ancient world it was precisely because laws were taken as being 
made that law-making was not categorised as a political activity. Certainly Arendt’s 
own conception of politics was not one which equated it with the legislative functions 
of representative government. While she made much of the political importance of 
founding, for example, the founding of Rome or of the American Constitution, clearly, 
she believed law-making itself and the whole framework of statutory law, which 
exists to promote and to protect private interests and welfare and secure private 
happiness is, though a crucial aspect of government, nevertheless an aspect of 
government which confirms it as belonging in the social realm more than in the public 
realm. In Arendt’s conceptual framework, or logical geography, the political actor is 
actually a spectator critic, an onlooker, the public intellectual as I have labelled him or 
her, who is not actually involved in making laws at all. He is, rather, the occupant of a 
space open to all equally, there are no entry qualifications (save perhaps for being an 
‘exile and marginal’
600). This  makes communication possible. However, if it is the 
judgement of the spectator that effectively creates the public space, are the resources 
of the onlooker alone enough to guarantee the continued existence of this intangible 
sphere? 
599 Bernard Wasserstein, ‘Blame the Victim: Hannah Arendt among the Nazis – the Historian and her Sources’, 
in The Times Literary Supplement (9 October 2009): 13–15.
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It seems to me that in reality the guarantee that Arendtian public space will continue to 
endure, must surely depend upon a number of material and not just constitutional 
conditions being met, too. Arendt neglected to discuss these. Individuals must, for 
example be permitted to gather and to speak to each other without fear of being 
accused of conspiracy or other unlawful intentions; there must be freedom of speech; 
there must surely be a free media and freedom of the press; there would need to be 
free access to libraries and databases as well as to public records; free movement 
nationally and internationally and so on and so forth. Without such material conditions 
being met what hope could there be that Arendt’s public realm would persist? 
Nevertheless, with all of these material conditions in place, I think that her rejoinder 
might well have been, that without the writer, the scholar, the thinker, the intellectual, 
who is committed to retrieving, from the past, fragments of genuine experience that 
can be fused with current experience to create a ‘new now’, something beyond him or 
herself, no genuine public discussion, no intelligibility, would be possible at all:
I ask you about us. I know
why you so blissfully touch: because the caress withold,
because it does not vanish, the place that you
so tenderly cover; because you perceive thereunder
pure duration. Until your embraces almost 
promise eternity.
(Second Elegy)
601
     
To return finally to Little Rock, Elizabeth Eckford should never have been given the 
responsibility that was handed to her, Arendt believed. There were, she thought, no 
moral grounds on which this could be justified. As with much of her other writing, 
Arendt’s reasoning confounded many but she had, as we have seen, clear grounds for 
thinking in the way that she did. In the case of the ‘Battle of Little Rock’ we are led, I 
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think, not just to the rights and wrongs of this particular event but in addition to the 
very core of Hannah Arendt’s message about the nature of politics and the 
responsibility of the public intellectual as a spectator who can benefit from making 
reasoned judgements, not just from a unique perspective, but additionally from an 
understanding distance. Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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CONCLUSION
Hannah Arendt: An Intellectual in Exile
Denn offen ist es bei dir und hell. (Where you are at home, 
everything is open and light.)
602 
For a man who no longer has a homeland, writing becomes a 
place to live [yet] in the end, the writer is not allowed to live in 
his writing.
603
The anxiety and edginess expressed in the extract from Theodor Adorno above 
reinforces his expression of unhappiness at living in exile, already suggested by my 
earlier reference to the fact that ‘at no moment during [his] emigration did [he] 
relinquish the hope of coming back’ – to Europe, to Germany.
604 Adorno’s personal 
experience of life in America, if unhappy, was not totally bereft of humour, as Anson 
Rabinbach has pointed out.
605 Nevertheless, it lead him to judge exile resolutely, I 
think, as cheerless, unsatisfying, gloomy. In his 1993 Reith lectures, Representations 
of the Intellectual, Edward Said on the other hand, in enthusing over the ideal of 
autonomy, reinterpreted exile and marginality in order to disclose their advantages 
rather than their associated anxieties.
606 It strikes me that, in reflecting both on the 
Arendtian public intellectual and on Arendt’s own personal achievement, Said’s 
thoughts about those ‘embarrassing troublemakers who do not toe the party line’, has 
some valuable insights to offer.
607  
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First, the exile is resourceful. He, or she, ‘learn[s] to make do in circumstances of 
shaky instability that would confound or terrify most people’.
608 ‘Knowledge and 
freedom’ acquire their meaning because of ‘experiences actually lived through’ rather 
than as a result of pure contemplation or abstract theorising.
609 To recall Hannah 
Arendt: ‘my assumption is that thought itself arises out of incidents of living 
experience and must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take 
its bearings’.
610 Thought alone, in other (Kantian) words, deprived of content would, 
of course, simply be empty. Arendt’s turn to politics and the contribution she made to 
political philosophy from the late nineteen fifties until her death in 1975 was rooted 
precisely in lived experience, the lived experience of having witnessed the 
appearance of totalitarianism and the attempted annihilation of European Jewry by 
the Nazis. It was these events that triggered a change in direction of her thought, 
though not in her basic concerns. In recounting the story of the origins of 
totalitarianism – ‘All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story 
about them’, she wrote, quoting the novelist, Isak Dinesen
611 – it suddenly occurred to 
her (‘dawned’ on her) that she was thinking about politics, not just history. 
Said has more to offer on this point, though: ‘Because the exile sees things both in 
terms of what has been left behind and what is actual here and now, there is a double 
perspective that never sees things in isolation’.
612 Hannah Arendt’s first major work, 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, was a study of a unique political phenomenon 
manifest through National Socialism and Stalinism. Yet her analysis of the forbidding 
and dehumanising isolation that the victims of the Nazi death camps and Soviet 
608 Ibid.
609 Ibid.
610 See footnote 62 above.
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Gulags were subjected to, did not apply just to the Nazi Germany or to Stalinist 
Russia. Arendt perceived the very same conditions that succeeded in reducing a life 
spent amongst others to one that denied their plurality, replicated in the mass society 
of her adopted homeland, the United States of America. If, having finished The 
Origins, she realised then, that she had been writing a book about politics even more 
than about history, it must surely have occurred to her too, that this was not a book 
purely about totalitarianism, but that it also addressed her current experience in 1950s 
America, exposing the iniquities of capitalism (though she never framed her 
arguments against capitalism, as such) and modern democracy too.
The second advantage of being an exiled intellectual that Said identified in his Reith 
Lectures involved ‘see[ing] things not simply as they are, but as they have come to be 
that way’.
613 Of course, such an attitude is not exclusive to the exiled intellectual, but 
again it was true of Hannah Arendt.  Her approach to thinking confirmed that trying 
to make the world intelligible to ourselves constitutes who we are as human beings. 
Human nature is not a given or fixed, something, that is distinct from whatever we 
might think about ourselves. Thinking about who we are and what, in fact, we are, 
turn out to be one and the same. Thus, notwithstanding the fundamental ontology that 
Arendt believed she had identified as conditioning human existence, she always 
believed that we are able to alter the way in which we live. Her thought was thus 
rooted in history from the start, as I have argued. We are not beings who have simply 
to obey laws of human nature from which we are unable to escape. It is possible for 
us to re-orient the way we think and respectfully reorganise ourselves by 
transfiguring institutions to which we are not bound to show passive reverence. To 
613 Ibid.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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this extent Arendt remained, I think, broadly in agreement with Heidegger, although 
not with the political theories of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau.
Finally, Said suggested, exile discharges the intellectual from conventional 
preoccupations and pursuits: ‘wherever you end up you cannot simply take up life 
and become just another citizen of the new place’.
614 Hannah Arendt, whatever else 
she may have been, certainly was never ‘just another citizen’. Unlike Walter 
Benjamin, who has been described as ‘a rag picker amongst the ruins’ (Benjamin 
himself used the expression in his essays on Charles Baudelaire, for example
615) on 
account of the fact that he never attained an academic post, Hannah Arendt lectured at 
Chicago and Columbia Universities, and, of course, at the New School for Social 
Research in New York.
616 However, while she was never isolated like Benjamin she 
was never part of the Establishment either, and never sought to be. She was too 
independent-minded and outspoken for that. ‘Exile’, observes Rajeev Patke, ‘gives 
Said’s intellectual a position oblique to society. In that condition, the intellectual 
becomes a conscientious critic of society, a champion of unorthodoxies and 
principles, and an antidote to the compromises of the assimilated insider’.
617 We have 
seen how Arendt’s ‘oblique’ approach to what occurred over Little Rock lost her 
friends. The same happened in respect of what she wrote about the Eichmann trial, A 
Report on the Banality of Evil. In addition to the public exchange of letters with 
Scholem to which I have already referred above, her longstanding friendship with 
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Hans Jonas suffered, for example. He dispatched to her in 1963, in response to what 
she had already published, a letter that expressed, not just his exasperation, but sheer 
despondency.
618 In it he wrote: 
When I read, with horror, the third article [Jonas is 
referring   to   the  New   Yorker]   of   “Eichmann   in 
Jerusalem,” I meant to implore you by telegraph to at 
least abstain from a German version. [...] But then, in 
mind of the lesson I increasingly learned over the 
years that you are not open to reasons, do not like 
listening to anyone and always simply want to be in 
the right, I said to myself: there is no point.
619 
Altercations of this sort, of which Hannah Arendt had more than a few, and her 
preference for staying on the fringes of society should not lead us to conclude 
however, that she spent her life isolated in an intellectual hinterland. Very far from it, 
she was, we might say, always well connected and never very far from the centre of 
events. And this should not come as a surprise. The essence of her thought and 
writings was from the start focussed, as I have tried to argue, on the question of what 
it means to be with others. Her teacher, Martin Heidegger, had introduced her to this 
question but I think that, for reasons I have set out above, the answer he provided in 
the course of addressing the ‘Being question’ painted a picture of Dasein and depicted 
the social life of ‘being-with-one-another’ in somewhat dispiriting terms that Hannah 
Arendt, ‘a real sunshine child’, simply felt herself unable to accept.
620 What I have 
tried to show therefore, is that in each of her works I have chosen to discuss, 
beginning with her 1929 dissertation on Saint Augustine’s treatment of love, first one 
and subsequently two questions, in effect, were continuously playing in her mind and 
618 The letter is published as ‘Appendix D’ in Christian Wiese, The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas (Waltham, 
Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 2007), 181–186.
619 Ibid., 181.
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set the context for what she wrote. The first question concerned whether an 
alternative depiction of being with others could be offered to counter Heidegger’s 
sombre portrayal of das Man. As early as the dissertation, she thought just such an 
alternative account was indeed possible and she looked to Saint Augustine for 
direction and illumination. At this time her response to Heideggerian ontology was 
formulated in empirical terms, in terms, that is, of human history. And Arendt 
continued to rely upon history, essentially Geschichte, significant moments that 
changed the course of thinking, as she went on to discuss the Jewish question, that is, 
the question specifically concerning the being of the Jews with non-Jews.   
It was with the appearance of what she would describe as totalitarian government that 
everything was to change, however. Already, we can see that prior to the events of the 
Second World War, Arendt, like Rilke, like Nietzsche, like Heidegger, was conscious 
that man’s relationship to God was no longer what it had been. If what Nietzsche had 
claimed was anything to go by, God was, in fact, dead and had been for some time. 
This pronouncement of seismic historical proportions in and of itself, of course, 
paved the way for, indeed demanded, new ways of thinking, a new way of orienting 
ourselves to the world. However, if totalitarianism and the Shoah only reinforced this, 
they did so by taking Hannah Arendt along untrodden paths. Still the question of what 
possibilities exist for being with others was, I think, at the forefront of her mind but, 
her political conversion, as it were, demonstrated that it was not only Heidegger to 
whom she needed to respond. Totalitarianism, a unique form of terror-based 
government, whose chilling logic it was to eradicate human plurality, was an evil that 
needed to be addressed.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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In doing so, the second question that perturbed Hannah Arendt, a question concerning 
the nature of the spaces in which beings can expect to encounter one another, manifest 
itself. If she had been unpersuaded that Heidegger’s environmental assessment of the 
practical relations between human beings exhausted all the possible accounts that 
could be given of the spatial dimensions in which such beings might meet with one 
another socially, totalitarianism demonstrated that it was the absurd intention of some 
to extinguish the space separating people altogether. In the twentieth century, the Nazi 
concentration and death camps and the Soviet Gulags were testimony to such insanity. 
What had this involved? It had involved the destruction of human dignity and 
integrity and enforcement of human beings living in proximity to one another as if 
there were no distinction between them, as if plurality were no longer a condition of 
human life on earth. Totalitarianism represented then, the death of politics. There was 
an even more sinister lesson to be learned, though. Arguably the most frightening 
consequence of making the horrors of totalitarianism intelligible, was, as I have 
attempted to argue, that Arendt identified in the social and political arrangements of 
the very countries that had combined to defeat Nazism, and which fiercely opposed 
Stalinism, a tendency to isolate their citizens in a manner, ironically, not dissimilar to 
that novel and calamitous form of government. In the nineteen sixties then, her focus 
shifted from the possibilities generally, of being with others, to specifically the nature 
of political being and to what is meant by public discourse. 
All of which brings me to an estimate of Hannah Arendt’s achievement. Near the end 
of my introductory chapter I gestured towards asking this question: would a political 
realm along the lines presented to us by Hannah Arendt serve us any better than our 
current arrangements? Perhaps with Habermas’ criticisms in mind, I asked, would the Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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public space to which her spectator-judges retreat – their ears tightly closed to so 
much of the daily buzzing inside the rest of the human swarm – reduce their chances 
of making the world around us intelligible rather than improve them? Was the ‘new 
concept of humanity’
621 Arendt had formulated by the nineteen sixties, indicating 
politicly astute and politically articulate beings, yet conditional upon a reconstituted 
and heavily censored public discourse, actually little more than a phantom? We are, 
of course, already aware of Arendt’s modesty underscored by the proposal with which 
she began The Human Condition to the effect that she would be concerned in that 
book with no more than thinking about what we are doing. I am not sure though, 
whether making intelligible the complex (the human condition) or the 
incomprehensible (totalitarianism), was her lasting achievement. In a rather different, 
though similarly self-effacing, personal reflection she indicated that in seeking to 
make sense of the world in which she was resident, to let it open up to her, she hoped 
she might ‘find [her] way around in reality without selling [her] soul to it the way 
people in earlier times sold their souls to the devil’.
622 I think that we should 
understand this to imply that her quest was not for an ultimate ur-experience; it was 
not even for the conceptual apparatus adequate to a much more limited task, 
relatively speaking, of understanding. Rather, finding her way around in the world 
surely involved her relations with others, something that was very important to her 
and something too, that was reflected as much in her philosophy as it was in her 
politics. I would speculate that, had totalitarianism never manifest itself, had there 
never been an attempt to annihilate European Jewry, Hannah Arendt would still have 
been concerned with the possibilities in regard to being-with-others. She would still 
have been intent on addressing, in response to Heidegger, those two fundamental 
621 See footnote 1.
622 Hannah Arendt, ‘Dedication to Karl Jaspers’ in EiU, 213.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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questions: is there a sense in which men can be together with each other in public that 
is not dictated by the Heideggerian depiction of das Man? Can there be a public space 
in which, when men discourse with each other, it is not questions that suggest merely 
practical solutions that preoccupy them? In answering ‘yes’ to both of these questions 
Hannah Arendt, in looking to the ancient Greeks for answers to her fundamental 
questions, as indeed Heidegger had looked to them for answers to the Being question, 
might have felt that hers was a more faithful appreciation of life in ancient in the polis 
than was her former teacher’s. Given their very different philosophical objectives, we 
should not be surprised by this, however.
In his 1962 review of Hannah Arendt’s Between Past and Future, Michael Oakeshott, 
Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics, distinguished 
between three types of intellectual historian.
623 First, there are those who project, as it 
were, a beam of light into some previously unexplored corner of the conceptual 
terrain throwing into relief ideas and beliefs heretofore ‘neglected’ thereby adding 
‘something to what we think of as our stock of knowledge’. Then there are those who, 
by shining light from a ‘new direction’ the source of which is a novel and authority-
claiming hypothesis, aspire to reconfigure even the ‘most solid conformations’ of the 
logical geography itself – an endeavour which, all too frequently in the judgement of 
the reviewer, produces more in the way of obfuscation than clarification due to the 
contentiousness of the hypotheses. Finally, there are those who resist the attraction of 
a single glowing organising premise, but who nevertheless possess the gift of being 
able to illuminate afresh what is already familiar ground populated by instantly 
recognisable features, such that ‘a new pattern of light and shade [transfigures] the 
623 Michael Oakeshott, Review of Hannah Arendt’s, Between Past and Future, in Political Science Quarterly, 
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whole landscape’.
624 In Oakeshott’s estimation, Hannah Arendt was such a 
luminary.
625 The judgement that she reminded us of what we already know but, 
perhaps, have forgotten, is I think, generous but plausible. However, I also think that 
of more profound import was the fact that she reminded us too, that thinking and the 
illumination it brings are, ultimately, dependent upon the company we keep and the 
conversations we engage in with others. Deprived of such company, thinking amounts 
to nothing. Of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing she wrote:
And yet he, who was polemical to the point of 
contentiousness, could no more endure loneliness 
than the excessive closeness of a brotherliness that 
obliterated all distinctions. He was never eager really 
to fall out with someone with whom he had entered 
into   a   dispute;   he   was   concerned   solely   with 
humanizing the world by incessant and continual 
discourse about its affairs and the things in it. He 
wanted to be the friend of many men, but no man’s 
brother.
626
With these words, Hannah Arendt could, I think, just as easily have been writing 
about herself.
624 Ibid., 88.
625 Oakeshott was, in this regard, at odds with Isaiah Berlin, who believed Hannah Arendt to be a hedgehog, 
guided by a single idea, rather than a fox open to many ideas. See Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An 
Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (London: Orion Books, 1992). 
626 Hannah Arendt, ‘On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing’, in Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark 
Times (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 30.Being Political and the Reconstitution of Public Discourse
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